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Abstract
The evolution of digital content and rapid expansion of data sources has raised the need for
streamlined monitoring, collection, storage and analysis of massive, heterogeneous data to
extract useful knowledge and support decision-making mechanisms. In this context, cloud
computing o↵ers extensive, cost-e↵ective and on demand computing resources that improve
the quality of services for users and also help service providers (enterprises, governments and
individuals). Service providers can avoid the expense of acquiring and maintaining IT resources
while migrating data and remotely managing processes including aggregation, monitoring and
analysis in cloud servers. However, privacy and security concerns of cloud computing services,
especially in storing sensitive data (e.g. personal, healthcare and financial) are major challenges
to the adoption of these services.
To overcome such barriers, several privacy-preserving techniques have been developed to
protect outsourced data in the cloud. Cryptography is a well-known mechanism that can
ensure data confidentiality in the cloud. Traditional cryptography techniques have the ability
to protect the data through encryption in cloud servers and data owners can retrieve and
decrypt data for their processing purposes. However, in this case, cloud users can use the
cloud resources for data storage but they cannot take full advantage of cloud-based processing
services. This raises the need to develop advanced cryptosystems that can protect data privacy,
both while in storage and in processing in the cloud. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) has gained
attention recently because it can preserve the privacy of data while it is stored and processed
in the cloud servers and data owners can retrieve and decrypt their processed data to their
own secure side. Therefore, HE o↵ers an end-to-end security mechanism that is a preferable
feature in cloud-based applications.
In this thesis, we developed innovative privacy-preserving cloud-based models based on
HE cryptosystems. This allowed us to build secure and advanced analytic models in various
fields. We began by designing and implementing a secure analytic cloud-based model based
xxi
on a lightweight HE cryptosystem. We used a private resident cloud entity, called ”privacy
manager”, as an intermediate communication server between data owners and public cloud
servers. The privacy manager handles analytical tasks that cannot be accomplished by the
lightweight HE cryptosystem. This model is convenient for several application domains that
require real-time responses. Data owners delegate their processing tasks to the privacy man-
ager, which then helps to automate analysis tasks without the need to interact with data
owners. We then developed a comprehensive, secure analytical model based on a Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE), that has more computational capability than the lightweight HE.
Although FHE can automate analysis tasks and avoid the use of the privacy manager entity, it
also leads to massive computational overhead. To overcome this issue, we took the advantage
of the massive cloud resources by designing a MapReduce model that massively parallelises
HE analytical tasks. Our parallelisation approach significantly speeds up the performance of
analysis computations based on FHE.
We then considered distributed analytic models where the data is generated from dis-
tributed heterogeneous sources such as healthcare and industrial sensors that are attached to
people or installed in a distributed-based manner. We developed a secure distributed analytic
model by re-designing several analytic algorithms (centroid-based and distribution-based clus-
tering) to adapt them into a secure distributed-based models based on FHE. Our distributed
analytic model was developed not only for distributed-based applications, but also it eliminates
FHE overhead obstacle by achieving high e ciency in FHE computations. Furthermore, the
distributed approach is scalable across three factors: analysis accuracy, execution time and the
amount of resources used. This scalability feature enables users to consider the requirements
of their analysis tasks based on these factors (e.g. users may have limited resources or time
constrains to accomplish their analysis tasks).
Finally, we designed and implemented two privacy-preserving real-time cloud-based appli-
cations to demonstrate the capabilities of HE cryptosystems, in terms of both e ciency and
computational capabilities for applications that require timely and reliable delivery of services.
First, we developed a secure cloud-based billing model for a sensor-enabled smart grid infras-
tructure by using lightweight HE. This model handled billing analysis tasks for individual users
in a secure manner without the need to interact with any trusted parties. Second, we built a
real-time secure health surveillance model for smarter health communities in the cloud. We
developed a secure change detection model based on an exponential smoothing technique to
predict future changes in health vital signs based on FHE. Moreover, we built an innovative
technique to parallelise FHE computations which significantly reduces computational overhead.
xxii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The world has seen a substantial rise in the use of social media, the Internet of Things (IoT)
and multimedia in recent years. This digital revolution and technological innovations have
exponentially increased the amount of data produced and stored [1]. This has given rise to
several challenges in terms of storing and processing massive and heterogeneous data in tradi-
tional systems that are non-scalable and limited in terms of storage and processing capabilities
[2]. In this context, cloud computing o↵ers a promising solution. It can outsource enterprises’
databases and their processing functionalities with elasticity and on-demand resources with a
high level of Quality of Service (QoS) and at low cost [3, 2]. Several enterprises (e.g. industrial,
healthcare) have already moved their applications and databases to the cloud. Data owners
benefit from the low cost of cloud-based computing (e.g. lower infrastructure investment) and
can improve their services through this platform. The limitation of this approach is that Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) have complete control over the data in their cloud storage and are,
therefore, required to be to be fully trustworthy. The maintenance of data confidentiality and
integrity is a key issue that must be addressed in cloud-based frameworks [4, 5, 6].
Unlike traditional computing systems, public cloud computing is vulnerable to various
external malicious attacks and internal misuse behaviours from CSPs. Although CSPs are
bound by regulations to protect cloud stored data, there is no guarantee that data is completely
secure as the cloud servers are distributed among di↵erent locations worldwide, each with their
own user data security and privacy policies. Data owners, therefore, have major concerns about
the security and privacy of their sensitive data in cloud computing, where there is a significant
risk of security breaches if well-defined security mechanism to protect their data are not applied.
Security models, such as access control and cryptography, play a critical role to preserve
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the privacy of sensitive data and to avoid any susceptible to leakage or loss [7]. Cryptographic
techniques are one of the most well-defined and e↵ective security mechanisms that can be
deployed to achieve high levels of data security in cloud computing [8]. They rely on well-
defined mathematical models that ensure data confidentiality during data transmitted, both
between entities and the cloud and also within cloud computing storage. In this regard, several
traditional cryptographic techniques have been developed to secure data in cloud storage, such
as symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems, where data is encrypted upon being sent to the
cloud computing. The encrypted data stored in the cloud can be retrieved by the authorised
user who has the decryption keys can then perform further processing on the plaintext data.
However, although these cryptosystems ensure data confidentiality in the cloud, they are not
suited to performing analysis tasks on encrypted data while it is stored in the cloud. This
prevents users from gaining the full computing power benefits of cloud resources and leads to
massive communication overhead between users and the cloud [9].
Hence, more convenient cryptosystems are required to overcome the limitations of tradi-
tional cryptographic techniques in cloud computing and which eliminate the need for massive
data exchange between cloud storage and data owners when processing data (e.g. data analy-
sis). One possible approach is to use a Trusted Third Party (TTP) (e.g. CSP). The TTP can
ensure the privacy of the data by collecting, processing and communicating with data owners
to retrieve analysis results in a secure manner. However, TTP models should not be applied
in cloud computing because they are not fully trusted and the data is vulnerable to misuse
by authorised parties when the stored data is not encrypted [10]. Therefore, the data in the
cloud-based models must be encrypted to ensure both data confidentiality and integrity. This
highlights the need for more advanced cryptosystems that have the ability to process data in
an encrypted domain.
Homomorphic cryptography has been introduced as the key solution to overcome this issue
in cloud-based models. The aim of homomorphic cryptography is protecting data through
encryption while it is stored and processed in the cloud. For example, data owners can use
homomorphic cryptography to encrypt and delegate their data computations to an untrusted
party (e.g. cloud computing) without revealing any information on which computations were
actually performed [11]. Although homomorphic cryptography can solve a major security
obstacle in cloud computing frameworks, most of the existing homomorphic cryptosystems
identified in the literature su↵er from either a lack of computational capabilities or massive
computational overhead [12].
This research aims to investigate the visibility of deploying homomorphic cryptography
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to develop practical privacy-preserving data analytics models in cloud computing for various
application domains. Moreover, the research strives to design e cient and scalable distributed
approaches to overcome the massive computational overhead of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) cryptosystems. These approaches will be used to build real-world application scenarios
that can benefit from secure cloud computing services.
1.1 Background and Motivations
Cloud computing has been introduced as an advanced computing paradigm to overcome the
limitations of traditional systems ability to deal with grwoing massive data associated with the
digital revolution [13, 14]. The unlimited and on-demand storage and processing capabilities
of cloud computing opens the doors to move analytics services from traditional based systems
to the cloud [15]. Data owners can send their data and delegate the analytic services to the
CSP which is considered a TTP. Several analytics-as-a-service applications in various domains,
such as healthcare, industrial and utility services, can be adapted e ciently in cloud computing
(Figure 1.1). According to Gartner Inc, by 2017 the global cloud computing services market will
reach $246.8 billion and by 2018 half of all IT spending will be on cloud-based and preferable
mechanism to deliver analytics services [16].
Nevertheless, cloud computing platforms are exposed to several risks and challenges related
to data security and privacy. This is one of the major concerns raised by data owners. Security
and privacy threads like data breaches or loss, and malicious attacks from outsiders or insiders
within CSPs, can lead to data theft or misuse [17]. Moreover, data in cloud computing needs to
be shared in an unrestricted manner with the service provider; an approach which is considered
to be highly risky and can cause a privacy vulnerability from the data owners perspective
[18]. Therefore, improvements to cloud computing security are required to make cloud a more
convenient platform for both individual users and enterprises. Data protection is an essential
requirement to build secure and reliable cloud-based frameworks for analytics services, and can
be achieved through applying the following main security properties:
• Data confidentiality – this property ensures that the data contents are not disclosed
by unauthorised parties. When data is outsourced to cloud computing storage, it means
the data is out of the data owners control. In such cases only the data owners are granted
privileges to access their data and all other parties including CSPs, must not access user
data without the data owners permission.
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Figure 1.1: An overview of applications domains that can benefit from privacy-preserving data
analytics model in cloud computing. Data owners can delegate their data analytic services to
the cloud computing securely.
• Data integrity – this property ensures the completeness and accuracy of the outsourced
data. Data owners expect trustworthy cloud storage that protects their data from any
malicious activities, including tampering, changing or deleting.
• Data availability – this property ensures the continuous availability of data and services
for data owners. The CSP must guarantee the availability of data to be accessed at any
time and place by the data owners or any other authorised party.
Cloud computing users must be involved in the management of data security mechanisms,
especially at the enterprises level where the consumers’ information can be highly sensitive. For
example, healthcare, social media and business customer data all contain highly confidential
information that needs to be secured against any leakage or loss.
To overcome these issues, several privacy-preserving techniques have been proposed in the
literature. These include authentication, authorisation, access control and cryptographic tech-
niques which can be used to ensure the confidently and integrity of outsourced data in the
cloud. Among the various privacy-preserving techniques, cryptography-based algorithms are
the most convenient approaches that have been developed in the context of privacy preserv-
ing data mining [8]. Broadly speaking, cryptography is a meaning to transform data from
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plaintext to ciphertext format, which makes it unreadable for security and privacy purposes.
Cryptographic techniques are mainly used to protect the exchange messages between di↵erent
parties from any malicious activities. In recent years, cryptographic techniques have played
a significant role in preserving data privacy while it is stored in cloud computing and pro-
viding cloud-based analytics services in a secure manner. Traditional cryptography algorithms
based on symmetric and asymmetric key encryption have been used to build privacy-preserving
models in cloud computing [19]. Traditional cryptographic techniques encrypt owners’ data
by using ecnryption keys on the secure side before sending it to cloud storage.Then, only au-
thorised uses who have access to decryption keys can download and decrypt data for further
processing.
Although traditional cryptographic techniques guarantee the privacy of data while it is
stored in the cloud, it is impractical for real-world scenarios as the data needs to be retrieved
and decrypted for processing (e.g. performing analytics services) [20]. Moreover, this leads
to significant communication overheads between the data owner side and cloud computing
storage. High computing capabilities are also required on the data owner side to process
massive amounts of data. These limitations can be a major obstacle when building a secure
cloud-based analytics services model and make cloud computing less attractive for individuals
and enterprises adaptation for data analysis.
Advanced cryptographic techniques are required to overcome the traditional techniques
limitation, specifically the ability to perform analysis computations on encrypted data in the
cloud. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) or privacy homomorphism, was introduced by Rivest,
Adleman, and Dertouzous in 1978 [21]. It has the ability to carry out arithmetic computa-
tions on encrypted data. HE has two main categories: Partially Homomorphic Encryption
(PHE) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). The FHE construction was an open prob-
lem until Gentry introduced the first fully homomorphic cryptosystem [22]. PHE refers to
lightweight cryptosystems that has a limited ability to perform computation over encrypted
data (e.g. either addition or multiplication) while FHE has an unlimited ability to perform
computations over encrypted data. HE breakthrough supports the migration to cloud com-
puting and motivates both individuals and enterprises to move their data and analytic services
to the cloud. However, HE techniques continue to su↵er from either an inability to perform
a variety of arithmetic computations or have a massive computations overhead [23]. There-
fore, our main objective of this research is to study the visibility of building privacy-preserving
analytics services models based on HE (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, the research proposes ef-
ficient and scalable homomorphic based models for various real-world applications, by taking
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the advantage of cloud computing.
1.2 Security and privacy challenges for cloud-based
applications
The cloud computing environment is exposed to several security and privacy vulnerabilities
which are obstacles for applications’ migration to the cloud. The cloud computing vulnerabili-
ties can be categorised in two main types: insider and outsider threats. Some of major sources
of threats are cloud services abusing, virtualisation vulnerabilities and side channel attacks.
Our focus is on the security and privacy of user data in an untrusted cloud environment. We
will provide a detailed description of the major sources of threats to user privacy, data contents
and data integrity in cloud-based applications. The adversaries activities from insiders (e.g.
CSP) or outsiders (e.g. hackers) can lead to data disclosure and leakage, data corruption or
loss, and unauthorised access [24].
The insider participants in cloud computing models, including CSP or other TTP, interact
with data owners during data processing in the cloud. The honest-but-curious threat model is
the assumption that exists in the majority of cloud-based application frameworks. This model
implies the CSP honestly follows the protocol setting, but is also curious about the data content
stored in its cloud servers [25] [26] [27]. The CSP is often curious and has the ability to explore
the stored data in their cloud servers. The CSP can procure a lot of information about the kinds
of data processing tasks undertaken and cloud users’ identifications and preferences. Access
to such information is of interest to the CSP as it can help to increase the e↵ectiveness of its
operations, however it can be a misuse of the data owners personal information. Furthermore,
outsider malicious activities aim to illegally access to data stored in cloud computing resources
and corrupt user data by changing or deleting, or to disrupt the cloud-based application services
[28]. Moreover, outsider malicious attackers can interfere in the communication between the
data owner side and the cloud computing to sni ng the data to analyse its content. The
outsider threats may lead to software and hardware failures, which e↵ect the availability of
data and services. This can be disastrous for the service provider, as user cloud service requests
can be denied and potentially incur costs associated with service interruptions or data loss.
Hence, protection of the data in cloud-based applications must be ensured to preserve user the
confidentiality and eliminate and the possibilities of both insider and outsider threats.
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Result = Decsk ( Evalpk
Key GenerationGenerate(secret key (sk),public key (pk))
Y = Enc(a+b) EvaluationY = EvalpkDecryptionDecsk (Y)
Encryption(E(a), E(b), pk )
Encrypteddata storage
(E(a), E(b))
(Enc(a), Enc(b)))
Figure 1.2: An overview of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) functionalities and its workflow. A
pair of secret and public keys (sk,pk) are generated where a public key (pk) is used to encrypt
plaintext values (a,b) and a secret key (sk) is used to decrypt the evaluated encrypted values
((E(a),E(b)).
1.3 Homomorphic encryption preliminaries
This section outlines the fundamental information underlying concepts about homomorphic
cryptography and approaches needed to understand the homomorphic cryptography paradigm.
1.3.1 Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
HE has been studied extensively in the last few years and its ability to perform computations
on encrypted data has inspired many researchers to deploy it in various real-world application
domains (e.g. financial, healthcare and Internet of things (IOT)). By using HE cryptosystems,
individuals and enterprises can delegate their homomorphic based encrypted data to any third
party to perform certain analysis tasks without the need to reveal the plaintext data, which
can raise several privacy issues. Figure 1.2 shows the main functionalities of Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) functionalities.
Data owners seek to protect their data while it is stored and managed by a third party,
like a cloud computing provider. HE was first proposed by Rivest [21] where the privacy
homomorphism concept was used to carry out computations in an encrypted domain. Subse-
quently, several other HE schemes have been proposed, such as ElGamal [29] and Paillier [30].
However, these schemes lack of the ability to carry out a variety of computational capabilities
on encrypted data. In 2009, Gentry [22] introduced the first breakthrough Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE) scheme. Broadly speaking, HE cryptosystems can be classified in two
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main categories: Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) cryptosystems and Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE) cryptosystems. Table 1.1 shows a selection of HE schemes from
both categories.
Table 1.1: Examples of homomorphic encryption cryptosystems with their properties.
Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
RSA [31] (Multiplication) Gentry [22]
Paillier [30] (Addition) Marten van Dijk et al. [32]
ElGamal [29] (Multiplication) Smart and Vercauteren [33]
Goldwasser-Micali [34] (Addition) BGV [35]
Benaloh [36] (Addition) (FHE schemes can perfrom unlimited
addition and multiplication operations)
1.3.1.1 Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) cryptosystems
A cryptosystem is considered to be partially homomorphic scheme if the encrypted compu-
tations that can be carried from its ciphertexts are either addition or multiplication but not
both. There are two types of partially homomorphic cryptosystems: additively and multi-
plicatively homomorphic encryption. PHE is a public key encryption f() = (PHE.KeyGen,
PHE.Enc, PHE.Dec, PHE.Evl), where all public keys (PHE.pk) and secret keys (PHE.sk)
that are generated from PHE.KeyGen(K), that can define groups of plaintext space (P) and
ciphtertext space (C) so that:
• PHE.Enc (m,Pk): the HE function takes a plaintext (m) from a plaintext space (P) as
input and the randomised space K determines the corresponding generated output (c)
from ciphertext space (C):
PHE.Enc (m, pk)  ! c m 2 P, pk 2 K, c 2 C
• PHE.Dec (c, sk): the homomorphic decryption function is the inverse process of encryp-
tion where a ciphertext c from ciphertext space (C) is the input of the decryption function
along with the corresponding sk from randomised space K and the output is a plaintext
(m) from a plaintext space (P):
PHE.Dec (c, sk)  ! m c 2 C, sk 2 K,m 2 P
• PHE.Evl (c1, c2): the homomorphic evaluation function involves arithmetic computa-
tions processing over encrypted data ( ) (addition or multiplication). For any two ci-
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phertext c1 and c2 that are corresponding to two homomorphically encrypted plaintext
values m1 and m2, we can carry out the arithmetic computation in encrypted domain as
follows:
PHE.Dec(PHE.Enc(m1)  PHE.Enc(m2)) = PHE.Dec(c1   c2) = m1  m2
Although PHE cryptosystems are lightweight and e cient in secure data processing for
cloud applications, they are restricted on the variety of computations. This makes them
impractical for the data analysis conducted in cloud-based frameworks [37]
1.3.1.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) cryptosystems
To support more e cient solutions in terms of computations capabilities, FHE can be used to
build a secure data analytics model in the cloud. FHE provides unlimited arithmetic compu-
tations based on both addition and multiplication operations.
Similar to the definition of PHE, FHE can be defined as f() = (FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc,
FHE.Dec, FHE.Evl) , where all public keys (FHE.pk) and secret keys (FHE.sk) that are
generated from FHE.KeyGen(K), that can define groups of plaintext space (P) and ciphter-
text space (C).
For all m1 and m2 2 P and c 2 C, FHE cryptosystems can perform both addition and
multiplication operations as follows:
FHE.Dec(FHE.Enc(m1)  FHE.Enc(m2)) = FHE.Dec(c1   c2) = m1  m2
FHE.Dec(FHE.Enc(m1)⌦ FHE.Enc(m2)) = FHE.Dec(c1 ⌦ c2) = m1 ⌦m2
The cryptosystems is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
In the 1970?s Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos proposed the first privacy homomorphic
scheme. But the ability to build FHE cryptosystems remained unknown for about 30 years. In
2009, Gentry [22] proposed a solution to build the first FHE cryptosystem. The initial idea was
based on a somewhat HE scheme using ideal-lattices [38] that can perform a limited number of
computations (addition and multiplication) on encrypted data. However, the encrypted result
become indecipherable due to created noise. Thereafter, Gentry improved the FHE scheme
through a refreshing mechanism that is applied periodically. This significantly reduces the
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encrypted data noise and has more capabilities to perform further encrypted addition and
multiplication operations without resulting in indecipherable outcomes.
Other subsequent FHE cryptosystems that achieve full homomorphism have been proposed,
including [32] [33], to name a few. However, performance overhead becomes a major obstacle
in the face of the practical implementation of FHE cryptosystems. Gentry, Halevi and Smart
proposed several optimisations for Learning With Errors (LWE)-based FHE schemes [39] [40]
[41]. Moreover, the Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme improved FHE
performance e ciency with a light weighted approach to refresh encrypted data and limit noise
growth. These optimisations improved the FHE cryptosystems in terms of both performance
and encrypted data size limitations. Compared with FHE schemes identified, the BGV scheme
with its implementation HElib is considered to one of the most e cient FHE cryptosystems.
For example, it speeds up performance from 36 hours in a homomorphic Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) scheme to only 3 hours [42]. With the growing need to process massive
amounts of data in recent years, more e cacious methods to process data homomorphically
are required to ensure the data privacy in the cloud computing environment.
1.4 Research challenges
We aim to develop various privacy-preserving analytic frameworks for cloud-based applications
where the provided services (e.g. analysis services) and the data is protected by HE in cloud
servers. The evolution of the digital world has led to an explosion in data collection and anal-
ysis over a variety of real-world applications, such as healthcare, utility and industry services,
which require real-time response to improve the quality assurance of services [43]. Unlike tradi-
tional systems, the adoption of cloud computing can play a vital role in improving the e ciency
and capabilities of services to manage and process large-scale data in various application do-
mains [3]. The data in such situations needs to be shared unrestricted with a CSP and is also
vulnerable to eavesdropping or security attacks by other malicious intruders or third parties
[18]. From this perspective several critical challenges are highlighted, particularly the security
and privacy issues [9]. These obstacles must be overcome in order to build comprehensive and
e cient privacy-preserving cloud-enabled applications. Ensuring end-to-end security commu-
nication and the ability to store and process sensitive data in a secure manner are essential
requirements to successfully migrate applications to the cloud computing environment.
Cryptographic techniques have been introduced as one of the most convenient mechanisms
to protect outsourced data in the cloud. The traditional cryptographic techniques, such as such
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as Advanced Encryption Standard [44] and RSA [21], have the ability to store data in the cloud
securely but cannot process data independently. In this case, data owners can either delegate
the processing permission by providing encryption/decryption keys to the CSP or download
and decrypt large amounts of the data from the cloud each time they want to process data.
This approach is impractical and does not take full advantage of cloud computing capabilities.
Being able to process data in a secure manner is a very desirable feature to realise the full
potential of cloud computing. It is essential to develop visible solutions for cloud-enabled ap-
plications that can outsource and process data in a secure manner without the need to interact
with data owners or expose the data content to any TTP. Recently, HE has been introduced to
enable such features, where the data can be processed in its encrypted form and the encrypted
results decrypted on the secure user side [11]. However, the existing HE solutions are far from
practical because they su↵er from either a lack of computational capabilities (e.g. PHE) or
huge computational overhead (e.g. FHE). Therefore, it is important to explore and improve
HE cryptosystems to develop e cient and privacy-preserving cloud-enabled applications. Im-
proving HE solutions in terms of computational capabilities and performance e ciency would
contribute substantially to provision of independent and secure paradigms for outsourcing,
managing and real-time processing (e.g. analytic services) data in cloud computing.
Moreover, the rapid growth of a variety of pervasive monitoring and ubiquitous computing
applications [45] has generated an overwhelming data flow from many sources, such as real-time
monitoring and Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. This raises several challenges in terms of storing
and processing large-scale and heterogeneous data [2]. In this context, developing scalable
and distributed approaches for data mining plays a vital role in the extraction of meaningful
knowledge from massive data [46] for cloud-enabled applications. More specifically, clustering,
as a data mining technique is increasingly being adopted in real-time data processing in the
medical, utility and industrial fields, particularly in regards to anomaly detection and data
segmentation. Therefore, the cloud computing paradigm can be utilised to build a new genera-
tion of distributed and scalable data clustering algorithms with unlimited capabilities to store
and process huge and heterogeneous data [2]. In this research, we introduce privacy-preserving
cloud-based data analytic frameworks while using improved versions of HE cryptosystems to
protect data. Furthermore, we propose distributed data mining approaches to further improve
the e ciency of both encrypted computational performance and analysis accuracy for cloud-
enabled applications. This is important to meet the need for secure large-scale processing
frameworks in the cloud.
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1.5 Research Questions
To address the aforementioned research challenges, we identify the following research questions,
with the overall aim to develop e cient privacy-preserving data analytics cloud-enabled appli-
cations using Homomorphic Encryption (HE) cryptosystems. We aim to design and implement
various models to answer these questions. There are three main research questions which will
be addressed in this thesis:
• Research Question 1 (RQ-1): How to develop an e cient privacy-preserving analytic
model based on lightweight Homomorphic Encryption (HE) in cloud computing?
This research question addresses the issue of developing an e cient cloud-based model
based on a lightweight HE cryptosystem. In this question, we use Domingo-Ferrer’s
additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism scheme [47], that is a lightweight
and e cient cryptosystem in terms of computational performance. The significance of
addressing this issue is to provide a visible solution to protect stored and processed data
that is capable of performing certain analysis tasks e ciently with the help of a private
cloud-based entity. This approach overcomes some of the limitations in computational
capabilities of the lightweight HE cryptosystem required for data analytics.
• Research Question 2 (RQ-2): How to develop a secure analytic model based on Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) in the cloud?
This research question overcomes the limitations of lightweight HE cryptosystems by
utilising a FHE cryptosystem. In this question, we use Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikun-
tanathan (BGV) cryptosystem [35] to develop a cloud-based framework that has com-
plete computation capabilities for data analytics. However, BGV as with most of FHE
cryptosystems su↵er from huge performance overhead. The massive cloud resources are
utilised to parallelise homomorphic computations to speed up performance. The signif-
icance of addressing this issue is to provide a comprehensive solution that completely
automates cloud-enabled analytic services in an e cient and secure manner.
• Research Question 3 (RQ-3): How to build a distributed and scalable approach for
cloud-enabled analytic services based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)?
Using the data analytic cloud-based model based on the FHE cryptosystem developed
in Research Question 2, this research question addresses the issues of scalability and
e ciency of analysis tasks processing. A distributed data analysis approach is developed
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to provide more e cient performance for encrypted data based on FHE. This approach
is applicable to various data analysis algorithms (e.g. centroid-based clustering and
distribution-based clustering).
• Research Question 4 (RQ-4): How to design and implement privacy-preserving real-
time analytic applications based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE) in cloud?
This research question demonstrates the capabilities of HE cryptosystems to build real-
world applications that require real-time response and reliable delivery of services. Two
applications models from smart grid and healthcare fields are developed, based on the HE
cryptosystems presented in Research Questions 2 and 3. In the first application, we show
how the lightweight HE cryptosystem carries out analysis tasks for a smart grid billing
system. In the second application, a real-time health surveillance model is build based
on FHE and a novel disturbed-based approach is developed to enhance the performance
of FHE computations.
1.6 Research Contributions
The contributions of this research are summarised as follows:
– Privacy-preserving anomaly detection in the cloud with lightweight ho-
momorphic approach.
In Research Question 1 (RQ-1), we propose a practical privacy-preserving cloud-
based data analytics model based on the lightweight homomorphic cryptosystem.
The outsourced data is protected by HE, which can store and process data in an
encrypted domain. To overcome the computational limitations of lightweight HE, we
build a private cloud-based entity to perform computations that cannot be carried
out on encrypted data. This entity is managed by the data owners who interact with
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) securely. The model is tested by implementing
data analytics algorithms for cloud-enabled anomaly detection applications in the
Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Overall, this innovative model enables e cient and
secure data processing for a wide range of applications in various fields.
– Privacy-preserving anomaly detection in the cloud based on fully homo-
morphic encryption
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In Research Question 2 (RQ-2), we develop a scalable, cloud-based model to pro-
vide a privacy preserving data analytics service for quality assured decision-making.
FHE is employed to preserve data privacy during analysis and MapReduce based
distribution of tasks and parallelisation is used to overcome computational overheads
associated with FHE cryptosystem. An experimental evaluation demonstrates that
a high level of accuracy is maintained for analysis tasks performed on encrypted
data and that the adopted distributed data processing approach significantly re-
duces associated computational overheads.
– Towards secure and scalable cloud-enabled big data analytics.
In Research Question 3 (RQ-3), we develop a distributed approach for cloud-enabled
big data analytic services. This approach addresses the inevitable challenge of pro-
cessing distributed and massive data in the cloud using FHE cryptosystem. We de-
sign a distributed-based analytic model for various data mining algorithms (in this
case, centroid-based clustering) in such a way that they are adequate for distributed-
based applications. This model also significantly speeds up computational perfor-
mance while preserving high levels of analysis accuracy. Experimental evaluation
demonstrates the e ciency of the proposed framework, in terms of both analysis
performance and accuracy, for building a secure big data analytic cloud-enabled
application.
– Privacy-preserving expectation-maximisation for gaussian mixture mod-
eling in the cloud.
Building on previous research contribution in (RQ-3), we build a distributed Expec-
tation Maximization EM model for cloud computing applications. In this case, we
deploy the distribution-based clustering technique to demonstrate the applicability
of using our distributed approach in a variety of clustering algorithms. We imple-
ment an e cient and secure EM for Gaussian Mixture Modeling (GMM), which
provides the advantages of a distributed processing model. Experiments show a
significant improvement in convergence time of the distributed EM algorithm, with
a high level of accuracy achieved and a reduction in FHE associated computational
overheads.
– Privacy-preserving real-time applications in cloud computing:
In Research Question 4 (RQ-4), we develop privacy-preserving real-world applica-
tions to demonstrate the capabilities of HE cryptosystems, in terms of both compu-
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tational and e ciency capabilities for applications that require timely and reliable
delivery of services. We design and implement two application models: the first is a
privacy-preserving billing cloud-based model based on the lightweight homomorphic
cryptosystem. This model performs real-time analytic tasks on aggregated smart
grid data in a secure manner. The second is a secure real-time health surveillance
monitoring and diagnosing model for smarter health communities. In this model,
we demonstrate the capabilities of FHE adaptation to perform analysis tasks on
encrypted healthcare data.
1. Application 1: Privacy-preserving real-time billing system with lightweight
homomorphic encryption
Integration of sensor-enabled smart grid infrastructure with cloud-based data
storage and analysis has the potential to significantly enhance the e ciency,
resilience and adaptability of smart infrastructure management. In this re-
search, we propose a secure and practical billing model using lightweight HE
within a cloud-based data processing framework. Di↵erent privacy issues are
demonstrated, including the illustration of possible secure scenarios to preserve
consumers’ privacy through HE. Moving billing management into the cloud
securely, with privacy preserving, on-demand data retrieval and statistical com-
putations is a major strength of our proposed model.
2. Application 2: Real-time secure health surveillance for smarter health
communities.
Pervasive healthcare services and technologies in smart communities can im-
prove the health and quality of life of residents. Real-time health surveillance
for the early detection of life-threatening diseases, through advanced sensing
and communication technology, can provide better treatment, reduce medical
expenses and save lives of community residents (i.e. patients). However, the
assurance of data privacy is the biggest concern for such smart health technolo-
gies. This research aims to describe a privacy-preserving cloud-based system for
real-time surveillance through change detection of multiple vital signs of smart
community residents. Residents are highly concerned about the privacy of their
medical data when it is processed in a third party (e.g. cloud computing) en-
vironment. In this research, we develop a secure change detection model based
on an exponential smoothing technique to predict future changes in various
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health vital signs. FHE is adapted to perform computations in an encrypted
domain, which can ensure the privacy of the patients’ raw data. Moreover, we
introduce an innovative technique to parallelise encrypted computations which
significantly reduces the overhead of FHE computations. We demonstrate the
proposed model by evaluating case studies for di↵erent health vital signs of
patients. The accuracy and e ciency outcomes for the implementation demon-
strate the e↵ectiveness of the proposed model.
1.7 Thesis organisation
The remaining chapters in this thesis are organised as follows:
• Chapter 2: Privacy-preserving anomaly detection in the cloud with a lightweight
homomorphic approach. This chapter describes the solution to RQ-1. Here we intro-
duce a secure cloud-based analytic model based on a lightweight homomorphic approach.
The main contributions to this chapter corresponds to [48].
• Chapter 3: Privacy-preserving anomaly detection in the cloud for quality
assured decision-making in smart cities. This chapter describes the solution to
RQ-2. The model proposed for RQ-1 relies on FHE, while this model relies on FHE,
which helps to eliminate the need for interaction with any trusted parties and the cloud-
based solution can completely automate the analysis tasks. The primary focus of this
chapter is to provide a secure, practical and visible model for analytic services in the
cloud, based on FHE. FHE capabilities are improved to meet the needs for floating-point
numbers computations. The primary contributions of this chapter appear in [49].
• Chapter 4: Privacy-preserving distributed analytics based on Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE) in cloud computing This chapter describes the solu-
tion to RQ-3. Here we introduce a privacy-preserving distributed analytic cloud-based
model based on FHE. This chapter has two sections; firstly a description of the proposed
distributed approach and how it is applied in centroid-based clustering algorithms and
secondly, the adaption of the proposed approach in distributed-based clustering algorithm
(in this case, Expectation Maximization (EM)).
– 4.1: Towards secure and scalable big data analytics frameworks for cloud-
enabled applications. This section describes a distributed and scalable approach
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for analytic services based on FHE. This improves the scalability and e ciency of
FHE computations compared to the proposed model in Chapter 3. It focuses on
the development of a distributed approach for centroid-based clustering algorithms
to rapidly improve performance of analysis tasks carried in encrypted form.
– 4.2: Privacy-preserving Expectation Maximization (EM) for Gaussian
Mixture Modelling (GMM) in the cloud. This section describes how the
developed distributed approach can be applied in a distribution-based clustering
algorithms (in this case, the EM algorithm). A distributed EM for Gaussian Mixture
Modelling (GMM) is designed and implemented to show the applicability of the
proposed distributed approach for variety of data mining algorithms.
• Chapter 5: Real-time cloud-based applications based on Homomorphic En-
cryption (HE) This chapter describes the solution to RQ-4. We design and implement
two secure real-time application models based on the applied homomorphic-based cryp-
tosystems. The first application is a privacy-preserving billing cloud-based model based
on the lightweight homomorphic cryptosystem, presented in Chapter 2. The second ap-
plication is a secure real-time health surveillance monitoring and diagnosing model based
FHE, presented in Chapter 3.
– 5.1: Privacy-preserving real-time billing system with lightweight Homo-
morphic Encryption (HE) in the cloud. This section presents a secure and
practical smart grid billing model in the cloud. It shows how smart grid data can be
stored, managed and processed in a cloud-enabled framework based on lightweight
HE. The primary contributions of this work appear in [50].
– 5.2: Real-time secure health surveillance for smarter health communi-
ties. This section presents privacy-preserving real-time analytic services for smart
healthcare communities. It describes a secure change detection model for multiple
health vital signs of smart community members based on FHE. A distributed ap-
proach is developed for the change detection algorithm (Holt’s linear trend method)
to overcome the FHE computations overhead, through distributing analysis tasks
computations among a large set of Virtual Machines (VMs) in the cloud.
• Chapter 6: Conclusion. This chapter concludes the thesis with a discussion of the
key findings, main contributions and research significance. Limitations of the developed
17
models are also addressed. This thesis concludes with a consideration of future research
directions.
The four core chapters (Chapters 2-5) are presented in a standalone and self-explanatory
manner as shown in Figure 1.3. Therefore, the relevant context including related work
discussion, description of architecture, model and experimental results are presented in
each of these chapters separately.
Figure 1.3: A summary of research thesis contributions and chapter organizations
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Chapter 2
Privacy-preserving anomaly
detection in the cloud with
lightweight homomorphic
approach
Abstract
Cloud computing has critical privacy and security concerns. In Chapter 1, we
presented our approach to overcome these issues through development of privacy-
preserving analytics models that ensure the privacy of users’ sensitive data while ac-
complishing various analytic services. This chapter introduces a privacy-preserving
anomaly detection cloud-based model for large-scale, complex and dynamic data;
an essential service that is vital to enable smart functionality in most systems. In-
creased reliance on cloud computing infrastructures to process such data pose critical
challenges with regard to security and privacy. Our model takes advantage of cloud
resources to provide a lightweight and scalable privacy preserving anomaly detection
service for sensor data. A lightweight Homomorphic Encryption (HE) scheme is used
to ensure data security and privacy with computational limitations overcome through
a convenient data processing model that employs a private server collaborating with
a set of public servers within a cloud data centre. Virtual nodes implemented on
public servers perform granular anomaly detection operations on encrypted data.
Comprehensive experimentation demonstrates consistently high detection accuracy
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with less overheads in a cloud-based anomaly detection model. This approach is both
lightweight and scalable, and ensures data privacy.
2.1 Introduction
In the current networked landscape, smart functionality over various services is enabled
through the implementation of continuous, ubiquitous sensing and the analysis of gath-
ered data. A key application in this context is to ensure the privacy of the data that may
be compromised due to faulty sensors, malware corruption or various security attacks
through an e↵ective anomaly detection procedure. This is an increasingly vital task to
be performed prior to the various analysis techniques that work to extract knowledge
and enable decision support in di↵erent applications [51]. The exponential growth in
the amounts of data collected on these applications lead to significant challenges that
relate to the underlying large-scale, heterogeneity and complexity of data while provid-
ing e cient and scalable anomaly detection services [2]. Essentially, the recent big data
paradigm in these application areas with variety, volume and veracity creates significant
challenges in terms of the computational and storage capabilities with regard to provid-
ing timely analysis for decision support [52]. These challenges are increasingly overcome
by adapting cloud computing technology to provide a convenient framework in imple-
menting services like anomaly detection on such applications [53]. Therefore, large-scale
data processing is moving towards a cloud computing paradigm that has access to signif-
icant computational capabilities with massive storage capacity and supports distributed
on-demand access [54]. These cloud features can be exploited in a manner that leads
to improvements in performance and e ciency of anomaly detection services when com-
pared to traditional data processing approaches for anomaly detection, which are mostly
non-scalable given the current landscape of big data analytics.
However, despite the benefits of adapting a cloud computing paradigm for enabling e -
cient anomaly detection services, significant challenges in data security and privacy have
to be overcome [55]. Most applications, ranging from industrial and machine monitoring
to personal healthcare systems, deal with private data sets that cannot be exposed to any
third party due to individual sensitivity or the risk of compromising corporate privacy.
A key concern for owners of such data is whether they have control over their data irre-
spective of where it is located in the data processing infrastructure [56]. In this regard,
various solutions have been proposed based on di↵erent perspectives such as cryptogra-
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Figure 2.1: A variety of applications that generate large-scale data require anomaly detection
to enable smart functionality and decision support. The large volumes of data and the need
for e cient data processing facilities mandates the use of cloud infrastructure which introduces
critical problems of data ownership, security and privacy.
phy and third party participation [57] to ensure the security and privacy of cloud-based
data processing. These facts are illustrated in a summarised manner in Figure 2.1. The
focus of this work is therefore, to provide an e↵ective cryptographic data processing
model to preserve data privacy in performing anomaly detection as a cloud-based service
for large-scale and distributed data applications. We investigate the viability of adopting
an e cient Lightweight Homomorphic Encryption technique that supports mathematical
computations on encrypted data for such a distributed cloud-based anomaly detection
framework.
More specifically, we propose a secure cloud-based data processing solution for large-
scale sensor data anomaly detection that is both scalable and adaptive for large amounts
of dynamic data streams while preserving individual data privacy. Sensor data is first
encrypted using a lightweight Homomorphic Encryption (HE) scheme before being com-
municated to the cloud infrastructure for analysis while keeping the network topology
information of the original network intact. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the pro-
posed architecture consisting of the particular cloud infrastructure and the application.
A key feature of this architecture is that each data centre that handles a certain organisa-
tion’s data consists of a single private server owned by that organisation. This particular
server will handle some limited operations that are not supported by the adapted HE
scheme with regard to implementation of the anomaly detection service. All other oper-
ations on the encrypted data will be performed by the public servers in the cloud data
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Figure 2.2: An overview of the cloud computing architecture proposed for privacy-preserving
anomaly detection as a service in cloud. Organisations can delegate specific anomaly detection
tasks to the cloud where public servers collaborate with a private server to perform required
sub-tasks in a secure manner with homomorphic encryption.
centre. As the private server is assumed to be in the same data centre there are no
unsustainable communication overheads. The di↵erent data analytics tasks in the pro-
posed anomaly detection algorithm are mapped onto separate virtual machines on the
public cloud in a manner that reflects the network architecture of the source sensor net-
work application. Tasks that require a computation tasks beyond the capability of the
lightweight encryption scheme employed are performed on the private server.
The specific anomaly detection technique used in the proposed framework is based on
the work presented in [58] and uses a distributed and fuzzy data clustering scheme to
e ciently partition the data and classify anomalies. The distributed data clustering
procedure is therefore adopted in the proposed framework over the introduced cloud
computing architecture as depicted in Figure 2.2. Di↵erent phases of the data clustering
and anomaly detection scheme over a distributed hierarchical topology is to be processed
through virtual machines (VMs) that are dynamically managed by a VM management
process. Figure 2.3 illustrates this mapping process with the cluster analysis tasks per-
formed hierarchically over the cloud computing architecture by leveraging di↵erent VM
22
entities in communication with the private server. Overall the proposed framework works
to further increase the e ciency of the original cluster-analysis process for anomaly de-
tection proposed in [58] by leveraging on the cloud infrastructure.
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Figure 2.3: Hierarchical distributed data processing architecture for lightweight and privacy
preserving anomaly detection. The hierarchical clustering process to facilitate anomaly detec-
tion (based on Kumarage et al [58]) is moved to the cloud in a compatible manner where the
data processing sensor nodes are mapped to hierarchical structure of virtual machines (VMs).
In the proposed model, both private and collaborative public cloud servers collaborate to man-
age and perform clustering tasks securely and a privacy-preserving manner while located in
the same data centre.
2.1.1 Contribution
The proposed model in this work solves the key issues of providing a scalable anomaly
detection service for large-scale heterogeneous data by leveraging on cloud resources
through a secure and privacy-preserving data processing approach. The privacy of the
data in the proposed model is ensured by utilising an appropriate HE technique prior to
processing the data. A major concern in this context is the e ciency of the underlying
homomorphic scheme. The specific contributions of the work can be highlighted as
follows.
– A cloud-based data processing model is presented for performing anomaly detec-
tion in a privacy-preserving manner for large-scale sensor data. Data processing is
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performed in a public cloud data centre complemented by a single server that is
owned privately by the organisation that requires the analytics service and owns the
data. Lightweight HE is applied on all sensed data prior to analysis on the cloud.
However, due to limitations in current HE methodologies some of the required op-
erations in the overall anomaly detection scheme (e.g. division operations) have
to be done on decrypted data. These operations are done on the trusted private
server while all other operations are performed in the public cloud infrastructure
on the encrypted data itself. The communication between these two entities is
encrypted to ensure end-end privacy and there are very few communication costs
as the private server is located in the public data centre itself. It is shown that
this model is capable of performing anomaly detection as a cloud-based service
both accurately and e ciently through a distribution of di↵erent analytical tasks
in the cloud infrastructure. A lightweight HE scheme that is able to carry compu-
tations on data while it is encrypted, is used to protect data privacy in the cloud
computing infrastructure. Specifically, Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplica-
tive privacy homomorphism scheme [47] is employed due to its relative simplicity
in implementation as well as scalability aspects to encrypt all data prior to com-
munication and processing. Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme is shown to be particularly
successful in maintaining trade-o↵ between performance e ciency and computa-
tional capabilities when compared to other potential schemes.
– In addition, we provide a detailed description of the di↵erent secure operations
and their implementation in the proposed hybrid data processing model between
a private server and the public cloud infrastructure. In the evaluation section, re-
sults of comprehensive experimentation demonstrate that the proposed framework
can preserve data privacy without a↵ecting the accuracy of the anomaly detection
process. Comparisons for detection accuracy between plaintext and ciphertext are
presented to be comparable with our previous work [58] where the same anomaly
detection model was applied on non-encrypted data on a more resource constrained
non-cloud environment. Experiment results of privacy-preserving anomaly detec-
tion show an average sensitivity of 95% and an average specificity of 99% with a
high processing e ciency.
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2.2 Related work
In this section, we briefly review recent research on privacy-preserving data mining on
cloud computing.
Secure computation allows single or multiple parties to execute specific functions on data
inputs and return results without compromising data privacy. In practice, several appli-
cations have single or multiparty computations, especially those that perform statistical
analysis computations shared by distributed multiparties. The main concern with such
applications is how to preserve data privacy while retaining the desired analytic func-
tionality. In this work, we focus on cryptographic approaches that are used to secure
cloud-based computations for massive amounts of data. Although several cryptographic
techniques can be adapted to secure cloud-based computations, we focus our discussion
on the following approaches that can be considered as candidates to achieve privacy pre-
serving data computation in a scalable and lightweight manner [59]; Secure multiparty
computation (SMC), verifiable computation (VC) and Homomorphic Encryption (HE).
SMC was introduced by Yao [60] and extended to multiparties by Chaum, Cr`epeau, and
Damg˚ard [61]. This is considered an important part of cryptography concepts and is
directly involved in data analysis applications. In general, there are two common tech-
niques for multiparty computations: garbled circuits, such as [62], and secret sharing,
such as [61] and [63]. These techniques are involved in many existing multiparty com-
putation protocols in cloud computing. However, SMC techniques are either exposed
to several security vulnerabilities from shared parties (e.g. Trusted Third Party (TTP))
which may be corrupted by an adversary [59] or have high communication overheads.
Especially in case of large-scale data, extensive communications occur between parties or
within a TTP to perform computations in a secure manner.
Verifiable computation (VC), as in Pinocchio [64], allows the data owners to check the
integrity of performed computations. In the VC scheme, the data owner gives the data,
along with the requirements of the computation desired, to a powerful entity, called the
prover. The prover then outputs the result of the required computation, along with a
proof of the output correctness. The VC is mainly used to ensure data integrity while
it is delegated to a cloud-based provider to perform specific computations. However,
it does not support data confidentiality compared with both SMC and HE approaches,
which is an essential requirement when data computation is delegated to an untrusted
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Table 2.1: Homomorphic Cryptosystems
Cryptosystem Additively HE Multiplicative HE Key Type Security Aspect
Paillier [30] X Asymmetric Semantically secure
El-Gamal [29] X Asymmetric Semantically secure
Okamoto-Uchiyama
[71]
X Asymmetric Provably secure
Naccache-Stern [72] X Asymmetric Semantically secure
RSA [21] X Asymmetric Not semantically secure
Domingo-Ferrer [47] X X Symmetric
Secure against chosen
ciphertext attack
cloud-based provider.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) on other hand, has the ability to perform computations
directly on encrypted data as if it is performed on plaintext data. We believe that HE can
be an ideal and convenient approach compared to others, as it does not require interaction
between parties to perform computations and avoids the need to have a TTP which may
lead to several security vulnerabilities. HE has existed since the inception of public key
cryptography. Examples of HE include RSA [21] ElGamal [29] Benaloh [65] and Paillier
[30]. However, these are somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) schemes, which can
only support a limited number of operations (either addition or multiplication, not both).
A number of these schemes fail to be appropriate for practical applications because they
are often ine cient and are unable to perform a variety of arithmetic computations that
are required to build useful applications in cloud.
In contrast a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme would support a variety of
arithmetic computations simultaneously. This was a major goal that remained unatained
until the breakthrough result of Gentry [66], which is based on the properties of ideal
lattices [65]. Shortly after, several FHE schemes were developed, such as Brakersk et al.
[67] and other [68, 69]. While these schemes are proposed to reduce the complexity of
an original FHE scheme [66], they are still impractical for use in large-scale applications
due to a common drawback: they include computational overheads in terms of e ciency
and execution time that are impractical over current cloud applications. This led to the
conclusion that FHE is not e cient enough for practical applications, especially in a
cloud paradigm. Table 2.1 shows some selected HE techniques and their capabilities. A
comprehensive review of HE techniques is given in [70].
Considering the limitations discussed above, we adapt a lightweight and provably secure
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additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism scheme [47] which has the ability
to securely perform main basic arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction and mul-
tiplication) on encrypted data. It is a symmetric-key encryption scheme that is secure
against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) [73]. Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme is characterised
by lightweight and e cient computational capabilities when compared with other HE
schemes. Also, it can perform an unlimited variety of arithmetic operations securely
based on homomorphic properties. These features make Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme a con-
venient solution to preserving the privacy of cloud applications. We believe that the
Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism scheme [47] is one
of the most applicable HE schemes for data analysis purposes. Indeed, it has a con-
venient encryption/decryption mechanism, which helps to e ciently implement di↵erent
tasks and operations on various cloud-based applications. A brief but detailed description
of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme is included in section 2.3.
2.3 Lightweight privacy-preserving model for anomaly
detection in cloud
In the section, we propose a scalable and privacy preserving model for cloud based
anomaly detection using a lightweight homomorphic approach. Our model is imple-
mented to perform distributed data clustering for anomaly detection on encrypted data
by leveraging on the reliability and scalability of cloud computing resources. However,
an anomaly detection scheme, as in any other data analysis technique, involves vari-
ous mathematical computations; some of which cannot be carried out completely on an
encrypted domain based on existing homomorphic schemes with tolerable levels of com-
putational complexity. We overcome this issue by adapting the privacy manager concept
[74] through a secure privately-owned server entity collaboration within a public cloud
data centre.
The proposed model can therefore perform secure computations that are required (addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, division and comparison) by using HE within the public
cloud computing infrastructure, complemented by the private server (the privacy man-
ager). The computations to be performed in this server are those that need decryption
due to limitations in the adapted HE scheme. However, as it is assumed that this server
belongs to the client organisation as a trusted entity while located in the same public
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cloud data centre where the analytics service is carried out, the communication over-
heads that occur in such situations where data need to be communicated to this server
are mitigated.
In detail, the proposed model has two main entities. The first is the private server that is
assumed to be located in the public cloud infrastructure. It is responsible for managing
both plaintext and ciphertext data and also encryption/decryption mechanisms which
must be performed in a secure manner with regard to the specific operations that cannot
be performed without decryption in the public cloud infrastructure. The second entity is
the collaborative servers with individual virtual machines (VMs) that are considered to
be public servers within a public cloud computing environment and are responsible for
performing data analysis computations that can be performed on ciphertext. These two
entities collaborate in the proposed model to perform scalable anomaly detection on data
that is encrypted using a HE scheme. We look at the specific sub tasks of homomorphic
encryption and data clustering and anomaly detection in the next sections. These are
followed by sections describing the overall system workflow and a security analysis dis-
cussion.
2.3.1 Lightweight homomorphic encryption
We build our model based on HE that can ensure end-to-end security. Domingo-Ferrer’s
additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism scheme [47] is considered a lightweight
HE scheme in this aspect. We illustrate Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme specification in detail
below.
The Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme has two groups of parameters: public parameters ( m ,
v ), and private parameters ( mˆ , rˆ ).
– The two public parameters are represented by a large integer with many divisors
(m) and a small integer that determines a vector space (v), which is a correspond-
ing ciphertext of a plaintext value.
– The two secret parameters are represented by a small divisor of m, (mˆ) where
mˆ > 1 and (rˆ) 2 Zm, where r 1 modulus m must exist.
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There are two levels of operations where the classified level is a secure entity that perform
initial encryption operations and final decryption operations; the unclassified level is in a
public environment and can perform mathematical computation on encrypted data (e.g.
public cloud computing).
– DF.Encryption (a , m , mˆ , rˆ): The encryption operation has two stages.
Transformation stage where a plaintext value a 2 Zmˆ is split into a set of
random values (a1, a2..., av), where v is a number of elements in a vector for each
transformed plaintext value. The encryption stage is where vector elements are
encrypted individually. A generated vector for each plaintext value has to satisfy
the following constraint:
a =
vX
i=1
ai mod mˆ where ai 2 Zm (2.1)
We then perform an encryption operation for the vector elements as follows.
E(a) = (a1rˆ
1 mod m, a2rˆ
2 mod m, ... , av rˆ
v mod m) (2.2)
– DF.Decryption(E(a) , m , mˆ , rˆ 1): The decryption operation is performed
by computing a scalar product of the ith element of a vector by r i mod m to find
ai mod m as follows:
(a1r
 1 mod m, a2r 2 mod m, ... , adr d mod m) (2.3)
Next, we aggregate vector elements and, recalling Equation (2.1), retrieve a plain-
text value of E(a) as follows:
a =
vX
i=1
ai mod mˆ (2.4)
Algorithm 1 illustrates the encryption and decryption operations in more detail.
The arithmetic computations on encrypted domain are carried out over (Zm)v in
a public cloud computing environment (an unclassified level).
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Algorithm 1 Encryption and decryption operations
1: Inputs: a plaintext value a , m , mˆ , v , rˆ
2: Outputs: < E(a1) , E(a2), . . . , E(av])>  ciphertext as a vector
3: Initialisation: r 1 mod m exists, (0, . . . , 0) c an empty vector
4: function Encryption(a , m , mˆ , v , rˆ )
5: c = (a1, a2, . . . , av) generate v random values based on Equation (1)
6: c = E(a) = (a1r mod m, a2r2 mod, . . . ,m, a2r2 mod)
7: c =< E(a1), E(a2), . . . , E(av]) >
8: return c
9: end function
10:             Decryption procedure               
11: Inputs: < E(a1) , E(a2), . . . , E(av])> , mˆ , m , r 1 , sum = 0;
12: Outputs: a plaintext value (a)
13: function Decryption(< E(a1) , E(a2), . . . , E(av])> , mˆ , m , r 1 , sum)
14: a = (E(a1)⇥ r 1 mod m,E(a2)⇥ r 2 mod m, ..., E(av)⇥ r v mod m)
15: a = (E(a1), E(a2), ..., E(av))
16: for (i = 1, i  v, i++ ) do sum = sum+ E(ai)
17: a = sum mod mˆ
18: end for
19: return a
20: end function
– DF.Add(E(a) , E(b) , m ) , DF.Sub(E(a) , E(b) , m ): The addition and
subtraction operations between two encrypted ciphtertexts can be done component-
wise between terms (vector elements) with the same degree. For example, we can
add or subtract two ciphertexts in case of vector space v = 2 as follows.
E(a) = (a1, a2) , E(b) = (b1, b2)
E(a)± E(b) = ((a1 ± b1)mod m , (a2 ± b2)mod m) (2.5)
Algorithm 2 illustrates the addition and subtraction operations in more detail.
Algorithm 2 Addition and subtraction operations
1: Inputs: c1 =< E(a1) , E(a2), . . . , E(av])> , c2 =< E(b1) , E(b2), . . . , E(bv])>
2: Outputs: < E(r1) , E(r2), . . . , E(rv])>  ciphertext as a vector
3: Initialisation: result = (E(r1), . . . , E(rv))
4: function add/sub(c1, c2)
5: c1± c2 = ((E(a1)±E(b1)mod m), (E(a2)±E(b2)mod m), . . . , (E(av)±E(bv)mod m))
6: result = ((E(r1), E(r2) . . . , E(rv))
7: return result
8: end function
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– DF.Mult(E(a) , E(b) , m ): The multiplication operation works as polynomials:
all elements are cross-multiplications in Zm. For example, we can add or subtract
two ciphertexts in the case of vector space v = 2 as follows.
E(a) = (a1, a2) , E(b) = (b1, b2)
E(a)⇥ E(b) = (0 , (a1 ⇥ b1)mod m ,
(a1 ⇥ b2 + a2 ⇥ b1)mod m , (a1 ⇥ b2)mod m)
Algorithm 3 illustrates the multiplication operation in more detail.
Algorithm 3 Multiplication operation
1: Inputs: c1 =< E(a1) , E(a2), . . . , E(av])> , c2 =< E(b1) , E(b2), . . . , E(bv])>
2: Outputs: < E(r1) , E(r2), . . . , E(rv])>  ciphertext as a vector
3: Initialisation: result = (E(r1), . . . , E(rv))
4: function Multiplication(c1, c2)
5: //Multiplication works as polynomials
6: // Example of two ciphertext: c1 = (E(a1), E(a2), c2 = (E(b1), E(b2))
7: c1⇥c2 = (E(0), E(a1)⇥E(b1)modm, ((E(a1)⇥E(b2)+(E(a2)⇥E(b1))modm, ,E(a2)+
E(b2)mod m)
8: result = ((E(r1), E(r2), E(r3), E(r4))
9: return result
10: end function
– DF.Div(E(a) , E(b) , m ): The division operation cannot be carried directly as
polynomials are a ring. However, in our model we delegate the division operation
E(a)/E(b) to be handled in rational format by the private server. Similarly, any
Comparison operations that are required can be performed in the private server.
We demonstrate an unrealistic but self explainable numerical example to clarify compu-
tations with Domingo-Ferrer’s homomorphic scheme below.
We choose public and private parameters as follows:
– Public parameters (m, v)) (28, 2):
– Private parameters (mˆ, rˆ) ) (7, 3). We make sure r 1 mod m exists, which is
r 1 = 19 in this case.
31
An example formula to be calculated has two addition and a multiplication operations,
(x1 + x2)⇥ x3 where x1 = 2, x2 = 1 and x3 = 0 .
First, we transform the plaintext values x1, x2 and x3 by using Equation (1) (transfor-
mation stage) at a classified level.
x1 = 2  ! (0, 9)
x2 = 1  ! (1, 7)
x3 = 0  ! (2, 5)
Next, we encrypt the transformed plaintext values by using Equation (2) (encryption
stage) at a classified level.
E(x1) = ((0⇥ 3)mod 28 , (9⇥ 9)mod 28) = (0, 25)
E(x2) = ((1⇥ 3)mod 28 , (7⇥ 9)mod 28) = (3, 7)
E(x3) = ((2⇥ 3)mod 28 , (5⇥ 9)mod 28) = (6, 17)
After that, we execute the formula (x1 + x2)⇥ x3 on ciphertext data at an unclassified
level; in our case, public cloud computing. We perform the first part which is an addition
operation, (x1 + x2) in the encrypted domain, as follows:
2X
i=1
E(xi) = (0 + 3 mod 28 , 25 + 7 mod 28) = ( 3 , 4 )
Then we multiply the output of the previous equations ( 3 , 4 ) by E(x3),
( 3 , 4 )⇥ E(x4) = ( 3 , 4 )⇥ ( 6 , 17 )
= (0 , 3⇥ 6mod 28, (3⇥ 17 + 4⇥ 6)mod 28, 4⇥ 17mod 28)
= ( 0 , 18 , 19 , 12 )
The final ciphertext output is decrypted at a classified level based on Equation (3), and
we retrieve the plaintext result as follows:
(0⇥ 19mod 28, 18⇥ 192 mod 28, 19⇥ 193 mod 28, 12⇥ 194 mod 28)
= ( 0 , 2 , 9 , 24 )
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Finally, the decryption operation is finished by adding all elements in the vector over
Zmˆ to get (35 mod 7) = 0, which is the corresponding plaintext result if the formula is
executed on plaintext domain.
2.3.2 Data clustering and anomaly detection
The specific anomaly detection technique that is used in the proposed model is the
granular anomaly evaluation approach presented in [58]. This is primarily based on
Fuzzy c-means clustering (FCM) that is adapted in a distributed manner. In the current
context it is implemented over a virtual machine hierarchy in the public data centre. This
hierarchy is determined in order to reflect the original hierarchical network topology that
is commonly encountered in organised sensor network applications. Therefore, each such
VM will perform fuzzy c-means clustering in parallel for specific sensor node data as
the first step. The VMs at intermediate hierarchical levels then perform an additional
level of data merging in determining anomalies that are relative to that level of network
granularity. Therefore, VMs at this level have access to the clustering output in the
preceding levels to determine anomalies at the upper level. Therefore the anomalies
identified at a certain level consist of correlation-based analysis of all data coming under
that node. (i.e. analysis on all leaf nodes coming under that node in the hierarchy). The
adapted fuzzy c-means algorithm can be summarised as follows. First, cluster centres are
randomly initiated to a user given number of expected clusters. Memberships are then
calculated to each data point corresponding to each cluster centre on the basis of distance
between that cluster and the data point. The closer a data point is to a cluster centre,
the higher its membership towards that particular cluster centre. The algorithm stops
iterating when the di↵erence between membership values in two successive iterations is
smaller than the defined termination parameter. We illustrate the main FCM clustering
steps as follows.
1. Let n be the number of data points, (p1, p2, . . . , pn), in a specific data set D to be
analysed. The algorithm randomly selects a set of clusters c.
2. Calculate the fuzzy membership µij as follows:
µij =
1Pc
k=1(
dij
dik
)2/m 1
(2.6)
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where µij is the membership of the ith data point to the jth cluster centre and dij
is the Euclidean distance between ith data point and jth cluster center. k is the
iteration step and m is the fuzziness index that is defined to be 2 in the current
context.
3. Update cluster center cij as follows:
cij =
Pn
i=1 (µij)
mpiPn
i=1 (µij)
m
(2.7)
where Cij is the jth cluster.
4. The fuzzy membership value of data points and cluster centres are iteratively up-
dated in Steps 1 and 2 until the following condition is satisfied:
||Uk+1   Uk||    (2.8)
where U [ (µ)n⇤c] is the fuzzy membership matrix and   is the value for the termi-
nation criterion. Algorithms 4 and 5 illustrate the FCM clustering algorithm and
anomaly detection process respectively.
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Algorithm 4 Data clustering based on FCM clustering algorithm
1: Inputs: Data set D , Set of clusters c1, c2, · · · , cm ,  
2: Outputs: Set of clusters c1, c2, · · · , cm , membership matrix [U = uij , (uij > 0, 1 < i 
n, 1 < j  m)]
3: Initialisation: Select a set of clusters c1, c2, · · · , cm
4: function FCMclustering()
5: while ||Uk+1   Uk|| >   do
6: //Compute a distance between each data point and each cluster centre
7: for (i = 0 to D.length) do
8: for (j = 0 to c.length) do
9: dij = computeDist(pi, cj); //Distance computations
10: end for
11: end for
12: end while
13: //Compute a membership value between each data point and each cluster centre
14: for (i = 0 to D.length) do
15: for (j = 0 to c.length) do
16: uij = computeMembership(pi, cj); //Membership computations
17: end for
18: end for
19: for (j = 0 to c.length) do
20: cj = computeMembership(D,Uk);; //Update cluster centres
21: end for
22: return U
23: end function
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Algorithm 5 Anomaly detection
1: Inputs: Set of clusters with their data points [c1[pi, . . . ], . . . , cm[pi, . . . ]],
2: anomaly[ ], index = 0
3: function Anomalydetection()
4: for (j = 0 to c.length) do
5: meanj = computeMean(cj [pi, . . . ]); //Compute a cluster mean
6: standardDevj = computestandardDev(cj [pi, . . . ]); //Compute a cluster standard
deviation
7: Tvaluej = meanj   standardDevj ;
8: end for
9: for (j = 0 to c.length) do
10: for (i = 0 to cj .length) do
11: if pij < Tvaluej then
12: anomaly[index] = pij ;
13: index++;
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end function
2.3.3 System workflow
In this section, we explain the workflow directions between di↵erent parties to achieve
secure data analysis. The model’s life cycle starts when the private server receives data
from any data source such as sensors. The data is encrypted by using a convenient
HE algorithm and passed to collaborative public servers within the cloud computing
environment to perform data clustering computations. At some point during those com-
putations, the collaborative public servers return the encrypted results to the private
server to complete the rest of computations for the first iteration. After that, the new
parameters are set up and encrypted before they are passed again to collaborative public
servers for the next iteration. This cycle continues until the desired results are achieved.
During the system’s life cycle, the original data is encrypted only once for use by both
the privacy manager (private server) and collaborative public servers during analysis.
The main entities of our cloud-based model are shown in Figure 2.4. The privacy manager
is responsible for three main functions: to manage remote users accessibility within
the public cloud infrastructure; send analysis tasks to collaborative public servers, and
execute encryption/decryption mechanisms. The first function includes interaction with
the users who are benefiting from the system’s services; users communicate with the
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Figure 2.4: The privacy-preserving distributed anomaly detection life cycle and roles of each
party to achieve secure data analysis
privacy manger to submit their analysis requests. Authentication and authorisation
mechanisms are applied as a first defence layer of our cloud-based model. The second
function includes distribution of analysis tasks between collaborative public servers. The
third function is related to the cryptography technique that is performed on data before
analysis to ensure its privacy in the public cloud computing environment. Figure 2.5
shows the workflow of the model architecture among di↵erent parties.
2.3.4 Security analysis
In this section we analyse the security aspects of our proposed framework. We focus on
both data privacy and integrity, and also on communication security among authorised
parties in the architecture.
As mentioned earlier, the privacy preservation of data relies on Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme,
which is based on homomorphism properties to protect data privacy. We show the pa-
rameters’ settings for both encryption and decryption processes. The encryption process
involves four parameters: two are public and the other are private. The public parame-
ters are d and m: the former represents the number of splitted parts of a plaintext and
the latter is a large integer (⇡ 100200) or larger. The private parameters are r 2 Zm and
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Figure 2.5: A sequence diagram of the di↵erent processes in the proposed anomaly detection
framework among the di↵erent entities within a cloud computing environment.
m0 which is a small divisor > 1 such as s := logm0 m. Table 2.2 shows the influence of
encryption/decryption parameters choices on the probability of key guessing.
Table 2.2: Examples of encryption/decryption parameter choices and their relative strengths
(l(x) = dlog10xe).
n s l(m0) (m0) probability of key guessing
5 6 20 120 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 20
10 11 20 220 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 20
50 51 5 255 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 5
50 53 5 265 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 15
The variable n is the number of random revealed pairs of plaintext-ciphertext by a mali-
cious party. The value of s should be arbitrarily small to ensure the security of encryp-
tion/decryption parameters even if n pairs of plaintext-ciphertext are leaked. Moreover,
the behaviour of encryption keys should be taken into consideration: in Domingo-Ferrer’s
scheme, the probability of any two keys decrypting a random ciphertext to the same
plaintext is O((logm)/m). Hence, the parameter m should be increased to make this
probability arbitrarily small. The security of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme relies on the fact
that the subset keys consistent n revealed pairs is kept large, and the probability of any
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two keys yielding di↵erent plaintexts from the same ciphertext is high.
On the other hand, Secure Socket Layer (SSL)[75] protocol is adapted to secure communi-
cation channels between di↵erent parties exchanging information. This secure communi-
cation is implemented for both outside communications, that is between data owners and
cloud computing facilities, and inside communications within a cloud data centre that is,
between collaborative clouds and the private server during the data analysis phase.
2.4 Experiments and evaluation
This section demonstrates the viability of the proposed models through detailed experi-
ments that evaluate anomaly detection accuracy and performance e ciency. Experiments
are performed on the Google Cloud Platform where each data processing node in the em-
ployed hierarchical structure (see Figure 2.6) of virtual machines has two Intel Xeon E5
processors, with four cores at 2.6 GHz and 12GB of memory.
S1
S2 S3
S4 S5 S6 S7
Local clustering using fuzzy c-means 
clustering & local level anomaly detection
Data merging & secondary level 
anomaly detection
Tertiary level (final level) data merging 
& final level anomaly detection
Contextual 
anomalies 
identified 
over different 
granular levels 
Figure 2.6: Distributed anomaly detection architecture based on a hierarchy of data-processing
nodes (collaborative virtual machines) that enable the identification of anomalies at di↵erent
granular levels (ref: Kumarage et al [58]).
The proposed models are developed in Matlab and implemented on the Google cloud
environment. Four data sets derived from the publicly-available sensor data from Intel
Lab are used for evaluation. This data consists of real sensor network measurements
collected from 54 sensors deployed at the Intel Berkeley Research Laboratory [76] and
include time-stamped information on temperature, humidity, light and voltage values.
The format of the data set is presented in Table 2.3. Each derived data set consists
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Figure 2.7: The di↵erent data distributions with anomalies (bottom row) and without anoma-
lies (top row) as derived from the Intel Berkeley Lab wireless sensor network dataset
of 2800 data points with distributions 1 and 2 having zero anomalies and distributions
3 and 4 having 100 anomalies each. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of derived Intel
data sets based on the two attributes of humidity and temperature. For each data set,
we ran six levels of experiments corresponding to the expected number of clusters from
7 to 12 in the proposed data clustering based anomaly detection approach. This range
is selected as any number below that will be too small to optimally represent a general
sensor data distribution to score comparable fuzzy values, while a larger number would
increase the computational complexity beyond what is needed for the task of accurate
anomaly detection [58].
Table 2.3: The data format of Intel data set
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Parameter 3 Parameter 4
Date Time Epoch Moteid Temperature Humidity Light Voltage
2.4.1 Methodology and evaluation criteria
In our implementation, the specific cluster analysis algorithms underlying the distributed
anomaly detection approach are based on the work proposed in [58]. We derive our models
using this as a foundation to perform anomaly detection in a secure, privacy-preserving
manner with a unique lightweight homomorphic approach for data processing. Therefore,
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the accuracy of the proposed distributed anomaly detection model using fuzzy c-means
clustering (FCM) [77] is evaluated in a manner so that output accuracy is directly com-
parable with the accuracy findings in the above non-homomorphic plaintext anomaly
detection model which is the inspiration for the current work. The current results are
based on experiments that use a subset of the data in [58] and the output results of
accuracy analysis for anomaly detection over the data processing hierarchy can directly
be compared to the plaintext version accuracy as presented in [58]. We show that the
proposed framework successfully achieves the same levels of accuracy while performing
operations in cloud using a virtual machine hierarchy with integrated lightweight homo-
morphic encryption.
For each dataset, the statistical measures of sensitivity and specificity are calculated
through four values, namely, the number of, True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN),
False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN) over the di↵erent levels in the anomaly
detection process. The sensitivity is the probability of a statistical test to be positive
based on an identified TP value, while the specificity is the probability of a statistical
test to be negative based on an identified TN value.
Sensitivity =
Number of True Positive values
(Number of True Positive values + Number of False Negative values)
Specificity =
Number of True Negative values
(Number of True Negative values + Number of False Negative values)
The sensitivity and specificity measurements are calculated in three levels of the gran-
ular data clustering model with the Intel Lab data sets distributed over the four local
level clustering nodes (S4 - S7) in the VM hierarchy. Next, the second iteration of data
clustering occurs in the secondary level of processing nodes S2 and S3 based on extracted
results from the previous level. The final clustering and anomaly detection results are
computed in the final level at root node S1.
2.4.2 Anomaly detection accuracy
We implement two versions of the proposed framework, one that processes plaintext data
and the other processing ciphertext data through the integration of lightweight homo-
41
morphic encryption. The results are presented comparatively for the four data sets (
1- 4 INTEL Data Distributions - Figure 2.7) over the three di↵erent levels in the data
processing hierarchy as shown in Figure 2.8. The individual data distributions from 1-4
are taken to be processed at leaf nodes S4-S6. Tables 2.4 - 2.9 show the cluster analysis
based results for anomaly detection accuracy in both versions. We indicate the plaintext
version with postfix (P) and the ciphertext version with postfix (C). We refer (Sen) and
(Spec) to the sensitivity and the specificity respectively.
Table 2.4: Classification accuracy for INTEL normal distribution 1 and 2 at nodes S4 and S5
(Plaintext version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
9 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
10 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
11 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
12 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
Observing the results in Table 2.4 through to Table 2.9, we can infer that both plaintext
and ciphertext versions have achieved high levels of detection accuracy as measured by
the sensitivity and specificity metrics at all nodes in the hierarchical structure. Table
2.4 shows that ideal detection accuracy is achieved with 0 false positive rate for non-
anomalous data encountered in leaf nodes S4 and S5 in both plaintext and ciphertext
versions. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show that the sensitivity average achieved for the two data
sets with anomalies are 0.9049 and 1.0000 for plaintext while it is 0.9111 and 1.0000 for
ciphertext over the cluster range from 7 to 12 with regard to local level anomaly detection
at leaf nodes S6 and S7 in the data processing hierarchy.
Accuracy results at the secondary level of anomaly detection are given in Tables 2.7 and
2.8. Parent nodes S2 and S3 achieves high detection accuracy with a specificity average
of 0.9957 in plaintext and 0.9964 in ciphertext observed for the two merged distributions
without any anomalies at node S2. The corresponding average specificity values for S3 are
at 0.9968 in plaintext and 0.9970 in ciphertext with the number of clusters varying from
7 to 12 for the two merged distributions with anomalies present. The average sensitivity
observed at this node is 0.9605 for plaintext and 0.9597 for ciphertext.
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Table 2.9, gives the result for the final level of anomaly detection performed at the root
node of the hierarchy (S1). The average sensitivity and specificity for plaintext remains
high at 0.9476 and 0.9972, while the average sensitivity and specificity for ciphertext are
at 0.9492 and 0.9972. Therefore, the overall results clearly demonstrate that the pro-
posed ciphertext version of clustering based anomaly detection can achieve significantly
high accuracy results as to be comparable with the corresponding plaintext values that
are observed as well as when compared to the results obtained over the same data sets
for the work presented in [58]. This is while providing the added advantage of privacy-
preserving in a cloud environment using a lightweight homomorphic encryption approach.
Table 2.5: Classification accuracy for INTEL anomaly distribution 3 at node S6 (Plaintext
version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 15 13 2 3 0.8598 0.8785 0.9996 0.9993
8 9 10 11 6 0.9159 0.9065 0.9976 0.9986
9 9 7 25 8 0.9159 0.9345 0.9946 0.9985
10 8 7 2 9 0.9252 0.9345 0.9996 0.9980
11 8 9 2 2 0.9252 0.9158 0.9996 0.9995
12 12 11 5 16 0.8879 0.8971 0.9989 0.9965
Table 2.6: Classification accuracy for INTEL anomaly distribution 4 at node S7 (Plaintext
version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 0 0 196 58 1 1 0.9574 0.9873
8 0 0 1 7 1 1 0.9998 0.9984
9 0 0 1 5 1 1 0.9998 0.9989
10 0 0 32 13 1 1 0.9930 0.9971
11 0 0 32 9 1 1 0.99930 0.9980
12 0 0 1 19 1 1 0.9998 0.9958
Figure 2.8, visually shows the distribution of identified clusters and detected anomalies
for Intel normal distribution 1 and the distribution with anomalies 3. The first row de-
picts the clustering for normal distribution 1 while the second row depicts the clustering
for anomaly distribution 3 with the third row showing the isolated anomalies for this
distribution. In Figure 2.9, the first row depicts the clustering output for Intel normal
distribution 2 while the second and third rows consecutively show the clustering and
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Figure 2.8: Data clustering output (from left to right) for 7,9,10 and 12 expected clusters for INTEL normal distribution
1 (row1) and anomaly distribution 3 (row 2) with the detected anomalies for distribution 3 (row 3) using the proposed
model to perform cloud based distributed anomaly detection in a privacy preserving manner.
Table 2.7: Classification accuracy for INTEL normal distributions 1 and 2 at parent node S2
(Plaintext version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 0 0 0 0 NAN NAN 1 1
8 0 0 0 5 NAN NAN 1 0.9994
9 0 0 32 15 NAN NAN 0.9965 0.9983
10 0 0 19 22 NAN NAN 0.9979 0.9976
11 0 0 76 102 NAN NAN 0.9918 0.9890
12 0 0 11 27 NAN NAN 0.9988 0.9970
isolated anomalies for Intel anomaly distribution 4. Results of the final clustering stage
are shown in Table 2.9.
2.4.3 Performance e ciency
A key achievement in the proposed framework is that it performs privacy preserving
anomaly detection in a lightweight fashion as opposed to more computationally intensive
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Figure 2.9: Data clustering output (from left to right) for 7,9,10 and 12 expected clusters for INTEL normal distribution
2 (row1) and anomaly distribution 4 (row 2) with the detected anomalies for distribution 3 (row 3) using the proposed
model to perform cloud based distributed anomaly detection in a privacy preserving manner.
Table 2.8: Classification accuracy for INTEL anomaly distributions 3 and 4 at parent node S3
(Plaintext version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 3 0 32 15 0.9855 1 0.9965 0.9983
8 0 5 19 6 1 0.9758 0.9979 0.9993
9 0 0 76 41 1 1 0.9917 0.9955
10 18 10 22 7 0.9656 0.9516 0.9976 0.9992
11 25 23 5 31 0.8797 0.8889 0.9994 0.9966
12 14 12 39 62 0.9323 0.9420 0.9957 0.9932
methods that rely on HE. We examine performance e ciency in terms of the execution
time for the ciphertext cluster analysis and anomaly detection process for di↵erent levels
in the hierarchical structure as in [58]. The average execution times for encryption and
decryption processes over di↵erent amounts of data are given in Table 2.10. The variation
in average execution time for data clustering and anomaly detection tasks at the local
level in the hierarchy (where data processing is most intensive) when the amounts of data
increase are given in Table 2.11. This is divided into 3 sets of data points over which the
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Table 2.9: Final classification accuracy for INTEL anomaly distributions 1,3 and normal dis-
tributions 2,4 at root node S1 (Plaintext version - (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters FN(P) FN(C) FP(P) FP(C) Sen(P) Sen(C) Spec(P) Spec(C)
7 15 13 198 172 0.9275 0.9371 0.9894 0.9894
8 9 10 12 14 0.9565 0.9516 0.9994 0.9992
9 9 9 26 23 0.9565 0.9565 0.9986 0.9987
10 8 9 34 35 0.9614 0.9565 0.9982 0.9981
11 8 8 34 31 0.9420 0.9613 0.9982 0.9983
12 12 14 6 9 0.9420 0.9323 0.9997 0.9995
clusters are formed for anomaly detection with the number of clusters varying from from
7 to 12. Table 2.12 shows the average execution time for ciphertext data clustering and
anomaly detection considering all three levels (complete process from leaf node to root)
of the proposed hierarchical data processing framework.
Table 2.10: The average execution time of encryption and decryption processes for di↵erent
amounts of data (unit: millisecond)
# of Data Points
Process type 1200 2400 4700
Encryption 11.9418 23.7261 46.2950
Decryption 5.0038 11.0750 23.594
Table 2.11: The average execution time for ciphertext cluster analysis and anomaly detection
at the local clustering level (leaf nodes) with varying data set size (unit: millisecond)
# of Data Points
No.clusters 1200 2400 4700
7 259.1736 504.0812 1096.5587
8 281.9739 552.1109 1152.9083
9 301.3022 620.3400 1240.2602
10 359.4110 693.0236 1309.2317
11 412.1381 705.6102 1372.3950
12 473.4015 740.9021 1425.1055
To overcome the increase in execution time, the proposed model distributes the cluster
formation and subsequent anomaly detection tasks at each local node among a larger sets
of VMs. In general, increasing the number of VMs at each data processing level leads to
a rapid decrease in the execution time while managing computational complexity as de-
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sired. Figure 2.10 illustrates how the increase in the number of VMs for data processing
decreases the execution time over di↵erent numbers of expected clusters.
Table 2.12: The average execution time of ciphertext data clustering and anomaly detection
for the complete process including all three levels of the hierarchical data processing structure
(unit: millisecond).
# of Data Points
No.clusters 1200 2400 4700
7 529.5813 764.5448 1326.3192
8 547.9503 809.6010 1412.0183
9 579.8740 875.2913 1487.2622
10 639.6551 839.2039 1540.2317
11 685.1209 941.6291 1604.3212
12 730.2901 1015.0047 1673.1655
Figure 2.10: The variation of average execution time for the proposed model using Intel normal
distribution 1 at the local clustering level with varying numbers of VMs and clusters.
The communication overhead imposed by the use of a private server that collaborates with
other public cloud computing infrastructure in the proposed model is examined in Table
2.13. This gives the communication overhead (number of data points communicated)
based on di↵erent cluster settings and di↵erent amounts of processed data.
Each iteration involves data exchange between public cloud VMs and the private server.
Most operations are performed on the data that are stored as ciphertext values in the
public cloud. However, some intermediate operations cannot be performed on the public
cloud without decryption due to limitations in the adopted homomorphic scheme. The
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Table 2.13: The average number of iterations (with each iteration signifying one bidirectional
data communication cycle between the private server and a public server or VM) that are
required based on di↵erent number of clusters as the amount of data varies.
# of Data Points
No.clusters 1200 2400 4700
7 35 44 76
8 40 56 82
9 57 61 85
10 66 74 93
11 78 92 101
12 95 105 112
amount of data that is required to be transferred between public cloud servers and the
private server can be expressed as follows.
Each data point (plaintext value) can be considered as n bits. The encrypted data point
(ciphertext value) is based on parameter d in a ciphertext algorithm setting. If we assume
d = 2, then the ciphertext value is n ⇤ 2. If we have i ciphertext values, then the amount
of data that is required to be sent in each iteration is (i ⇤ (n ⇤ 2)). These values can vary
based on di↵erent clustering and encryption/decryption algorithm settings.
2.4.4 Execution time comparison
Table 3.10 provides a detailed comparison on ciphertext execution time of the proposed
model with that of the ciphertext execution time of Craig Gentry’s Homomorphic scheme
if adapted over the proposed data clustering and anomaly detection framework. Each of
the data processing tasks is analysed considering the di↵erent sub-tasks under encryp-
tion/decryption, cluster formation and anomaly detection over the local, intermediate and
final levels of a three level data processing hierarchy as relative to the proposed model.
The data is presented per node basis with n representing the number of data points,
i the number of iterations before converging and c the number of clusters. The aver-
age execution time per operation is given in seconds with input directly from performed
experiments for the proposed model and from [78] for Craig Gentry’s Homomorphic
scheme. The machine specifications for experiments in both schemes are dual proces-
sor systems with Intel Xeon E5 processors having four cores each. Our model employs
12Gb of RAM with proceessor speeds of 2.6GHz while Craig Gentry’s scheme employs
16Gb of RAM with processor speeds at 3.0GHZ. Therefore, the machine specifications
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for Craig Gentry’s model implementation over which the following execution times are
calculated remain high in comparison to the machine specifications where our model is
implemented. However, even with the added advantage, it is clearly shown that the pro-
posed model has a significantly lighter footprint as compared through execution time.
The operational breakdown presented in Table 2.14 clearly demonstrates that by adapt-
ing Domingo Ferrer’s scheme for homomorphic encryption results in significant reduction
of computational complexity as evidenced by the execution times that are significantly
less than if Craig Gentry’s Homomorphic scheme is adapted over the same framework.
Therefore, adoption of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme in the proposed model enables lightweight
arithmetic computations to be performed in a far e cient manner compared to other HE
schemes. This feature as demonstrated in the above table forms the core strength of the
proposed model in terms of providing scalable and privacy preserving anomaly detection
for large-scale data with significantly less computational complexity while retaining high
accuracy in anomaly detection .
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a unique cloud-based framework that is lightweight and
has the ability to perform scalable anomaly detection in a secure and privacy-preserving
manner. An inherently practical anomaly detection scheme based on distributed fuzzy
c-means (FCM) clustering was integrated with an e cient lightweight cryptography tech-
nique in the form of Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism
to perform operations on encrypted data using a cloud based collaborative model. A
private server acting as a privacy manager collaborates with a set or public servers to
perform the required tasks e ciently within the capabilities of the adopted homomorphic
approach. The proposed framework can be adapted e ciently in a scalable manner for
critical anomaly detection applications that wish to take advantage of cloud computing in-
frastructure without compromising data security and privacy. The experiments described
in this work have demonstrated the capability of our proposed models to accurately de-
tect data anomalies without compromise data privacy or any associated overheads in
computational and communication complexity. Future research will improve the model
in terms of further reducing communication overheads as well as enhancing the capabili-
ties of the adapted Homomorphic Encryption technique to cover more operations without
any trade-o↵s in e ciency.
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Table 2.14: The average execution time of involved operations for Domingo-Ferrer’s and Craig
Gentry’s homomorphic schemes (i is the number of clustering iterations, with n the number of
data points and c the number of clusters).
Local Clustering & Anomaly Detection Level (per node)
Number of operations Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme Craig gentry’s scheme
Encryption Phase
Encryption: Enc = n Encryption: Enc⇥ 0.00985 (per value: 7 bits) Encryption: Enc⇥ 1450 (per bit)
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 0.77 seconds ⇥i
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 220 hours ⇥i
Data Clustering Phase
8><>:
Distance Calculation: D = (n⇥ c⇥ 5)
Mean Calculation: M = n
Update clusters: U = (n3 + n)⇥ c
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Distance: D ⇥ i {Add ⇡ 0.00985,
Sub ⇡ 0.00985 , Mult ⇡ 0.00727} (per value)
Mean: M ⇥ i {Add ⇡ 0.00985} (per value)
Update clusters: S ⇥ i {Add ⇡ 0.00985,
Mult ⇡ 0.00727} (per value)
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Distance: D ⇥ i {Add & Sub < 1µs,
Mult ⇡ 1.76s} (per bit)
Mean: M ⇥ i {Add < 1µs} (per bit)
Update clusters: S ⇥ i {Add < 1µs
Mult ⇡ 1.76s} (per bit)
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 46.8 minutes ⇥i
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 1260 hours ⇥i
Anomaly Detection Phase8><>:
Mean Calculation: M = n
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S = (n2 + n)
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i {Add < 1µs}
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 2.8 seconds ⇥i
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 1.4 hours ⇥i
Secondary Anomaly Detection Level (per node)
Anomaly Detection Phase8><>:
Mean: M = n
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S = (n2 + n)
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 9400 ,
Execution time ⇡ 5.6 seconds ⇥i
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 2.6 hours ⇥i
Final Anomaly Detection Level
Anomaly Detection Phase8><>:
Mean: M = n
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S = (n2 + n)
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
8><>:
Mean: M ⇥ i
Threshold (Standard deviation)
application: S ⇥ i
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 18800 ,
Execution time ⇡ 11.3 seconds ⇥i
In case n = 18800 ,
Execution time ⇡ 5.3 hours ⇥i
Decryption Phase
Decryption: Dec = n Decryption: Dec⇥ 0.00502 Decryption: Dec⇥ 200
—————————————————— ————————————————–
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 0.39 seconds ⇥i
In case n = 4700 ,
Execution time ⇡ 4.3 hours ⇥i
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Chapter 3
Privacy-preserving anomaly
detection in the cloud based on
fully homomorphic encryption
Abstract
Building on the model proposed in Chapter 2, we adapt Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) to build a secure analytic services model for smart cities. Rapid
urbanisation places extensive demands on city services and infrastructure. Inno-
vative and sustainable solutions that increasingly involve streamlined monitoring,
collection, storage and analysis of massive, heterogeneous data are required. Analyt-
ics services, such as anomaly detection, work to both extract knowledge and support
decision-making mechanisms that enable smart functionality in such contexts. This
chapter introduces a scalable, cloud-based model to provide a privacy preserving
anomaly detection service for quality assured decision-making in smart cities. FHE
is adapted to preserve data privacy during analysis. FHE has the advantage of build-
ing complete automated processing models, where the cloud servers perform analysis
tasks without the need to interact with external parties. To overcome computa-
tional overheads associated with FHE, we develop a MapReduce based distribution
approach for analysis tasks parallelisation. Experiments demonstrate a high level
of accuracy is maintained for anomaly detection performed on encrypted data with
the adopted distributed data processing approach significantly reducing associated
computational overheads.
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3.1 Introduction
The vision of smart cities is to integrate information and communication technologies
to implement smart functionality through instrumentation and interconnection in the
e cient provisioning and management of city services and infrastructure. This has lead
to an explosion in data collection and analysis over a variety of urban services and
applications to support smart decision making. In this context, anomaly detection on
data is a critical service that needs to be performed in order to ensure the quality of
data and, in turn, facilitate quality assured decision-making. Figure 3.1 shows a high
level view of a four-layer smart city architecture. However, the large volumes of data
that are involved require the adoption of scalable systems, like cloud infrastructure, with
significant resources to sustainably implement a versatile anomaly detection service [15].
This in turn leads to critical issues in data privacy [18] as most of the data can be specific
to particular residents or involve sensitive data on critical city infrastructure. The data in
such situations needs to be shared unrestricted with a cloud service provider (CSP) and
will also be vulnerable to eavesdropping or security attacks by other malicious intruders
or third parties [18]. Control over the data, irrespective of where it is located in the
cloud, can also be of concern for data owners and stakeholders [56]. Therefore, e↵ective
methods that enable cloud-based anomaly detection services while assuring data privacy
are of significant importance.
In the context of providing a privacy-preserving analytic service in the cloud, achieving
the right balance between e↵ective privacy and maintaining accuracy of the analysis is
a major challenge. Several models have been introduced recently that can help enable
preserve data privacy and perform privacy-preserving data analytics using di↵erent ap-
proaches such as access control, randomisation, secure multi-party computation (SMC)
[79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86]. However, these approaches have several drawbacks in
terms of e ciency and security that need to be adequately addressed before practical
implementation and widespread adoption. These limitations are briefly noted as follows:
– Data mining based on randomisation approaches, such as [83, 86], can either lead
to unavoidable data leakage or output inaccurate results due to the random noise
that is added in a pre-defined way to perturb original data. These models are,
therefore, applicable only to a limited scope of applications that can tolerate some
data leakage and noise based result degradation.
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Figure 3.1: A high level view of a smart city architecture involving large volumes of data
collection to enable smart decision-making over a variety of applications. Anomaly detection
is a critical umbrella service that is to be performed in ensuring the quality of data and the
quality of decision-making over all such applications.
– Secure data mining models based on secure multi-party computation approaches,
such as secret sharing [85] and oblivious transfer [87], can achieve highly accu-
rate results. However, they fail from an e ciency perspective due to significant
communication and computation overheads.
– Approaches that rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) also inflict massive com-
munication overheads among shared parties which in turn increases the security
vulnerabilities.
In this chapter, we propose a model based on fully homomorphic cryptography that can
perform di↵erent analytic tasks based on mathematical operations while preserving the
privacy of data in the cloud. Fully homomorphic cryptography can be the key solution
53
Sub-dataset-1
Smart sensors Secure data processing fully based homomorprhic encryptionSensed data !low
Sensors data
generation
Secure
communication
Mapper-1
Outputs
Sub-dataset-2
Sub-dataset-3
Sub-dataset-n
.
.
.
Mapper-m
.
.
.
.
.
Reducer-1
Reducer-r
OutputInput Map tasks Reducer tasks
MapReduce box
Each Sub-dataset can be processed in 
a single or multiple MapReduce boxes 
based on data analysis topology
Each mapper 
performs secure 
micro-computations 
as a part of the whole 
data analysis process
Smart city
Smart 
healthcare
Smart 
factory
Smart 
energy
Smart 
traf!ic & 
logistics
Smart city
applications
Figure 3.2: An overview of the proposed framework where sensor data anomaly detection is
performed using fully homomorphic encryption employing a distributed data processing ap-
proach using a MapReduce model to improve e ciency and reduce associated computational
overheads. Data owners can securely delegate their data analytic services to the cloud com-
puting.
for privacy-preserving analysis in cloud compared to other cryptographic approaches, as
it can accurately perform computations on encrypted data while eliminating the need for
any interaction with data owners or other authorised parties during the analysis process.
However, despite the privacy-preserving capabilities of fully homomorphic cryptography,
the associated computational overheads need to be overcome in order to build practical
applications that can be eminently adopted. We overcome the computational overhead
through a scalable data processing framework that distributes computational tasks among
a large number of virtual machines (VMs) using a MapReduce model. Figure 3.2 illus-
trates an overview of how the aggregated data from di↵erent applications are divided
and processed within a large number of VMs, called (MapReduce box), where each Map-
per performs a small number of arithmetic computations or micro-computations. The
distributed approach can significantly reduce the execution time for fully homomorphic
cryptography computations, making it applicable for real-world applications. Existing
fully homomorphic techniques have another limitation. They are unable to accurately
represent and perform floating-point arithmetic computations that are essential to most
data mining applications. In our model, we improve the capabilities of fully homomor-
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phic cryptography to perform such computations on floating-point numbers by adapting
a transformation technique based on IEEE Standard for floating-point arithmetic (IEEE
754) [88].
3.1.1 Contribution
The specific contribution of this work is the design and implementation of an innovative
privacy-preserving analytic framework in cloud computing based anomaly detection in
large-scale sensor data for smart cities. The framework is both scalable and adaptive for
dynamic data streams that are generated in a distributed manner. The sensed data is
aggregated over a time window, encrypted using fully homomorphic cryptography and
sent to the cloud for implementation of required analytic tasks. A key feature of this
framework is that public cloud computing facilities handle all required computations
securely without any interaction between TTP or even the the data owners during the
analytics process. The particular anomaly detection technique is based on our previous
work in [58], and uses a distributed fuzzy-clustering scheme to e ciently partition the
collected data and classify anomalies over a hierarchical data processing topology as
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The work here further improves the security and e ciency of
the aforementioned cluster analysis process in [58] for anomaly detection by leveraging
cloud infrastructure. The overall process is augmented with homomorphic encryption
and distributed data processing with a MapReduce model. The specific contributions of
the chapter can be highlighted as follows:
– Privacy-preserving data analytics framework for smart cities is presented for en-
abling a cloud-based anomaly detection service for large-scale, dynamic sensor data.
A fully homomorphic encryption scheme Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV)
[89, 67] is adapted over a distributed data processing approach, due to its com-
putation capabilities in implementation as well as security aspects that ensure the
privacy of original data. A MapReduce based distribution of tasks is designed and
implemented to overcome involved computational overheads.
– The limitation of the BGV scheme of supporting secure computations only over
integers is addressed by the introduction of a practical solution to represent floating-
point numbers and their computations. This is achieved by using the IEEE standard
for floating-point arithmetic (IEEE 754).
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Figure 3.3: A distributed hierarchical anomaly detection scheme based on Kumarage et al.
The hierarchical topology of clustering architecture is applied in a compatible manner where
the hierarchical clustering nodes in the original scheme is mapped to a hierarchical topology of
virtual machines (VMs). Public cloud computing resources manage and perform the involved
clustering and anomaly detection tasks securely.
– Lastly, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of the capabilities in the proposed
model with accuracy and e ciency evaluated over di↵erent data sets using a variety
of experiments. Experiment outcomes demonstrate that the proposed model can
preserve data privacy in an e cient process without e↵ecting the level of accuracy
in the anomaly detection process when compared to that of the original scheme
over non-encrypted data in [58].
3.2 Related work
In this section, we review the existing literature on both privacy-preserving data analytics
techniques and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) fields which are related to our
proposed model.
3.2.1 Privacy-preserving data analytics
Privacy-preserving data analytics has been addressed by researchers in both data mining
and security fields. The current privacy-preserving data analytics can be classified in three
main approaches: the Randomisation approach and Secure Multi-party Computation
(SMC) approach which includes secret sharing, oblivious transfer and the HE approach.
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– Randomisation: a privacy-preserving technique where noise is added to the data
to mask the attribute values of records as in [86]. Although randomisation-based
models provide a high level of e ciency compared with cryptographic approaches,
they have less accurate results due to a high noise addition. Moreover, they do not
prove formally how much privacy is guaranteed. Therefore, they are not convenient
enough to be used in such privacy critical applications that requires highly accurate
results.
– Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC): a cryptography technique where two or
more parties collaborate to compute a function over their input data while keeping
the input private. The secret sharing as in [85, 90] and oblivious transfer [87, 91, 92]
are the two main approaches of SMC. The nature of secret sharing models requires
an extensive communication between di↵erent parties or even with a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) to accomplish clustering analysis. Furthermore, the oblivious transfer
models are costly in terms of the required computations to perform analysis tasks,
making it impractical for large scale datasets.
– Homomorphic encryption (HE): a privacy-preserving technique which carries out
computations while the data is encrypted. It has two main categories: Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes as in [31] and a Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE) as in [89, 67]. The SHE schemes are impractical due to the lack of
operations capabilities that are required to perform clustering analysis [12]. More-
over, most FHE schemes are still considered impractical because of the overhead
in their computations [12]. Table 3.1 illustrates the main categories of privacy-
preservation data analytics models.
3.2.2 Fully Homomorphic encryption (FHE)
HE was introduced in 1978 following the inception of public key cryptography. Rivest,
Adleman and Dertouzos [31] proposed first HE scheme. Other HE schemes include El-
Gamal [29] and Paillier [30], to name a few. However, these schemes are classified under
somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) schemes, which support either addition or
multiplication operations, but not both. Theses schemes fail to demonstrate practical
applications because their abilities are ine cient and cannot su ciently perform the
required arithmetic operations to build useful cloud-based applications.
57
Table 3.1: The privacy preservation data clustering models
Privacy preserving
Model
Complexity Overhead Scalability Scenario Drawbacks
Randomization
based [86] [83]
Low Low High Central/Distributed Less accuracy
Secret sharing based
[85] [90]
Medium Low High Distributed Scalability limita-
tion in the num-
ber of parties and
using a trusted
third party.
Oblivious transfer
based [87] [93]
High High Low Distributed Scalability limita-
tion in the num-
ber of parties and
dataset size.
Homomorphic en-
cryption (HE)
based, Paillier [94],
Goldwasser-Micali
[95]
Low Medium High Distributed Scalability limita-
tion in the num-
ber of parties.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) was an open problem until the breakthrough result
of Gentry [22], which is based on the properties of ideal lattices [96]. FHE has an
ability to support unlimited number of arithmetic operations. A few years later, various
homomorphic encryption schemes were developed based on three branches: lattice-based
[89, 97], integer-based and learning-with-errors (LWE) [35] or ring-learning-with-errors
(RLWE) [67] based encryption. In spite of the potential of FHE schemes, some remain
quite impractical for real-world applications because of their limitations in computations
overhead and the amount of resources that are required for computations.
In the meantime, researchers have introduced several FHE optimisations. A public key
compression technique based on integer based schemes, has been introduced to reduce
the size of the public key from over 2 GB down to about 10 MB [68]. The batching tech-
nique [98], which is for the encryption of multiple plaintext bits into a single ciphertext,
improves the performance of integer based schemes. Several FHE implementations have
been done on creating libraries to simplify FHE operations. The three most prominent
e↵orts are the HElib [99], FHEW [100] and and Microsoft’s SEAL [98]. Each is based
on a di↵erent encryption schema; HElib uses BGV, FHEW uses FFTW, and SEAL uses
FV. FHEW is the smallest and fastest of all the libraries. However, it only supports
boolean circuits at this time, so arithmetic operations must be encoded as boolean cir-
cuits in order to be used. SEAL supports arithmetic and polynomial evaluation over
the integers and rational numbers. In testing, SEAL takes the longest amount of time
to compute an encrypted polynomial. HElib is based on the Number Theory Library
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(NTL) and supports arithmetic and polynomial operations over the integers. HElib has
special tuning code to enhance performance, and also o↵ers the richest API of all three
libraries. It speeds up the performance from 36 hours in homomorphic AES scheme to
3 hours [42]. Furthermore, HElib algorithms have variety of mathematical capabilities
that have the advantage over other FHE schemes. Further comprehensive survey about
practical FHE schemes is shown in [37]. In this work, we exploit the advantage of HElib
implementation to improve its mathematical capabilities to meet our analytic services
requirements. We use HElib library because it is a well-know published implementation
and the most practical.
3.3 Privacy-preserving parallelisation framework for
cloud-based anomaly detection in smart cities
In this section, we introduce an innovative cloud-based model for performing scalable
anomaly detection in a privacy preserving manner. A distributed data clustering ap-
proach for anomaly detection is adopted for use on encrypted data by leveraging cloud
computing resources. The framework can perform entire analytic computations securely,
without any interaction with third parties in the context of smart cities sensor data.
The significant overheads that arise from performing analytical computations on en-
crypted data are overcome by an e cient parallelisation of computational tasks using a
MapReduce model. The HElib open source implementation of the BGV homomorphic
encryption scheme is used to build the proposed privacy preserving framework in the
cloud.
The cloud computing analytic framework has two main stages. The first stage is data
collection and encryption and that is assumed to be within a private application domain.
The application domain has to manage collected data from application to cloud domains
and vice versa. Moreover, it executes encryption/decryption mechanisms which must be
performed in a secure manner. The second stage is data analysis for anomaly detection.
This occurs in a hierarchical topology, as adopted from [58]; where each node represents an
individual virtual machine (VM) that is considered to be within a public cloud computing
environment. The VMs are responsible for performing data analysis computations that
are performed on ciphertext. These two entities collaborate in the proposed approach
to perform scalable anomaly detection on data that is encrypted, using a homomorphic
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encryption scheme.
However, although HElib library provides desirable features to build secure cloud-based
applications based on the BGV scheme, its implementation is limited by the inability
to deal with floating-point numbers. To overcome this obstacle, the IEEE Standard for
floating-Point Arithmetic (IEEE 754) is used. IEEE754 is a technical standard that can
be used to carry out computations in the floating-point domain in an integer domain.
This makes the required computations possible with HElib library. The di↵erent data
processing phases and the analytic models used in the framework are explained in detail
below.
3.3.1 Data clustering and anomaly detection
The anomaly detection technique used in the proposed model is the distributed fuzzy
data clustering approach presented in [58]. This is primarily based on Fuzzy C-Means
(FCM) clustering algorithm that is performed in a distributed manner over a distributed
VMs in a hierarchical manner. The hierarchical topology is determined in order to: (1)
Represent the original hierarchical topology that is commonly used in a structured sensor
network; and (2) Enhance data analysis e ciency through ensuring distribution of the
analysis process, while o↵ering anomaly evaluation with di↵erent levels of granularity.
Hence, the local level VMs perform fuzzy c-means data clustering for specific sensor node
data in parallel with the first step. At the intermediate level, VMs perform an additional
level of cluster merging in determining anomalies that are relative to that level. This
identifies anomalies at that level based on the original data clustering performed at earlier
levels by the VMs coming underneath that level in the hierarchy. The anomalies that are
identified in a specific level consist of analysis of all data of the lowest level (i.e analysis
on all leaf nodes coming under that node in the hierarchy for the original sensor network).
This topology and process workflow are graphically represented in Figure 3.4. The fuzzy
c-means algorithm can be accomplished as follows:
– First, cluster centroids are randomly selected from the original dataset.
– Then, memberships are assigned to each data point corresponding to each cluster
centroid on the basis of distance between that cluster and the data point. The closer
a data point is to the cluster centroid, the higher its membership value toward that
particular cluster centroid.
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Figure 3.4: Hierarchical distributed anomaly detection topology mapped to cloud virtual ma-
chines using a similar topology and representing the di↵erent analytical levels.
– The algorithm stops iterating when the di↵erence between membership values in
two successive iterations is smaller than the defined termination parameter.
We illustrate the main FCM clustering steps that will be performed on each VM node as
follows:
1. Let X be a dataset where X = {x1, . . . , xn}. The algorithm randomly selects a set
of clusters centroids C where C = {c1, . . . , cc} where m is a pre-defined variable.
2. For each data point xi where i = 1 to n, calculate the Euclidean distance dij
between xi and each cluster (cj) based on the following equation:
dij(xi, cj) =
q
(xix   cjx)2 + (xiy   cjy)2 (3.1)
3. Calculate the fuzzy membership µij between ith data point xi and jth cluster cen-
troid cj based on the following equation:
µij = 1 /
cX
k=1
(
dij
dik
)2/mˆ 1 (3.2)
where k is the iteration step and mˆ is the fuzziness index. The cluster centroids
are then updated in the next step.
4. Compute fuzzy cluster center cj as follows:
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cj =
nX
i=1
(µij)
mˆxi /
nX
i=1
(µij)
mˆ (3.3)
5. The membership values of data points and cluster centroids are updated based on
equations 1 and 2 until the following condition is satisfied:
||Uk+1   Uk|| <   (3.4)
where   is the termination criterion value that is pre-determined. Figure 3.5 shows
a flow chart of the FCM clustering algorithm. Once the data clustering phase is
performed as illustrated in the above steps the anomalies are determined as follows:
6. To identify both outlying data points and anomalous clusters, we calculate the Eu-
clidean distance between the resulting cluster prototypes and member data points
C = {c1, . . . , cc} as well as the inter-cluster distance between di↵erent cluster cen-
troids.
7. Then, the mean and standard deviation of these distances are used as a threshold
assuming a normal distribution (T ) to identify the individual anomalous data points
within each cluster and anomalous clusters as follows:
Threshold(T ) =
1
n
nX
i=1
xi
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
[xi   ( 1
n
nX
i=1
xi)2] (3.5)
3.3.2 BGV homomorphic encryption scheme
The BGV scheme [35] is classified as an asymmetric homomorphic encryption where its
security is based on the hardness of the ring-learning with errors (LWE) problem [101].
It is a leveled fully homomorphic scheme which can evaluate all circuits homomorphically
up to a predefined depth (L) without bootstrapping. This section illustrates the BVG
preliminaries and our implementation of encrypted operations (addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division and comparison) of IEEE single precision floating-point numbers.
The BGV cryptosystem can be briefly described as follows:
The BGV scheme operates over a polynomial ring A = Z[X]/F (X) where F (X) is a
cyclotomic polynomial. The ciphertext space is polynomials over Aq = A/qA where q is
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Figure 3.5: Flow chart for the employed fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm
an integer modulus, the plaintext space is a ring Ap = A/pA for some integers p⌧ q and
gcd(p, q) = 1. We can describe the basic BGV operations as follows:
– (pk, sk)  BGV.KeyGen (1 , , q). The key generation algorithm works by
choosing a secret key (s), a noise polynomial (e) from a discrete Gaussian distribu-
tion over A with standard deviation (  ) and a security parameter  . Choose a ran-
dom polynomial (a) from Aq and generate the public key (a, b = a⇥s+p⇥e) 2 Aq.
The outputs are a the public key pk = (a, b) and a corresponding secret key sk = s.
– c¯    BGV.Enc(pk,m): Given a plaintext message m 2 Ap and public key Pk and
the plaintext message. The output is a ciphtertext c¯ 2 Aq that is homomorphically
encrypted.
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– m    BGV.Dec(sk, c¯): Given a ciphertext c¯ 2 Aq and the secret key sk. The
output is a plaintext m 2 Ap.
3.3.3 Homomorphic computations based floating-point numbers
A limitation of the HElib library is its ability to perform arithmetic operations only on
integer numbers. We use the IEEE Standard for floating-point arithmetic to convert
the representation of floating-point numbers to its integer representation, to be adjusted
with the natural of HElib library. The IEEE 754 has an ability to convert floating-point
numbers to various forms of representation (e.g. binary and integer representation). An
IEEE 754 standard representation for a floating point number F occupies 32 bits (can
be extended to 64 bits). These bits are arranged as follows: S is the sign bit (a one bit
field), E is the exponent field (8 bit field) and M is the mantissa field (a 23 bit field) (see
Figure 3.6). The sign bit S is 0 for a positive number, and 1 for a negative number. The
exponent field E is the actual exponent + 127, so E should be treated as an unsigned
value in the range [0, 255]. The mantissa field represents a number in the range [1.0, 2.0],
except that the leading 1 is not encoded in M , only the decimal part. Therefore, if we
express F mathematically as follows:
F = ( 1)S ⇥ 2E 127 ⇥ (1 +M) (3.6)
The integer values S, E and M can be used to perform arithmetic operations with other
floating-point numbers that have the same representation in HElib library.
IEEE standard for !loating-point arithmetic (32 bits)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S (Sign)
Single bit !ield
E (Exponent)
8 bits !ield
M (Manissa)
23 bits !ield
Figure 3.6: The IEEE 754 representation for a floating-point number.
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We illustrate the arithmetic floating-point operations in the representation of IEEE 754
standard as follows:
– Addition and subtraction: If we have two floating-point numbers, F1 = ( 1)S1⇥
2E1⇥ (1+M1) and F2 = ( 1)S2⇥2E2⇥ (1+M2), then first observe that F1±F2
can be rewritten in canonical form:
F1± F2 = ( 1)n(F1± F2)
where n is a sign bit and F1 >= F2 >= 0. If we write:
F1 = ( 1)S12E1(1 +M1) and F2 = ( 1)S22E2(1 +M2)
then S1 = S2 = 0 since both F1 and F2 are positive. Also it follows immediately
that E1 >= E2. Define x = 2(E2 E1). Simple algebra then shows the following:
F1 + F2 = ( 1)n2E1(1 + g)
and
F1  F2 = ( 1)n2E1(1 + h)
where g = (M1 + x(1 +M2)) and h = (M1 - x(1 +M2)).
– Multiplication: In the case of multiply two floating-point numbers F1 and F2,
then similar to previous operation we perform multiplication as follow:
F1⇥ F2 = ( 1)(S1+S2) ⇥ 2(E1+E2) ⇥ ((1 +M1)⇥ (1 +M2))
– Division: The division operation F1/F2 c where F2 6= 0.
F1/F2 = ( 1)S1 S2 ⇥ 2E1 E2 ⇥ (1 +M1)/(1 +M2), where F2 6= 0
– Comparison:
We can already test if an encrypted context Ctxt is zero or not in HElib library
implementation, so we only need the <and > operators. Thus we can compute
signum(F ), where F is an encrypted quantity, by producing all the shifted right
values and testing for the equality of any two adjacent terms. If equality is found
then F is negative; otherwise it is zero or positive.
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3.3.4 Parallel anomaly detection using fuzzy c-means clustering in a
MapReduce model
In this section, we show how the adopted fuzzy clustering based anomaly detection model
is parallelised for encrypted data computations based on a MapReduce model. The main
discrete computational components of the anomaly detection are individually parallelised.
For example, the required Euclidean distance computations which are independent for a
set of data points and cluster centroids is a standalone task that is parallelised in this
context. Therefore, this computation for each subset of data points is sent to a separate
map node for parallel execution. Since the individual map nodes run in parallel this
greatly increases the speed of the overall encrypted computational process. The main
parallelisation of tasks for the proposed framework is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
The Euclidean distance dij 
between the data points 
and the cluster centroids in 
a data subset (Equation 1)
The membership value uij 
between the data points 
and the cluster centroids in 
a data subset (Equation 2)
The dot product between 
each data point and the 
membership values of a 
data subset (Equation3)
Centroid
matrix
The updated cluster 
centroids matrix 
of a dataset (Equation 3)
Centroid
matrix
Data Set
Data Set
Membership 
matrix
ReduceSet of mappers
ReduceSet of mappers
Map Reduce
stage 1
Map Reduce
stage 2
Distance 
computations 
for a subset of 
data points
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matrix
The dot product 
computations 
for a subset of 
data points
Figure 3.7: An overview of parallelisation tasks of the anomaly detection using fuzzy c-means
clustering in a MapReduce model
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We divide the anomaly detection using FCM clustering tasks into two stages of the
MapReduce model. In the first MapReduce stage, we parallelise encrypted Euclidean dis-
tance computation in Equation 4.1 with n number of data pointsX = {E(x1), . . . , E(xn)}
and m number of clusters clusters C = {E(c1), . . . , E(cc)} among a distributed set of
mappers as shown in Figure 3.8. In the second MapReduce stage, we parallelise the
dot product computations which is a part of an update cluster centroids in Equation
3.3 as shown in Figure 4.5. The input of the first MapReduce stage are the data points
and an initial membership matrix U = (E(µij))n⇥c and the output is an updated mem-
bership matrix, which is the input of the second MapReduce stage. The output of the
second stage is an updated centroid matrix C = (E(cj))1⇥c. Both stages iterate until
convergence. We assign MapReduce tasks in our model as follows:
– Mappers tasks:
⇤ Calculate the Euclidean distance between centroids and the data points for
cluster determination (Equation 3.1).
⇤ Calculate the dot product between each data point and the membership values
(Equation 3.3).
⇤ Calculate the Euclidean distance between centroids and member data points
as well as between individual centroids to determine anomalies.
– Reducers tasks:
⇤ Calculate membership values from the distance computations (Equation 3.2).
⇤ Recalculates the centroid for each cluster and generate an updated membership
matrix (Equation 3.3).
⇤ Calculate the mean and standard deviation from distance calculations to de-
termine threshold value for anomaly detection (Equation 3.5).
The anomaly detection involves Euclidean distance computation between the resulting
cluster prototypes to individual members and the inter-cluster distance between cluster
centroids. This is parallelised as shown in Figure 3.9. The threshold computation, which
involves the mean and standard deviation of the resulting distances, is performed in the
reducer part of the adopted MapReduce framework.
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Figure 3.8: Fuzzy c-means clustering with MapReduce stage 1. The inputs for the MapReduce
model are a dataset and initial cluster centroids. Each mapper performs sub-computations to
calculate the Euclidean distance and then the relevant membership values for a subset of data
points and a cluster centroid.
The computational complexity of the conventional centralised FCM clustering algorithm
is O(ndc2i) for each iteration until convergence is achieved, where (n) is the number of
data points, (d) is the dimension of the data points, (c) is the number of clusters and
(i) is the number of iterations until it converges. However, we reduce the computational
complexity by using two stages of a distributed approach. The computational complexity
of the first stage is O(ndc2)/m for mapping tasks and O(nc) for a reducer task, where
(m) is the number of mappers that is used to distributed the squared Euclidean distance
computations between mappers. The computational complexity of the second stage is
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Figure 3.9: Fuzzy c-means clustering with MapReduce stage 2. The output of MapReduce
stage 1 (the updated membership matrix) is an input for stage 2. Each mapper then performs
sub-computations to calculate the updated cluster centroids for a given subset of data points.
O(nc)/m for the mapping tasks and O(c) for the reducer task. In general, the number
of mappers is considered a main primary factor that can rapidly improve the e ciency
of FCM clustering algorithm which in turns overcome the HE computation overhead.
Table 3.2 summarises the complexity of FCM clustering algorithm for both centralised
and distributed approaches.
3.4 Security assumptions
In this section, we illustrate the security aspects of our proposed model. In our imple-
mentation we rely on the security of the HElib for our overall security. The secure client
is the only application that has access to the raw data. It generates a (private,public)
key pair and makes the public key available to the insecure server threads/nodes. When
the secure client transfers data to the server, it transfers it in the form of an opcode,
followed by the names of files containing encrypted data. Thus, for example, an operation
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Table 3.2: The computational complexity of the proposed model using fuzzy c-means clustering
algorithm for both centralised and distributed approaches using a MapReduce model.
Centralised-based Distributed-based
approach approach
The first stage: Fuzzy
O(ndc2i)
Mappers: O(ndci)/m
membership computations
where m is the number
of distributed VMs
Reducer: O(nc2i)
The second stage: Fuzzy
Mappers:O(nci)/m
clusters centroids computations
where m is the number
of distributed VMs
Reducer: O(ci)
to compute the distance between a centroid (Cx, Cy) and a data point (Px, Py) would be
transmitted as (DIST Cxfile , Cyfile , Pxfile , Pyfile). If we assume that the security
guarantees of HElib hold, then it is computationally intractable to decrypt the contents
of any of the files and gain access to the plaintext data. Furthermore, even if the results
of a computation are exposed, there is no way to recover the original values. It is obvious
that a computation such as a+ b = c, given c, cannot be inverted to recover either a or b.
The most an attacker can learn by observing the tra c between the client and the server
is the number of values that are being processed. This information has no practical value
in terms of learning anything about the data points themselves. Thus, if we assume that
the HElib is secure, then our implementation of floating-point operations using HElib is
also secure.
3.5 Experiment and results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving cloud-
based anomaly detection model through comprehensive experimentation and compar-
isons. This is performed under two phases. In Phase-1, the accuracy of the data clus-
tering and anomaly detection process is evaluated for di↵erent data distributions. We
then compare the achieved accuracy levels to the results obtained over the same data sets
in plaintext as presented in [58]. In Phase-2, we evaluate the e ciency of the proposed
model through detailed analysis of the execution time in the distributed data processing
model using a MapReduce. For these purposes, the proposed model was implemented to
run on a multilayer VM environment within the Google public cloud computing service
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platform. Based on the hierarchical node topology of data processing that was presented
in [58], each VM in our implementation acts as a node that processes a subset of the
encrypted data for clustering and anomaly detection purposes over di↵erent analytical
tiers (Figure 3.4). The MapReduce mechanism is then implemented over each of the
nodes in the replicated hierarchical node topology in further distributing individual data
clustering tasks in overcoming computational overheads in encrypted data processing.
The results show that the proposed model achieve the same or comparable levels of
clustering and anomaly detection accuracy as that of plaintext, but with the added
advantages of privacy preservation and ensured data security.
3.5.1 Datasets
Four data distributions are created with 5600 observations each from the meteorological
sensor data available from EPFL Sensorscope monitoring project. The attributes of
Temperature, Humidity and Solar Radiation were chosen to create four di↵erent data
distributions with three dimensions. As a first step, the extreme values in the data were
identified and labelled as anomalies by manually plotting and inspection. To the resulting
datasets, 500 artificially created anomalies were added in providing di↵erent dispersed
and concentrated sets of data anomalies. The datasets are plotted in three dimensions
in Figure 3.10.
3.5.1.1 Evaluation Criteria
With the aim of replicating the results obtained for the plaintext data clustering and
anomaly detection models, six levels of experiments are performed based on varying the
expected number of clusters from 7 to 12 over each data set. The selected clusters range
is chosen as any number below that will be too small to optimally represent a general
sensor mote data distribution to score comparable fuzzy values for anomaly detection. A
larger number is not chosen so as to reduce the computational complexities involved in
the current context of encrypted data analysis.
The statistical measures of Sensitivity and Specificity are calculated for each dataset
based on the results of distributed anomaly detection. These are identified through the
four values of True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP) and False
Negatives (FN). The sensitivity is the probability of a statistical test to be positive based
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Figure 3.10: The normal and anomalous data distributions derived using EPFL Sensorscope
datasets
on identified TP value while the specificity is the probability of a statistical test to be
negative based on identified TN value.
Sensitivity =
TP
(TP + FN)
, Specificity =
TN
(TN + FP )
(3.7)
The sensitivity and specificity measurements are calculated in all levels of the hierarchical
structure of the proposed data clustering and anomaly detection as the main evaluation
criteria. The datasets are initially distributed in the four local clustering level in S4 -
S7. The second iteration of clustering occurs in the secondary clustering level S2 and
S3 based on results from the local level S4-S7. The final iteration of clustering analysis
and anomaly detection is performed in the final clustering level S1 which is based on the
analysis results of the second or intermediate level nodes.
3.5.2 Phase-1: Data Clustering and Anomaly Detection Accuracy
The accuracy of the proposed model is evaluated with regard to data clustering and
anomaly detection accuracy in this section. Comparisons are made between the plain
text and cipher text versions of the proposed approaches and demonstrations made to
show similar accuracy levels as the work in [58] using the above discussed data sets. Tables
72
3.3 - 3.9 show the analysis results of EPFL datasets for both plaintext and ciphertext
implementations. We refer to the plaintext version with postfix (P) and the ciphertext
with postfix (C) respectively in the results tables.
We show observed results for local analysis level in Tables 3.3 - 3.6 where a sensitivity
average ranges between 0.9626 and 0.9816 for plaintext version and between 0.9623 and
0.9823 for the ciphertext version, with the expected number of clusters from 7 to 12.
Furthermore , the specificity average ranges between 0.8275 and 0.9990 for the plaintext
version compared to 0.9937 and 0.9983 in the ciphertext version. It is clear that ciphertext
version has achieved highly accurate results as comparable to the plaintext version.
Table 3.3: Classification accuracy: distribution 1 EPFL -S4- (Plaintext version - (P)) and
(Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 1 0.9880 0.9985 0.9991
8 0.9820 0.9700 0.9994 0.9982
9 0.9560 0.9880 0.9998 0.9976
10 0.9660 0.9580 0.9991 0.9987
11 0.9760 0.9840 0.9998 0.9973
12 0.9500 0.9560 0.9976 0.9991
Table 3.4: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 2 EPFL -S5- (Plaintext version - (P))
and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9980 0.9840 0.9960 0.9973
8 0.9740 0.9500 0.9983 0.9978
9 0.9440 0.9760 0.9925 0.9980
10 0.9660 0.9540 0.9937 0.9960
11 0.9380 0.9480 0.9930 0.9925
12 0.9560 0.9620 0.9973 0.9991
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Table 3.5: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 3 EPFL -S6 - (Plaintext version - (P))
and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9880 0.9980 0.9982 0.9989
8 1 0.9860 0.9944 0.9923
9 0.9600 0.9760 0.9983 0.9959
10 0.9540 0.9300 0.9928 0.9942
11 0.9860 0.9740 0.9889 0.9910
12 0.9580 0.9500 0.9978 0.9982
Table 3.6: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 4 EPFL -S7 - (Plaintext version - (P))
and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9840 0.9780 0.9955 0.9976
8 0.9940 0.9860 0.9966 0.9973
9 0.9400 0.9720 0.9901 0.9939
10 0.9820 0.9960 0.9852 0.9820
11 0.9980 0.9760 0.9955 0.9946
12 0.9920 0.9860 0.9925 0.9973
Table 3.7: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 1 and 2 EPFL -S2- (Plaintext version -
(P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9770 0.9820 0.9961 0.9963
8 0.9650 0.9720 0.9959 0.9952
9 0.9710 0.9670 0.9954 0.9946
10 0.9500 0.9580 0.9915 0.9899
11 0.9690 0.9550 0.9941 0.9925
12 0.9410 0.9470 0.9917 0.9906
Tables 3.7 - 3.8 show results for secondary analysis level where the sensitivity averages
between 0.9621 and 0.9635 for plaintext version and 0.9578 and 0.9613 for ciphtertext
version, with the expected number of clusters from 7 to 12. Furthermore, the specificity
average of plaintext version ranges between 0.9951 and 0.9990 compared to 0.9967 and
0.9983 in the ciphertext version. This indicates the ciphertext version has achieved highly
accurate results as comparable to the plaintext version. Results of the final (root) analysis
level are shown in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.8: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 3 and 4 EPFL -S3- (Plaintext version -
(P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9710 0.9570 0.9954 0.9942
8 0.9630 0.9610 0.9938 0.9927
9 0.9570 0.9520 0.9924 0.9906
10 0.9670 0.9740 0.9951 0.99352
11 0.9590 0.9650 0.9928 0.9917
12 0.9510 0.9380 0.9919 0.9899
Table 3.9: Clustering analysis accuracy: distribution 1,2,3 and 4 EPFL -S1- (Plaintext version
- (P)) and (Ciphertext version - (C))
No.clusters Sensitivity(P) Sensitivity(C) Specificity(P) Specificity(C)
7 0.9795 0.9725 0.9961 0.9957
8 0.9785 0.9755 0.9965 0.9960
9 0.9750 0.9705 0.9953 0.9945
10 0.9670 0.9725 0.9957 0.9954
11 0.9720 0.9760 0.9955 0.9957
12 0.9745 0.9705 0.9949 0.9946
Figure 3.11 and 3.12 show the cluster analysis results (from left to right) for 7,9 and 12
expected clusters for EPFL distribution 1 and 3, 2 and 4 respectively. The figures show
the resulting EPFL anomaly distributions of the datasets, with the detected clustering
and isolated anomalies consecutively.
3.5.3 Phase-2: E ciency and Performance Analysis
In this section, the second major criteria of e ciency is analysed based on execution time
over the di↵erent data sets, specifically the computational processes in each node of the
distributed hierarchical topology (see Figure 3.4). Two ciphertext cluster analysis ap-
proaches are implemented for comparative evaluation. First, we implement a centralised
approach where data is processed in a single VM. The second approach is based on a
MapReduce mechanism where the analysis process computations are distributed among
a set of VMs. The centralised-based approach runs on 4 Intel Xeon E5 2.6 GHz cores and
16 GB memory VM in each node of the distributed hierarchical topology. The MapRe-
duce based approach runs on 100 VMs of Google cloud computing services for each node
of the same topology.
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Figure 3.11: Data clustering output (from left to right) for 7,9 and 12 expected clusters for EPFL anomaly distribution
1 (row1) and anomaly distribution 2 (row 3) with the detected anomalies for distribution 1 (row 2) and the detected
anomalies for distribution 3 (row 4) using the proposed model to perform cloud based distributed anomaly detection
in a privacy preserving manner.
Table 3.10 shows the average execution time for di↵erent tasks over the two levels of
primary data processing in the proposed anomaly detection framework based on the
centralised approach of BGV homomorphic encryption scheme. We divide the local
analysis level into di↵erent stages of computations (data clustering and anomaly detection
stages), whereas secondary and final analysis levels of analysis are represented by the
single anomaly detection stage that is unique to that level. In each stage of the three
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Figure 3.12: Data clustering output (from left to right) for 7,9 and 12 expected clusters for EPFL anomaly distribution
2 (row1) and anomaly distribution 4 (row 3) with the detected anomalies for distribution 2 (row 2) and the detected
anomalies for distribution 4 (row 4) using the proposed model to perform cloud based distributed anomaly detection
in a privacy preserving manner.
levels, we aggregate all basic computations and illustrate a case study of the overall
execution time within pre-define parameters where (n) is the number of data points and
(c) is the number of clusters.
Moreover, we demonstrate how the distributed MapReduce approach overcomes the HE
computations overhead of the centralised approach in Table 3.11. It shows the execution
time of both approaches based on di↵erent sizes of datasets. It is clear that the distributed
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Table 3.10: The average execution time of involved operations in the distributed hierarchical
topology for BGV homomorphic scheme based on the centralised-based approach ( (n) is the
number of data points and (c) is the number of clusters).
Execution time
Local analysis level (per node)
Data clustering stage8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Distance computations:
In case n = 6100 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 30512.80 seconds
Mean computations:
In case n = 6100 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 4270.92 seconds
Update clusters computations:
In case n = 6100 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 65180.39 seconds
—————————————————————————
Anomaly detection stage8>>>><>>>>:
Mean computations:
In case n = 6100 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 4270.92 seconds
Threshold (Standard deviation) computations:
In case n = 6100 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 43061.57 seconds
Secondary analysis level (per node)
Anomaly detection stage8>>>><>>>>:
Mean computations:
In case n = 12200 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 8350.41 seconds
Threshold (Standard deviation) computations:
In case n = 12200 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 86309.60 seconds
Final analysis level
Anomaly detection stage8>>>><>>>>:
Mean computations:
In case n = 24400 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 16093.52 seconds
Threshold (Standard deviation) computations:
In case n = 24400 & c = 7, execution time ⇡ 172150.27 seconds
MapReduce approach speeds up the clustering analysis process which, in turn, proves that
the distribution mechanism is the optimal approach to overcome the performance barrier
of secure HE computations. Chart 1 shows how the increase in the number of VMs can
rapidly reduce the execution time of a dataset consisting of 6100 data points.
Table 3.11: Execution time variation for ciphertext clustering based anomaly detection ap-
proach using varying sizes of datasets. (unit: minute)
No.points No.points No.points
Approach 1500 3000 6000
Centralised-based 1904.05 3719.20 7169.29
MapReduce-based (20 VMs) 92.12 186.10 359.42
MapReduce-based (40 VMs) 46.39 90.23 182.17
MapReduce-based (60 VMs) 31.26 61.18 124.97
MapReduce-based (80 VMs) 23.75 46.70 88.12
MapReduce-based (100 VMs) 17.50 35.01 62.38
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Chart 1: Execution time variation for a dataset consisting of 6000 data points for the proposed
approach with varying number of VMs employed.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed an innovative cloud based model to perform privacy pre-
serving anomaly detection in a scalable and distributed manner to ensure the quality of
decision-making on smart cities. An anomaly detection approach based on a distributed
version of the fuzzy c-means (FCM) clustering algorithm was implemented over homo-
morphically encrypted data. Extensive experiments illustrated that the proposed model
achieves the same level of accuracy as compared to a plaintext version. The distributed
data processing approach based on a MapReduce model also plays an important role in
overcoming the significant computational overheads of homomorphic encryption. The
proposed model can be adapted e ciently for any smart city service application that
desires to take advantage of public cloud computing without compromising data privacy,
to enable smart functionality.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving distributed
cloud-based analytics based on
fully homomorphic ecnryption
Abstract
This chapter introduces a privacy-preserving distributed cloud-based big data an-
alytic model using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). In the previous chapter,
we developed a secure cloud-based analytic model that relies on parallel computing
based on MapReduce model to overcome the massive FHE computations overhead. In
this chapter, we aim to further enhance the capability of analytic services to process
big heterogeneous data by considering distributed computing approach (e.g. health-
care, smart grid and industrial fields) to improve the quality assurance of services.
Compared to the model presented in the previous chapter, the proposed distributed
approach can partition both data and computations to be processed independently.
This involves running multiple segments of analysis tasks to work simultaneously in
small sets of data on multiple Virtual Machines (VMs) and then merging the results
to produce final analysis results. The distributed approach allows us to consider a
scalability feature that enables a variety of application domains to use it based on
their individual requirements. The scalability feature supports three factors, namely
analysis accuracy, performance and the size of resources, where users can specify
their needs based on these factors when building the analytic model (e.g. users may
have limited resources or time constrains to accomplish certain analysis tasks). The
main advantage of the distributed model is its the scalability of distributed approach.
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The scalability feature supports three factors, namely analysis accuracy, performance
and the size of resources, where users can specify their needs based on these factors
when building the distributed analytic model (e.g. users may have limited resources
or time constrains to accomplish certain analysis tasks). We apply the distributed
approach for two categories of data clustering models, namely centroid-based and
distribution-based clustering. The first section (4.1) of this chapter describes the
development a distributed version of centroid-based clustering (Fuzzy c-means clus-
tering, K-means and K-means++ clustering) algorithms and the second section (4.2)
presents the adaptation of the distributed approach to distribution-based clustering
(Expectation Maximization (EM)) algorithm. In both clustering categories, our dis-
tributed processing approach runs multiple versions of the clustering algorithms to
process small sets of data independently. The analysis results of these sets are ag-
gregated and then merged to produce final analysis results. The merging process
includes normalisation and conciliation processes to ensure high levels of accuracy
from the aggregated results. Experimental evaluation demonstrates the e ciency
of the proposed framework for both analysis performance and accuracy of building
secure cloud-enabled analytic applications. Evaluation of the scalability feature of
the distributed approach shows that more highly distributed configurations e↵ects
analysis accuracy and cost of resources, but leads to shorter execution times.
4.1 Towards secure and scalable cloud-enabled big
data analytics
4.1.1 Introduction
The exponential growth in a variety of pervasive monitoring and ubiquitous comput-
ing applications [45] has resulted in an overwhelming data flow from many sources,
such as real-time monitoring, social media and Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. This has
given rise to several challenges in terms of storing and processing massive and het-
erogeneous data [2] to enable more fine grained control and smarter decision making
support in underlying big data applications. In this context, scalable data mining
plays a vital role to extract meaningful knowledge from data [46]. More specifically,
clustering, as a data mining technique, is increasingly adopted in stream data services
in financial and medical fields with regard to anomaly detection and data segmen-
tation. However, clustering techniques, in a non-scalable traditional context, are
limited in terms of storage and processing capabilities [102]. Therefore, cloud com-
puting platform can be used to build a new generation of scalable data clustering
algorithms with unlimited capabilities to store and process huge and heterogeneous
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data [2]. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of applications domains that can benefit from
outsourcing data analytics model in cloud computing.
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Figure 4.1: An overview of applications domains that can benefit from our privacy-preserving
data analytics model in cloud computing. Data owners can delegate their data analytic services
to the cloud computing securely.
However, the privacy of sensitivity data has raised great concern about trust
issues in cloud computing [18], which is considered a major obstacle in moving to-
wards data analytics-as-a-service in the cloud. In many real-world applications, such
as medical, banking and social networks, distributed data mining is required to not
only improve the performance of data mining algorithms, but also to reduce the use of
resources by delegating the data mining tasks to external services providers or public
resources (e.g public cloud computing). Therefore, it is essential to build privacy-
preserving distributed data mining models that can take advantage of cloud facilities
and eliminate data owners’ concerns through ensuring data analytics services are
performed in a secure manner. The existing privacy-preserving data mining models
can be categorised in two main approaches, randomisation approaches, as in [84, 86],
and cryptographic approaches, as in [62, 85, 87, 103]. However, these approaches
have several drawbacks and limitations that must be addressed before widespread
adoption: 1) lack in terms of data privacy and the accuracy of data mining analysis
result, as in randomisation approaches [104, 105], due to the high random noise that
is involved in perturbing process. 2) lack in terms of performance e ciency as in
secure multi-party computation (SMC) models [85, 87] that is due to the huge over-
head of communication and computation processes between shared parties [106]; and
3) Rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) which is considered a security vulnerability
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that can reveal an individual’s private data [10].
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Figure 4.2: An overview of our privacy-preserving extremely distributed data analytics model
in cloud computing.
In this work, we propose a cloud-based distributed analytic-as-a-service model
that provides services based on clustering for a single or multiple users, as shown in
Figure 4.2. Compared to our previous work [9] in Chapter 3, we not only parallelise
the analysis computations the analysis computations, but also distribute the data into
subsets that can be processed in cloud computing nodes independently. Thereafter,
analysis results are aggregated from di↵erent cloud computing nodes and merged to
produce final analysis results. A MapReduce model can be used within each node to
improve the performance e ciency. Assuming the analysis time to process a dataset
consists of N data points and C is number of per-defined clusters in the paralleli-
sation approach is Tp, then the analysis time to process the same dataset by our
distributed approach is Td = Tp/(NC), where (NC) represents the maximum num-
ber of cloud computing nodes that can be created to process the data. This can
rapidly improve the performance of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE ) compu-
tations with big data applications. Moreover, our distributed approach considers the
scalability feature which relies on three main factors: accuracy of analysis, execution
time performance and the size of resources. These factors influence each other and
users may wish to apply some constrains on these factors. For example, users may
have limited resources or time constrains to accomplish certain analysis tasks. In
summary, there are two main objectives of our model: 1) Preserving the privacy of
users’ data while stored and processed in the cloud; and 2) Reducing the substan-
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tial e↵ect of processing encrypted data by developing a distributed approach that
significantly improves processing time. Therefore, we focus on the following aspects:
– Data privacy: The privacy of users’ data in our model is guaranteed through
adapting a new developed cryptography technique called Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) [35]. FHE ensures End-to-End data privacy because all
clustering computations can be carried on the encrypted domain. The cloud-
based service provider only has access to encrypted data. Thus, our FHE-based
model can automate a secure clustering-based analysis without disrupting the
service during any stage of clustering process. This model, which has the ability
to preserve the privacy of clustering computations, can be useful in a variety of
applications that demand massive resources to cluster large-scale data [107].
– Analysis performance: While data clustering in our model is processed in an
encrypted domain to ensure the privacy protection of users’ data, this also leads
to high overhead due to Homomorphic-based computations [108]. To overcome
this, we propose a scalable and extremely distributed approach with flexible
settings, where both data and clustering tasks are distributed among a dis-
tributed topology of of Virtual Machines (VMs) to overcome the huge overhead
of FHE and to make it applicable for variety of business models. Moreover,
the service centre can receive data from a single source (e.g. personal health
data) or multiple (e.g. industrial sensors data) sources for clustering purposed
in a privacy-preserving manner. Figure 4.3 illustrates our distributed approach
paradigm where the objective is improve the scalability of clustering tasks in
a way that ensures the accuracy of results while decreasing the performance
overhead of encrypted computations. The paradigm of our approach is mainly
designed to address a major obstacle of massive FHE computations overhead.
Moving FHE computations from centralised to parallel processing significantly
reduces the encrypted computations overhead. However, we make further steps
to improve performance e ciency by building an extremely distributed ap-
proach that not only enhance the performance by at least the double compared
with parallelisation approach and also makes it more convenient for distributed
data mining environments (in our case, centroid-based data clustering).
4.1.1.1 Motivation
The deployment of FHE can eliminate several privacy and security concerns. It is
semantically secure and relies on a well-defined security mechanisms that make it
more convenient to cloud computing platforms. However, fully homomorphic com-
putations carry a massive overhead which make it impractical for real-world appli-
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Figure 4.3: An overview of our extremely distributed analytics paradigm in cloud comput-
ing. Moving from simple centralised data processing to extremely distributed data processing
provides much more e ciency in terms of encrypted computation performance. Although par-
allel processing improve the computations performance, our extremely distributed approach
enhances the performance by at least the double compared with parallelisation approach.
cations. For example, it takes about 5.6 hours to perform clustering analysis for a
dataset with 4000 data points in a centralised approach (a single machine). In this
work, we propose an extremely distributed approach that partitions the encrypted
computations in such away that it ensures the analysis accuracy while reducing the
computations overhead. In this approach, we significantly reduce the encrypted com-
putations overhead while maintaining a high level of analysis accuracy. It improves
the analysis performance by at least factor of two compared with the parallelisation
approach. Compared with the centralised approach with the same specification, the
extremely distributed approach takes only 86 seconds to process the data with 100
VMs. Furthermore, the proposed approach has a scalability advantage where the
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dataset is distributed among varying number of regions and the size of each region.
4.1.1.2 Contribution
The proposed model overcomes the key issues highlighted above with regard to estab-
lishing a scalable and e cient distributed data clustering service for large-scale and
heterogeneous data in a secure manner to be implemented as a cloud service. Data
privacy is ensured by use of a convenient FHE cryptosystem to perform analytics
services on an encrypted domain. The contributions of this work can be highlighted
as follows:
– A privacy-preserving extremely distributed data clustering model is introduced
to provide clustering-based analytic services for large-scale and heterogeneous
data. An extremely distributed clustering approach that segments the data
onto multiple subsets is used to overcome FHE computational overheads, as
compared to a centralised-based clustering approach. We make use of a FHE
technique, which has the ability to perform required computations in an en-
crypted domain without any interaction from either the data owners or other
trusted parties. The resulting framework ensures end-to-end security during
the communication between the cloud computing entity and data owners.
– The introduced model is able to perform analytics services e ciently while pre-
serving data clustering accuracy. This is demonstrated through detailed com-
parisons to a centralised approach, involving multiple datasets and description
of encrypted mathematical computations on data clustering with their imple-
mentation within a public cloud infrastructure. The experimentation outcomes
demonstrate that our model can preserve data privacy without reducing the
accuracy of the overall clustering process. In particular, it is highlighted that
the extremely distributed approach has the advantage of speeding up the clus-
tering process compared to a centralised approach while achieving similar level
of accuracy.
4.1.2 Related work
In this section, we review the literature of both privacy-preserving distributed data
clustering and Homomorphic encryption, which are the main fields related to the
proposed model in this work.
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4.1.2.1 Privacy-preserving distributed data clustering
Privacy and security in distributed clustering has been studied by researchers from
both data mining and security perspectives. Agarwal and Srikant [109] introduced
the idea of a privacy preserving distributed clustering where the aim is to retrieve
useful information from an individual’s private data and securely revealing the pri-
vacy of individual’s original data. Thereafter, several privacy preserving distributed
clustering models have been proposed [62, 110, 84, 85, 87] where the aim is perform
data mining algorithms e ciently while ensuring data privacy. In general, privacy
preserving distributed clustering models can be classified in two approaches: the
randomisation-based and cryptography-based approaches [111].
Randomisation-based approaches secure an individual’s data through adding
a random noise to mask the data, such as [83, 84, 86]. However, although the
randomisation-based approaches have a higher level of e ciency compared to the
cryptography-based approaches, they are considered to be less accurate because of
the noise addition and also do not have formal proven security provisions [112]. On
other hand, the privacy-preserving cryptography-based clustering approaches rely
mainly on Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [113]. In SMC, two or more
parties collaborate to perform computations over their data while preserving the pri-
vacy of input data. The cryptography approach supports a higher level of security
compared with the randomisation-based approach. However, it is considered to have
higher computation and communication overheads [112]. The cryptography approach
has three main categories: oblivious transfer [87, 93], secret sharing [85, 90] and ho-
momorphic encryption[31, 29]. Oblivious transfer is expensive due to the required
computations to perform clustering tasks [114] while the secret sharing models are
costly in terms of communication between shared parties or within TTP in order to
perform clustering tasks. In short, both oblivious transfer and secret sharing models
are considered to be impractical for large-scale data because of the high computation
and communication overheads [115]. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a privacy-
preserving technique where computations can be carried out on an encrypted form
of data. The privacy-preserving models based on HE are divided in two categories:
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE), as in [31, 29] and Fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE), as in [89, 67]. The SHE schemes lack operational capabilities (due
to computation limitations) that are essential to perform clustering tasks while the
majority of FHE schemes are impractical due to the computation overheads [12].
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4.1.2.2 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) has been recognised since the invention of public key
cryptography. Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [21] introduced the first HE scheme.
Some other schemes include [29, 65, 30]; these are categorised as SHE schemes that
can perform a limited number of either addition or multiplication operations. SHE
schemes can not be applied for practical applications due to their limited capabilities.
This makes them ine cient to build useful cloud-based applications.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) was an open problem until the break-
through results of Gentry [22], which are based on the properties of ideal lattices.
FHE has the ability to support additions and multiplications operations simultane-
ously. In subsequent years, various homomorphic encryption schemes have developed
based on there branches: lattice-based [89], integer-based and Learning-With-Errors
(LWE) [35]-based encryption or Ring-Learning-With-Errors (RLWE) [67] -based en-
cryption. In spite of the potential of FHE schemes, some remain impractical for
real-world applications because of their limitations in computation overheads.
In recent years, researchers have introduced several FHE optimisations. A public
key compression technique based on integer-based schemes has been introduced to
reduce the size of the public key from over 2 GB down to about 10 MB [68]. The
Batching technique [98], which is for the encryption of multiple plaintext bits into
a single ciphertext, improves the performance of integer-based schemes. Some FHE
schemes have software implementation such as the open source hcrypt Project, [116]
and [69]. Brakerski et al. [35], has open source implementation (HElib), which over-
comes the performance issue of other FHE schemes. HElib speeds up the performance
from 36 hours in the homomorphic Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) scheme
to 3 hours [117]. Further comprehensive surveys about practical FHE schemes are
shown in [37].
In this work, we investigate the possibility of applying FHE to preserve data
privacy during the clustering process. We also discuss how the FHE computation
overhead obstacle can be overcome by using a distributed approach to perform clus-
tering tasks which rapidly decrease the computation overhead associated with FHE
encrypted computations.
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4.1.3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the security preliminaries of our privacy-preserving
model which is the the BGV fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
4.1.3.1 Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) Cryptosystem
The BGV [35] is an asymmetric encryption scheme the security of which relies on
the hardness of Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem[101]. The BGV scheme
is a levelled fully homomorphic scheme that eliminates the expensive re-encryption
operation. Therefore, it can evaluate all circuits homomorphically up to a pre-defined
depth without bootstrapping. The BGV operates based on polynomial rings. Let
 i(x) be the ith cyclotomic polynomial with degree  (i). We then get a polynomial
ring A = Z[x]/ i(x). The plaintext space is a ring Ap = A/pA. The ciphertext space
is a set of polynomials over Aq = A/qA. We can describe the basic BGV operations
as follows:
– BGV.KeyGen (p, , l): The key generation algorithm has three inputs, a
prime number p that defines the plaintext space, a security parameter  , and
the depth level of the evaluated arithmetic circuit l. The outputs are a secret
key Sk and a corresponding public key Pk.
– BGV.Encryption Enc (Pk,m): The encryption algorithm has two inputs,
the public key Pk and the plaintext message m 2 Ap. The output is a ciphter-
text c 2 Aq that is homomorphically encrypted.
– BGV.Decryption Dec (Sk, c): The decryption algorithm has two inputs, the
secret key Sk and the ciphertext message c 2 Aq. The output is a plaintext
m 2 Ap.
The fact that the BGV scheme is homomorphic encryption means that:
m1 op m2 = Dec(Enc(m1) op Dec(Enc(m2))) 8m1,m2 2 Ap
where op is an unlimited number of arithmetic operations. The BGV scheme is built
in order to provide computationally feasible implementations in addition to certain
convenient routines on top of the basic arithmetic operations.
4.1.4 Privacy-preserving extremely distributed clustering
(EDC) approach
In this section, we introduce an Extremely Distributed Clustering (EDC) approach
that can be adapted e↵ectively to extremely distributed large-scale data clustering
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computations securely. Our aim is to reduce the computation overhead because it is
preformed on data that is homomorphically encrypted.
In the EDC approach, we focus on the distribution of both data and clustering
analysis tasks. EDC can speed up the data clustering process by processing di↵erent
subsets of data and clusters in di↵erent nodes (MapReduce boxes, which is a set
of VMs) in parallel, which is faster by at least a factor of 2. The EDC approach
enhances the computation’s e↵ectiveness though extremely distribution of clustering
computations compared with the original centralised clustering approach. Figure 4.4
shows an overview of EDC.
The overall EDC approach consists of three stages: Level-1 ”Data partition-
ing process”, Level-2 ” Distributed clustering process”, and Level-3 ”Merge
process”. In the first stage, the data and initial clusters are distributed among a pre-
defined number of nodes (MapReduce boxes). The second stage includes processing
centroid-based clustering tasks for each node independently. The final stage merges
all results on di↵erent nodes to produce final clustering results through two steps:
renormalisation and reconciliation. A weight matrix X is said to be normalised if
8r 2 X ` RowSum(r) = 1.0. Here r denotes a row of X and RowSum(r) =Pe2r e
where e denotes an element of r. We also require that all elements e are within the
range [0.0, 1.0]. Renormalisation is a process in which a matrix that is not normalised
is converted into one that is. A weight matrix is said to be reconciled if each row of
that matrix has a unique maximum element, that is 8r 2 X9me ` me > max(r me),
where the symbol   denotes set di↵erence. Reconciliation is a process in which a
matrix that is not reconciled is converted into one that is reconciled. Detailed expla-
nations of both renormalisation and reconciliation are given later.
The EDC workflow starts from data partitioning among MapReduce boxes, which
is ”Level-1”. In ”Level-2”, a parallel version of centroid-based clustering algorithms
is executed to speed up the clustering process in each MapReduce box. In ”Level-3”,
the merging process is performed to obtain the final clustering outputs. Figure 4.4
illustrates the workflow of the proposed distributed approach stages. We show more
detail of each EDC level approach in the following sections.
4.1.4.1 Level-1: Data distribution based on the EDC approach
In the EDC distributed approach, the collected encrypted data is split into multiple
fragments that we called it ”Regions” (see Figure 4.4). Each region represents a
MapReduce box that has a subset of data points and clusters that are processed
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Figure 4.4: The workflow of the proposed EDC approach stages.
based on the MapReduce Model. For the purpose of distributed processing of a
clustering algorithm, we must assign a certain number of data points, N , and a
certain number of clusters, C, to each MapReduce box. If the total number of data
points is P , then we write P = aN + a0 where a0 < N . If the total number of
clusters is Q, then we write Q = bC + b0 where b0 < C. Consider the problem as a
matrix U = (µ)P⇤Q with P rows and Q columns. We have now defined a method
in which this can be subdivided into ab submatrices, each of size NC. In addition,
if a0 > 0 or b0 > 0 then there will be one extract region that contains those data
points that do not fit into the region defined by the ab submatrices. Thus, the total
number of regions (MapReduce boxes) will be ab + z, where z = 0 if a0 = 0 and
b0 = 0. The initial weight matrix will be written as Uij , and has PQ members. The
index i varies over the data points (rows), while the index j varies over the columns
(clusters). For example, let us assume that we have two datasets with 1000 and 1067
data points and 12 cluster centroids. Then, we can distribute the data among four
regions (nodes) as follows:
Data distribution in a regular
case with 4 nodes (1000 data
points)
8>><>>:
P = aN + a0 ) 1000 = 2⇥ 500 + 0
Q = bC + b0 ) 12 = 2⇥ 6 + 0
Number of nodes : ab+ z = 2⇥ 2 + 0 = 4 nodes
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Data distribution in an extra re-
gion case with 5 nodes (1067
data points)
8>><>>:
P = aN + a0 ) 1067 = 2⇥ 500 + 67
Q = bC + b0 ) 12 = 2⇥ 6 + 0
Number of nodes : ab+ z = 2⇥ 2 + 1 = 5 nodes
Figure 4.5 shows how the data is distributed and processed a mong a set of
regions. For the purposes of distributed processing, we subdivide the matrix U =
(µ)P⇤Q into ab disjoint matrices Usub = (µ)N⇤C , each with (N) data points and (C)
clusters. Each submatrix ((µ)N⇤C) will have size (NC). Within each submatrix we
rename the row and column induces so that in each 1  i  N and 1  j  C. If
there is an extra region because of extra points that do not fit into the submatrix
regions, we treat this extra region as a special case, although the clustering analysis
tasks are the same.
Input data:
Dataset consists of 1000 data points
& 12 cluster centroids
Level - 2
Distribution 
clustering 
based on 
MapReduce
Level - 1
Data 
distribution
Level - 3
Merge 
distributed 
clustering 
results
Normalization 
& Conciliation
Clustering tasks 
parallelization based 
on MapReduce 
(MapReduce box 1)
Clustering tasks 
parallelization based 
on MapReduce 
(MapReduce box 2)
Clustering tasks 
parallelization based 
on MapReduce 
(MapReduce box 3)
Clustering tasks 
parallelization based 
on MapReduce 
(MapReduce box 4)
Dataset consists of 
1-500 data points &
1-6 cluster centroids
Dataset consists of
1-500 data points & 
7-12 cluster centroids
Dataset consists of 
501-1000 data points &
1-6 cluster centroids
Dataset consists of 
501-1000 data points &
7-12 cluster centroids
Region 1 
(Node 1)
Region 2 
(Node 2)
Region 3 
(Node 3)
Region 4 
(Node 4)
Figure 4.5: An example of how data is distributed among a set of regions (MapReduce boxes)
based on EDC approach (case of regular data distribution)
Assume that we have a single control node called Ctrl, M nodes (MapReduce
boxes) each of them calledMapBox, and a single reduce node calledRed. Note that
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each submatrice ((µ)N⇤C) has its own MapBox and the extra region, if it exists, will
also have its own MapBox. We can summarise the initialisation process as follows.
} The node Ctrl reads all data points P = {xi|1  i  P}.
} Create (NC) MapBoxes and send submatrix w = ((µ)N⇤C), where 1  w 
ab.
} The node Cntl creates (ab) random normalised matrices Uw.
} The node Cntl sends Uw to each node MapBox
} The iteration count is set to 0
4.1.4.2 Level-2: Distributed clustering based on the EDC
approach
In the second level of the EDC approach, we apply a parallel computations model in
each region (MapReduce box) for centroid-based clustering algorithms, in this case,
Fuzzy C-means clustering (FCMC), K-means clustering (KMC) and K-means++
clustering (KMC++). However, our approach can be extended to other clustering
techniques, such as distribution-based clustering algorithms. In the second level,
homomorphic-based encrypted data is processed within a subset dataset (NC), con-
taining N data points and C clusters (see Figure 4.5). We illustrate how the parallel
computations model works for each centroid-based clustering algorithm as follows.
– Fuzzy C-means clustering (FCMC) algorithm based on the EDC ap-
proach In the EDC approach, the total set of points P and clusters Q is
subdivided in regions (MapReduce boxes). Each region contains N points and
C clusters. In our implementation, a region is always assigned to exactly one
MapReduce box. To further improve the e ciency of homomorphic encryption
computations within each region (MapReduce box), we applying a MapReduce
model to parallelise FCMC algorithm encrypted computations that are not
overlapped. The FCMC algorithm is parametrised by three quantities: m, ✏
and T . The parameter m is the exponent used on each data value. Typically
m = 2 is used to simplify processing. The parameter ✏ is used to determine
whether the iterative clustering algorithm has converged. Convergence is re-
alised only if the divergence between iteration k+1 and iteration k is less than
✏. Typically this parameter is chosen to be much smaller than one, for example
✏ = 0.01. Finally the parameter T denotes the maximum number of iterations
permitted. If the algorithm has not converged after T iterations then the pro-
cessing is said to have failed. Typically T = 100. We illustrate the main FCMC
steps in the ED approach for each region (node) as follows:
93
1. Let x1, . . . , xn be the number of data points in a region R. The algorithm
randomly selects v1, . . . , vc number of cluster centroids from the data in
the region.
2. For each data point xi where i = 1 to n, calculate the Euclidean distance
dij between xi and each cluster (vj), as in Equation (4.1).
8(xi, vj) 2 R dij(xi, vj) =
q
(xix   vjx)2 + (xiy   vjy)2 (4.1)
3. Calculate the fuzzy membership µij based on the following equation:
8(xi, vj) 2 R µij = 1/
cX
k=1
(
dij
d1k
)m (4.2)
where µij is the membership of ith data point of the jth cluster centroid.
Note that µij will be zero if the jth cluster not in R. dij is the Euclidean
distance between ith and jth cluster centroid. The cluster centroids for R
are then updated in the next step.
4. Compute fuzzy cluster centroid ⌫j as follows:
8(xi, vj) 2 R ⌫j =
nX
i=1
(uij)
mxi/
nX
i=1
(uij)
m (4.3)
where ⌫j is the jth cluster.
5. The membership values of data points and cluster centroids are updated
based on equations 4.2 and 4.3 until the following condition is satisfied:
8(xi, vj) 2 R ||Uk+1   Uk|| <   (4.4)
where U is (µ)n⇤c the fuzzy membership matrix and   is the termination
criterion value that is pre-determined.
6. Once the previous steps have been completed for all regions R, the results
are then merged in Level-3 using our merge process (explained in detail
later). This gives a set of membership values for all points and all clusters,
just as in the centralised approach.
The MapReduce tasks per each iteration of FCMC algorithm in each region
(MapReduce box) are summarised in Table 4.1. The homomorphic encrypted
computations can be parallelise within each region as follows:
⇤ We allocate the n data points equally among the m VMs available to
perform MapReduce operations within each region (node).
⇤ In case the result of n
m
is not an integer, we add the remaining data points
to the last VM. Expressed mathematically, the number of data points per
VM equals b n
m
c for all VMs 1, 2, . . . , (m1), and
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Table 4.1: FCMC algorithm tasks parallelisation based on MapReduce model
Map tasks Reduce tasks
1- Calculate the squared Euclidian
distance between centroids and
the data points (Equation 4.1).
1- Calculate membership values
for each data point (Equation 4.2).
2- Calculate the dot product between
each data point and its the membership
values (Equation 4.3).
2- Recalculates the centroid for
each cluster and generate
a new membership matrix (Equation 4.3).
We illustrate the basic pseudo-code of the two MapReduce stages in Algorithm
6 and 7.
Algorithm 6 The FCMC algorithm tasks parallelisation: MapReduce stage 1
1: procedure (1)(Map task)
2: Inputs: Encrypted data points E(D) = E(x1),. . . ,E(xn))
3: Outputs: < E(xi) , [E(di1), . . . , E(dim)])>  <key, value>
4: Initialisation: Choose a random set of clusters centroids E(v1), · · · , E(vc) from a
given dataset E(D), m = 2, d = [ ], s = number of data points in each mapper.
5:
6: for each mapper [xi,. . . , xs] do
7: for (j = 0, j < c, j + + ) do E(temp) = E(0); E(temp) =
computeDist(E(xi), E(⌫j); . Distance computations based on Equation 4.1.
d[ ij ] = E(temp);
8: end forkey = E(xi); value = d[ ij ];
9: end for
10: end procedure
11: —————————————————————————————————-
12: procedure (2)(Reduce Task)
13: Inputs: < E(xi), [E(di1), . . . , E(dim)])>
14: Outputs: < E(xi) , [(µi1), . . . , E(µim)])>  <key, value>
15: Initialisation: E(µ = [ ])
16:
17: for i = 0, i < n, i++ do
18: for (j = 0, j  c, j ++ ) do E(µij) = computeMembership([E(di1), . . . , E(dim)]));
. Membership value computations based on Equation 4.2. E(µ[ ]) = E(µij);
19: end forkey = E(xi); value = µ[ ij ]
20: end for
21: end procedure
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Algorithm 7 The FCMC algorithm tasks parallelisation: MapReduce stage 2
1: procedure (1)(Map task)
2: Inputs: < E(xi) , [E(µi1), . . . , E(µim)])>  <key, value>
3: Outputs: < key, vj > < key, value >
4:
5: Initialisation: E(multi = [ ])
6:
7: for each mapper [xi,. . . , xs] do
8: for (j = 0, j < c, j++ ) do E(temp) = E(0); E(temp) = dotMult(E(µij), E(xi));
. The dot product computations based on Equation 4.3. E(multi[j]) = E(temp);
9: end forkey = E(xi); value = E(multi[ j ]);
10: end for
11: end procedure
12: —————————————————————————————————-
13: procedure (2)(Reduce Task)
14: Inputs: < E(xi), [E(multi[1]), . . . , E(multi[j])]>  <key, value>
15: Outputs: < key , E(vj) >  <key, value>
16:
17: for (j = 0, j  c, j ++ ) do E(temp) = E(0);
18: for i = 0, i < n, i++ do E(temp) = aggregate(E(multi[j]), E(µij));
19: end forvj = updatedCentroid(E(temp)); . Update clusters computations based
on Equation 4.3. key = j; value = vj
20: end for
21: end procedure
– K-means and K-means++ clustering (KMC - KMC++) algorithms
based on EDC approach
KMC and KMC++ algorithms can be accomplished as follows:
– Cluster centres are randomly initialised to a user given number of expected
clusters, and placed in a randomly chosen region.
– For each data point, a region is chosen at random, and then the Euclidean
distance to each cluster in that region is calculated and each data point is
assigned to the cluster with the closest cluster
– Recalculate the cluster centroids by finding the arithmetic mean of all data
points within their cluster, for each region.
– Repeat the last two steps until the cluster centroids converge.
– Merge the results for all regions using the Condorcet algorithm.
We illustrate the main steps of KMC and KMC++ algorithms based on EDC
approach as follows:
96
1. Let x1, . . . , xn be the number of data points in a region R. The algorithm
randomly selects v1, . . . , vc number of cluster centroids (in the region) from the
data in that region, with the number being determined by the user.
2. Calculate the Euclidean distance between each data point xn and the cluster
centroids based on the following equation:
8(xi, vj) 2 R dij =
cX
j=1
nˆX
i=1
(||xi   vj ||)2 (4.5)
where nˆ is a number of data points in each cluster in the region R.
3. Assign data points to each cluster centroid based on the shortest distance be-
tween each point and the cluster centroids in each region.
8(xi, vj) 2 R vj [ ] = min(xi)[d1, . . . , dc] (4.6)
4. Recalculate the cluster centroids ci, . . . , ck as follow:
8(xi, vj) 2 R vj = 1
vj
nˆX
i=1
xi (4.7)
where cj is the jth cluster in the region R and nˆ is a number of data points of
the cluster in that same region.
5. Repeat steps 2,3 and 4 until the cluster centroids converge.
6. Once all the steps above have been completed for all regions, use the merging
process to combine all the results from all regions. This gives a unique set of
assignments for every data point to a set of clusters.
The MapReduce tasks per each iteration of KMC and KMC++ algorithms in
each region (MapReduce box) are summarised in Table 4.2. The homomorphic
encrypted computations can be parallelise within each region as follows:
Table 4.2: KMC and KMC++ algorithms tasks parallelisation based on MapReduce model
Map tasks Reduce tasks
Calculate the squared Euclidian
distance between centroids and
the data points and assign each data point
to the closest cluster (Equations 4.5 and 4.6 ).
Recalculates the centroid for
each cluster and generate
a new membership
matrix (Equation 4.7).
We illustrate the basic pseudo-code of the MapReduce tasks of KMC and KMC++
in Algorithm 8.
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Algorithm 8 The KMC and KMC++ algorithms tasks parallelisation based on MapReduce
model
1: procedure (1)(Map task)
2: Inputs: Encrypted data points E(D) = E(x1),. . . ,E(xn))
3: Outputs: < E(xi) , [E(di1), . . . , E(dic)])>  <key, value>
4: Initialisation: Choose a random set of clusters centroids E(v1), · · · , E(vc) from a
given dataset E(D), m = 2, d = [ ], s = number of data points in each mapper.
5:
6: for each mapper [xi,. . . , xs] do
7: for (j = 1, j < c, j + + ) do E(temp) = E(0); E(temp) =
computeDist(E(xi), E(⌫j); . Distance computations based on Equation 4.5
d[ ij ] = E(temp);
8: end forE(minDis) = min(di1, ..., dic) . Calculate the minimum distance for
each data point based on Equation 4.6. assign(E(pi), E(vj)); . Assign data points
to each cluster centroid with the shortest distance based on Equation 4.6. key = E(xi);
value = E(vj);
9: end for
10: end procedure
11: ————————————————————————————
12: procedure (2)(Reduce Task)
13: Inputs: < E(xi), E(vj)>
14: Outputs: < key , E(vj)>  <key, value>
15: Initialisation: E(µ = [ ])
16:
17: for (j = 1, j  c, j + + ) do E(vj) = computeMean([E(x1j), . . . , E(xnj)); key = j;
value = E(vj)
18: end for
19: end procedure
4.1.4.3 Level-3: Merge process based on the EDC approach
After the convergence of clustering process in each region (MapReduce box), the
reduce node will have received output messages, one from each MapReduce Box (see
Figure 4.5). If any of these messages fail, then the algorithm has failed to converge
and the merging process can not be completed. In this case, the reduce node sends
(FAIL) message to the control node. However, if the reduce node has received all
messages successfully, then it will have a weight submatrice UN⇤C =
PC
j=1
PN
i=1 wij
from each MapReduce Box. Because of the nature of iterative processing, we assume
that each of the submatrices (UN⇤C) is normalised but it is not necessarily the case
that all submatrices are reconciled.
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We would like to unify the weight submatrices into a single matrix using set
union. However, the resulting matrix (UP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij) will not be nor-
malised. Since the row sums of each data point of the submatrices (UN⇤C) is 1.0
then the row sum of each data point in the overall matrix (UP⇤Q) will be a. This
is the first issue that must be resolved by the merging process. The second issue is
that we need to have one merged set of cluster centres C, but we actually have ab
sets of C cluster centres, potentially leading to as many as ab ⇥ C cluster centres.
We need to reconcile the cluster values so there are exactly Q cluster centres.
We can resolve both issues through a merging process that consists of four steps:
renormalise the overall weight matrix (UP⇤Q), reconcile the overall weight matrix
(UP⇤Q), merge the cluster centres, and recalculate cluster membership. In this work,
we focus on on three main algorithms FCMC, KMC and KMC++. We define the
membership matrix (MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 µij) to be the set of probability values such
that µi,j is the probability that point i is a member of cluster j. For some algorithms
(KMC, KMC++) the elements of MP⇤Q are binary: either a data point belongs (1)
or does not belong (0). We refer to this type of algorithm as univalent . Other
algorithms, such as FCMC, allow the probability values to be any real number in the
range [0, 1]. We refer to such algorithms as polyvalent . In either type of algorithm,
the probability of any point belonging to some cluster (or to belong probabilistically
to more than one cluster) is (1). Thus, the sum of the membership probabilities for
each data point must sum to (1) or (0). Since each data point corresponds to a row
of M , we have a requirement, which we refer to as the normalisation requirement,
that membership probabilities sum (j,M(i, j)) = 1.0. One of the di culties with a
distributed approach is that it only adds entries to a subset of M is that when M
is completely populated. It may be the case that membership probabilities row sum
(j,M(i, j)) ! = 1.0. This leads to Definition 1 of the EDC approach:
Definition 1 - Renormalisation: If membership probabilities row sum of a
data point V (i) = rowsum(j,M(i, j))! = 1.0, then divide each element of row i by
V (i).
While renormalisation is necessary, it is not su cient. To see why this is the case,
consider a single data point (x) whose membership is being computed relative to two
sets of clusters: C1 = {c11, . . . , c1q} and C2 = {c21, . . . , c2q}. When both computa-
tions are done, (x) will have a first set of membership probabilities {µ11, . . . , µ1q} for
C1 and a second set of membership probabilities {µ21, . . . , µ2q} for C2 where |C1|
and |C2| = q. In the univalent case, a data point (x) can only be assigned to one
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cluster, so if one of the (c1j) probabilities is 1 and also one of the (c2j) probabilities
is 1, then we have an inconsistency. Let us refer to these two clusters as c01 and c02.
Since (x) cannot belong to both c01 and c02, we set one of these probabilities to 0 and
leave the other probability as 1. To do this, we use Definition 2 (univalent) of
the EDC approach:
Definition 2 - Reconciliation (univalent): If a data point appears to belong
to more than one cluster, then recalculate the metric distance of that data point to
each of the clusters and choose the cluster to which it is closest. Set this probability
to be 1, and all other probabilities to be zero, in row x of the membership matrix.
For polyvalent algorithms reconciliation is more complex. In such algorithms,
we wish to identify the primary cluster to which a data point belongs. Typically,
this cluster will have a probability membership value > 0.5. However, it may be the
case that not of the probability values is greater than 0.5. To address this, we use
Definition 3 for polyvalent algorithms, which is used in conjunction with renor-
malisation.
Definition 3 - Reconciliation (polyvalent): Let µ1 be the largest probability
value, and µ2 be the second largest value of a given data point in the membership
matrix UP⇤Q. Suppose that after renormalisation it is the case that both µ1 < 0.5
and µ1 < 0.5. Then, we adjust the value of µ1 to be 0.5, and adjust the value of µ2 to
be µ2  (0.5 µ1). This process preserves normalisation and another renormalisation
pass is not required.
Given these definitions, we can describe the general distributed approach EDC
as follows: First, we split the membership matrix UP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 µij into a
set of non-overlapping regions (nodes) (U1, . . . , Um) where {Ui|1  i  m} and
Ui =
PC
j=1
PN
i=1 µij . Second, given that there are m compute nodes, data are dis-
tribute among the regions as evenly as possible among the (m) nodes and run each
node to completion. Once each node (m) is fully populated then merging process is
performed through the reconciliation (univalent) operation for univalent algorithms,
and renormalisation and reconciliation (polyvalent) operations for polyvalent algo-
rithms.
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4.1.5 Extremely scalable environment
The EDC approach has the property of being massively scalable. As discussed, the
EDC approach allows both the data and the clusters to be distributed across nodes.
This allows for a scale up to systems with potentially millions of points and hun-
dreds or thousands of clusters. Of course, the scale of the system depends on various
factors of the implementation. The most important factors are time, resources and
accuracy . Figure 4.6 shows the scalability factors where the size of each one can
e↵ects on others.
In the EDC approach, the amount of time used for executing the clustering al-
gorithms depends on two things: the maximum time it takes for one of the parallel
nodes to finish execution, and also the time it takes to merge results once all the
node-based processing has been completed. Merge processing can be accomplished
in linear time, so that the overall EDC processing times depends on the time the
most heavily loaded node takes to execute. Obviously the number of nodes used
in the computation, the faster processing will be. In a simulated environment one
can specify an arbitrarily large number of nodes. In the real world, however, nodes
are associated with physical cost, which may be a limiting factor on the processing
time. In addition, any individual node can have di↵erent configurations, such as the
number of (real or virtual) CPUs supported by the node. While more powerful nodes
will allow more algorithm threads to run, such nodes will also be more expensive.
Finally, one must consider accuracy. In cases where data points are subdivided,
while clusters are not, then there is no loss of accuracy. However, once clusters
start being subdivided, errors are introduced that cannot be reconciled during the
merge process. The reconciliation step used to find a clear winner cluster centroid
Ci with Ci >= 0.4. If no such clear winner exists then the maximum value M of
all the Ci is promoted (”reconciled”) to the value 0.5. Suppose, however, that the
maximum valueM is not unique, for example Ci = Cj =M . Does it matter whether
we choose index i or index j to promote. Choosing index i will introduce a small
error in all the other coe cients, but choosing j will introduce that same error in a
di↵erent set of coe cients. Thus, while a highly distributed system may complete
the algorithm processing very quickly, the error rate will always increase as more and
more subsets of the total set of clusters are used. The user must therefore decide
how much error is permissible in a system. This will be another critical factor in
the overall performance of the system. In an e↵ort to characterise the behaviour of
the EDC approach as a function of these three parameters, experiments have been
performed using varying numbers of cluster subsets, nodes and threads per nodes. In
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each experiment the time to complete execution was measured, as well as the overall
error when compared with the serial execution of the algorithm. The results of these
experiments will be described later.
Analysis 
accuracy
Availability of 
resources
Execution 
time
Figure 4.6: The EDC approach takes into consideration three quantities: the accuracy of the
clustering and the execution time and the total cost of clustering analysis.
4.1.6 Computational complexity analysis
In this section, we discuss the computational complexity of clustering algorithms
computations based on three approaches: centralised-based on a single process-
ing machine; distributed data across multiple machines; and the proposed ”ex-
tremely distributed” approach with both data and clusters distributed across
multiple machines. Given a clustering algorithm we refer to these three approaches
as Centralised.Alg, Distributed.Alg and ExtremelyDistributed.Alg respec-
tively. We assume that the total number of points being processed in P , and the total
number of (initial) clusters to be Q. In the distributed and extremely distributed
approaches, we refer to the number of machines over which data is distributed to
be N . In the extremely distributed scenarios, we refer to the number of clusters to
be C. Thus, in the centralised-based approach, there is a single processing machine;
in the distributed approach there are N processing machines, and in the extremely
distributed case there are NC processing machine. If Centralised.Alg is an iterative
algorithm, we use k to denote the number of iterations needed to converge. Finally
we set a to be the integral part of the fraction P/N, and a0 to be the remainder,
so that P = aN + a0. For the extremely distributed approach, we also define b and
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b0 similarly, so that Q = bC + b0. Finally, we define A = N if a0 = 0, otherwise
A = N + 1. B is defined similarly.
Unfortunately big-O notation does not have su cient granularity to distinguish
the computational complexity of these three approaches, since the di↵erence will
be a matter of scale factors rather than polynomial order. Therefore, we intro-
duce the measure T , where T (x) denotes the amount of time an algorithm x will
take to execute on a single machine or multi-machines environment. We express
T(Distributed.Alg) and T(ExtremelyDistributed.Alg) in terms of T(Centralised.Alg).
In the case of T(Distributed.Alg), all data is distributed among A machines, but
each machine processes all Q clusters. Each of these machines can run in parallel.
However, there is a merge step at the end in which each data point’s distance to all
of the cluster centres must be recomputed, since each cluster only saw a subset of the
data. Thus, we can write T(Distributed.Alg) = T(Distributed.Alg)/A +MD where
the term MD denotes the extra time needed for this merge. From the standpoint of
the computations that need to be performed, this is exactly the same as computing
one more iteration of the baseline algorithm, so we can write:
T(Distributed.Alg) = (k + 1)/k ⇥ T(Centralised.Alg)/A
Turning now to the extremely distributed approach, we can see immediately that
we can write:
T(ExtremelyDistributed.Alg) = T(Centralised.Alg)/AB + VD
Where VD denotes the merging method that requires both reconcile and renormalise
all the data from theNC machines, after all such machines are done processing. Once
again this will require recomputing the distance of each data point to each cluster
centre. The additional iteration adds a multiplicative cost factor of (k+1)/k while
the merging process is linear in the number of points. In fact, since both functions of
merging method (reconciliation and renormalisation) are linear, the total execution
time for the merging method is bounded above by 2P, so we arrive at the equation
T(ExtremelyDistributed.Alg) = (k + 1)/k ⇥ T(Centralised.Alg)/AB + 2P
How do the three forms of the algorithm compare in terms of time to execute?
We have:
T(Centralised.Alg) < T(Distributed.Alg) < T(ExtremelyDistributed.Alg)
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There are two reasons for this. The first is that the distributed and extremely
distributed approaches use parallel processing on many nodes while the serial ap-
proach uses only serial processing on a single node. The second reason is that the
distributed and extremely distributed approaches replace a part of a quadratic algo-
rithm (the clustering operation is typically quadratic O(N2)) with a linear algorithm
(merging method, which is always linear O(N)). For example, in fuzzy c-means clus-
tering with 12 data points and 4 clusters, the time for serial encrypted processing is
about 500 seconds while the time for distributed processing (four nodes) is about 70
seconds (with a 0% error rate). If we go to an extremely distributed approach with
12 nodes, each processing of 2 data points and 2 clusters takes about 40 seconds, with
an error rate of 8% (namely, 1 point is assigned to the wrong cluster). In general
the distributed approach will have zero error rate, measured by the distance between
the final set of points and the set of points obtained in the serial case. However,
in the extremely distributed approach empirical data suggests that the error rate is
approximately 10%.
4.1.7 Security discussion
The primary goal of our EDC approach is to be able to perform algorithms on en-
crypted data without revealing any information about the data. The principal algo-
rithms of concern are machine learning algorithms, such as clustering and anomaly
detection. This section discusses end-user security considerations, security in the
cloud, and also the security of the underlying encryption mechanism.
Our architecture is a client/server architecture in which only the client, and thus
the end-user, has access to the unencrypted data. The client generates a key-pair
and sends the public key to the server (which will, in fact, be a set of machines in the
cloud, not a single machine or server process). It then encrypts all the data by first
tagging all data items and then using the private key to perform encryption. The user
only communicates with the client, and it is the responsibility of user to ensure that
the unencrypted data is secure. Note that unencrypted data is never transmitted to
the server, nor does the server ever send any unencrypted data back to the client.
The server operates only on encrypted data. This is possible because of a set of
FHE algorithms. In FHE implementation, there are a set of primitive operations,
denoted by op, that can be performed on the data to yield the same result as if that
op had been applied to unencrypted data. Mathematically this means that an FHE
algorithm has the property:
A op B = Enc(A) op Enc(B))
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For all A and B in the domain of the encryption algorithm Enc(). For the pur-
poses of the current work this domain is taken to be the set of all 32-bit integers
and the set of all single precision floating point numbers. For this domain the set
of allowable operations is op = +, , ⇤, /, <,=, >, signum. The standard implemen-
tation of FHE only operates on the integer domain, but our work has extended it
to the (single precision) floating point domain as well. Formally, we define a FHE
algorithm as an algorithm that operates on a term that has one of the two forms
op(dataVector) or op(term, dataVector). Thus, for example we can define the func-
tion F (a, b, c) = a+ b+ c as a term of the form +(+(a, b), c), which is the equivalent
of writing it as F (a, b, c) = (a+ b)+ c. Note that the input to the function is defined
as a vector of data so that an arbitrary number of arguments can be supplied. This
formal definition of a FHE function allows recursion, so, for example, we can define
the exponential function exp(A, n) of an argument A and a non-negative exponent
n by writing Exp(A, 0) = 1 and Exp(A, n) = ⇤(A, exp(A, n  1)).
At this time there are no known attacks against any of the published FHE algo-
rithms that are more e↵ective than brute force attacks. Brute force attacks against
FHE would take longer than the age of the universe for any reasonably sized data
set, so it is reasonable to assume that FHE is secure, unless some unprecedented
breakthrough in number theory occurs. If an outside observer were to view our im-
plementation of any of the standard machine learning algorithms in the cloud, it
would be immediately apparent that the algorithm was organised as a hierarchical
Hadoop algorithm. Since almost all of the machine learning algorithms are itera-
tive, the Map nodes handle the computations for some subset of the data at a given
iteration, and the Reduce nodes handle the merging of the subset results into an
overall result. This observer would also notice that the global file system of the
cluster was being used for the storage of information used by all nodes, such as an
ASCII representation of the public key. An observer of this type that had the ability
to capture individual packets in the cloud would only see operations of the form
(Op Tag1 Tag2), where each Tag refers to an agreed-upon data value known in
both encrypted and unencrypted form to the client, (which is also the control node
in the Hadoop cluster), but only in encrypted form in the servers. Thus even with
complete access to all network packets the malicious observer would learn only the
tag names and not any actual data. Any attempt to use tra c analysis to attempt
to infer the algorithm being used would not be successful, since only the primitive
operations are sent in network packets, not entire terms. Finally, if the malicious
observer has the ability to examine the contents of the global file system, it could
only learn the public key (which is already public by definition), as well as encrypted
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file representing intermediate results in the computation. Without the private key,
which is known only to the client, the malicious observer cannot learn anything from
these files.
In summary, our approach to extremely distributed computation for machine
learning algorithms builds upon the security of standard FHE algorithms, while
implementing them using a cloud-based paradigm. This approach is as secure as
FHE itself, and allows the machine learning algorithm developer the opportunity to
create fully secure algorithms in a distributed setting.
4.1.8 Experiment and results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy preserving EDC
approach through comprehensive experimentation and comparisons. This is per-
formed in three phases. In Phase-1, the accuracy of data clustering is evaluated
for di↵erent data distributions and the achieved accuracy in the EDC approach for
plaintext and ciphertext implementations compared. In Phase-2, we evaluate the
e ciency of the proposed model through detailed analysis of the execution time for
the EDC approach through variations in the dataset size and the number of VMs
employed. In Phase-3, we demonstrate the scalability of our EDC approach through
studying three quantities: the accuracy of the clustering analysis, execution time and
total cost of clustering analysis. We implement the extremely distributed clustering
algorithm to run in the Google cloud platform (GCP). Each VM in the applied set-
ting has a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. We demonstrate that the proposed EDC
approach can achieve the same, or comparable, levels of classification accuracy irre-
spective of the data being encrypted and also that it achieves significant reductions
in overhead and enhanced e ciency compared with a centralised clustering approach
4.1.8.1 Dataset
We use synthetic datasets for evaluating the accuracy and e ciency of the distributed
data clustering algorithms based on the EDC approach. Figure 4.7 shows four
datasets that have di↵erent properties in size and number of clusters. The datasets
are generated based on the model in [118] which generates two dimensional datasets
for clustering purposes. Each data point is represented by a vector of two values [x, y]
and a label that represent a data point cluster based on the generated specifications.
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Figure 4.7: The distribution of 2D synthetic datasets varying in size, from left to right 4000
and 6000 data points (row 1), and 8000, 10000 data points (row 2)
4.1.8.2 Evaluation Criteria
The statistical measures of True Positive Rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR) and
F-score are calculated for each data set based on the results of distributed data
clustering. These are identified through the four values of True Positives (TP), True
Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN).
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
, TNR =
TN
TN + FP
, F-score =
2TP
2TP + FP + FN
The TPR, TNR and F-score measurements are calculated for each data cluster-
ing algorithm based on both centralised-based and EDC approaches. There mea-
surements identify data clustering accuracy in both approaches in each clustering
algorithm and whether the EDC approach impacts the way of how we distribute
clustering among a set of VMs.
Table 4.3: Classification accuracy of FCMC for both plaintext and cipehertext versions.
Plaintext version Ciphertext version
Dataset size TPR TNR F-score TPR TNR F-score Error rate
4000 data points 0.9680 0.9701 0.9730 0.9600 0.9751 0.9675 1  2%
6000 data points 0.9730 0.9540 0.96490 0.9581 0.9653 0.9617 1  2%
8000 data points 0.9912 0.9830 0.9840 0.9772 0.9940 0.9804 1  2%
10000 data points 0.9964 0.9946 0.9930 0.9816 0.9906 0.9910 1  2%
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Table 4.4: Classification accuracy of KMC and KMC++ algorithms for both plaintext and
cipehertext versions.
Plaintext version Ciphertext version
Dataset size TPR TNR F-score TPR TNR F-score Error rate
4000 data points 0.9680 0.9701 0.9730 0.9800 0.9722 0.9708 1  2%
6000 data points 0.9730 0.9540 0.96490 0.9834 0.9586 0.9761 1  2%
8000 data points 0.9912 0.9830 0.9840 0.9604 0.9969 0.9982 1  2%
10000 data points 0.9826 0.9789 0.9808 0.9916 0.9946 0.9930 1  2%
4.1.8.3 Phase 1: Data Clustering Accuracy
The accuracy of the EDC approach is evaluated with regard to data clustering accu-
racy in this section. Comparisons are made between plaintext and ciphertext version
of clustering algorithms and between centralised-based and EDC approaches. We
demonstrate similar accuracy levels in both approaches by using the above datasets.
Figure 4.8 shows the cluster analysis results for the FCMC, KMC and KMC++
algorithms (from left to right) for 4,6,8 and 10 expected clusters.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show results with the TPR, TNR and F-score for both plaintext
and ciphertext versions of the EDC approach. Both versions achieve similarly accu-
rate results for the FCMC,KMC and KMC++ clustering algorithms. The sensitivity
and specificity averages of EDC plaintext version for FCMC algorithm are 0.9821
and 0.9754 compared to 0.9692 and 0.9812 in the EDC ciphertext version. In the
plaintext KMC and KMC++ algorithms, we achieve 0.9787 and 0.9715, and 0.9788
and 0.9805 of EDC ciphertext version for sensitivity and specificity respectively. We
can therefore conclude that the ciphertext version of the cluster analysis based ECD
approach has achieved highly accurate results compared with the plaintext version.
Moreover, we compare the clustering accuracy for both centralised-based and
EDC approaches in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. We illustrate the error rate of clustering ac-
curacy between the two approaches which is in the range of 4.76% - 7.17% for FCMC
and 3.07% - 7.08% in the KMC and KMC++ algorithms. The centralised approach
has higher accuracy but we achieve comparable results with the EDC approach with
much higher performance e ciency.
4.1.8.4 Phase 2: E ciency and Performance Analysis
In this section, the second major criteria of e ciency is analysed based on execu-
tion time over the di↵erent datasets. Two ciphertext cluster analysis approaches
are implemented for comparative evaluation. First, we implement centralised-based
approach for all clustering algorithms. The second approach is EDC which has dis-
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Figure 4.8: Data clustering output (from left to right) the objective function value for 4,6,8 and
10 expected clusters for the distribution of 2D synthetic datasets in (row1) and the detected
clusters for varying datasets sizes (from left to right) 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000 data points (row
2) using the proposed EDC approach to perform in a privacy preserving cloud-based model.
Table 4.5: Classification accuracy of FCMC algorithm for both centralised-based and EDC
approaches.
Centralized-based approach EDC approach
Dataset size TPR TNR F-score TPR TNR F-score Error rate
4000 data points 0.9899 0.9876 0.9888 0.9600 0.9751 0.9675 4.76 %
6000 data points 0.9610 0.9697 0.9822 0.9581 0.9653 0.9617 5.24 %
8000 data points 0.9854 0.9981 0.9946 0.9772 0.9940 0.9804 6.81 %
10000 data points 0.9940 0.9980 0.9958 0.9816 0.9906 0.9910 7.14 %
Table 4.6: Classification accuracy of KMC and KMC++ algorithms for both centralised-based
and EDC approaches.
Centralised-Based approach EDC approach
Dataset size TPR TNR F-score TPR TNR F-score Error rate
4000 data points 0.9985 0.9859 0.9822 0.9800 0.9722 0.9708 3.07%
6000 data points 0.9928 0.9743 0.9935 0.9834 0.9586 0.9761 4.25%
8000 data points 0.9778 0.9987 0.9992 0.9604 0.9969 0.9982 6.83%
10000 data points 0.9942 0.9968 0.9955 0.9916 0.9946 0.9930 7.08%
tribution capabilities based on MapReduce model. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the
execution time of both approaches based on datasets of di↵erent sizes. It is obvious
that the EDC approach achieves superior performance in the execution time.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate how the cloud computing resources e↵ect perfor-
mance of execution time in data clustering algorithms FCMC, KMC and KMC++
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Table 4.7: Executing time for FCMC, KMC and KMC++ based on centralised approach with
datasets of di↵erent sizes (unit: second).
Dataset size / clustering algorithm FCMC KMC KMC++
4000 data points 20275s 14135s 13829s
6000 data points 32440s 22616s 21905s
8000 data points 43381s 31591s 30248s
10000 data points 54307s 37881s 37120s
Table 4.8: Execution time for FCMC, KMC and KMC++ based on EDC approach using 100
VMs with datasets of di↵erent sizes (unit: second).
Dataset size / clustering algorithm FCMC KMC KMC++
4000 data points 86s 44s 35s
6000 data points 100s 63s 58s
8000 data points 157s 78s 69s
10000 data points 192s 121s 95s
with the EDC approach, especially when we take into consideration that all clus-
tering computations are performed on encrypted data. The encrypted computations
have a huge overhead which can be reduced by distributed clusters computations by
taking advantage of unlimited cloud computing resources. Table 4.11 clearly shows
that the increase in the number of VMs rapidly decreases the clustering execution
time. For example, FCMC with 4000 data points is processed in about 120 seconds
by using 20 VMs, while the execution time is reduced by %15 if we use 40 VMs, %40
in the case of 60 VMs and %113 in the case of 100 VMs.
Table 4.9: Execution time for FCMC algorithm with datasets of varying sizes in di↵erent
MapReduce settings (number of VMs) (unit: second).
Number of VMs / Dataset size 4000 6000 8000 10000
20 VMs 292s 445s 587s 734s
40 VMs 250s 328s 441s 617s
60 VMs 193s 296s 340s 501s
80 VMs 129s 166s 269s 333s
100 VMs 86s 100s 157s 192s
4.1.8.5 Phase 3: Scalability of ECD approach
We demonstrate the scalability of our EDC approach through studying three quan-
tities; the accuracy (A) of the analysis, the execution time (T) and the total cost
of clustering analysis (K). In the EDC approach a set of data points P and a set of
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Table 4.10: Execution time for KMC algorithm with datasets of varying sizes in di↵erent
MapReduce settings (number of VMs) (unit: second).
Number of VMs / Dataset size 4000 6000 8000 10000
20 VMs 241s 370s 466s 593s
40 VMs 183s 257s 351s 434s
60 VMs 121s 209s 280s 320s
80 VMs 94s 143s 172s 238s
100 VMs 44s 63s 78s 121s
Table 4.11: Execution time for KMC++ algorithm with datasets of varying sizes in di↵erent
MapReduce settings (number of VMs) x(unit: second).
Number of VMs / Dataset size 4000 6000 8000 10000
20 VMs 219s 310s 397s 553s
40 VMs 168s 237s 302s 406s
60 VMs 102s 161s 247s 283s
80 VMs 69s 112s 152s 197s
100 VMs 35s 58s 69s 95s
initial clusters C are subdivided in regions that are processed on N nodes using a
MapReduce computational approach. After the initial processing is done (which can
involve one of several di↵erent algorithms, including FCMC, KMC and K-Means++
) there is a post-processing step in which the results for the individual nodes are
combined, using a merging process. The EDC approach can involve multiple di↵er-
ent configurations, even if the number of nodes (N) is fixed. For example, for 1000
data points, 12 initial clusters and 25 nodes, one can create a single task on each
node with 40 data points and either 6, 4 or 3 clusters. One can also create two tasks
per node, with 20 data points in each. Keeping P and C fixed, it is also possible
to vary N nodes, thus creating even more potenial configurations. Is it possible to
determine the ’best’ configuration? In this section, we will discuss an experimental
approach in which a particular metric is used to assess the quality of a particular
configuration, given fixed P and C.
As mentioned earlier, the three quantities that demonstrate scalability are the
analysis accuracy (A); execution time (T ), which must include both the computa-
tional steps and also the merging process steps; and total cost (K). The accuracy
(A) for a given EDC configuration (X) is equal to || centroids(X) - centroids(S) ||,
where (S) is the serial solution, and ||.|| denotes the Euclidean distance between the
two sets of data points. We normalise the accuracy to be A = 100⇤(1 A/N), so that
is has a value in the interval [0.0, 100.0], so that it can be thought of as a percentage
of the fully centralised approach (S). The execution time is given in seconds. The
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inclusion of cost (K) is important because the more nodes that are used, the higher
the cost will be. We assume a model in which (K) is directly proportional to (N).
Intuitively, more highly distributed configurations should have lower accuracy,
but also shorter execution times. As one increases the number of nodes, for a fixed
configuration of regions, we would expect the accuracy to increase, execution time
to decrease and cost to increase. Figures 4.9-4.11 show plots of the number of nodes
(x axis) versus the computed accuracy (y axis) for six di↵erent EDC region config-
urations. Looking at this raw data, there is a trend in the accuracy considered as
a function of the number of clusters: fewer clusters per node gives less accuracy.
Considering accuracy as a function of the number of nodes, we can also infer that
adding more nodes actually causes the accuracy to decrease, because the number of
data points per region decreases.
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Figure 4.9: The variation in the EDC approach setting a↵ects the accuracy of clustering
analysis results for a dataset consist of 2000 data points. The table on the right side shows
varying setting of nodes and clustering and the plot in the left side shows the change in the
accuracy within each setting.
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Figure 4.10: The variation in the EDC approach setting a↵ects the accuracy of clustering
analysis results for a dataset consist of 4000 data points. The table on the right side shows
varying setting of nodes and clustering and the plot in the left side shows the change in the
accuracy within each setting.
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Figure 4.11: The variation in the EDC approach setting a↵ects the accuracy of clustering
analysis results for a dataset consist of 8000 data points. The table on the right side shows
varying setting of nodes and clustering and the plot in the left side shows the change in the
accuracy within each setting.
These trends in the raw data are purely qualitative observations. Also, the
execution time is not shown in the raw data, yet it is obviously an important factor
in evaluating the quality of a given configuration. Therefore, we define an aggregate
metric g = A/KT . For a given set of total points (P ) and total initial clusters (C),
we would like (A) to be as large as possible, while we would also like (K) and (T )
to be as small as possible. Figures 4.12 - 4.14 show plots of the value of the metric
g (y axis) with the configuration (data) index I. The collected data I ranges over
6 di↵erent configurations. Based on this metric the best configurations (those with
the largest values of g) actually employ fewer nodes and split up the clusters into
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as many per region as possible. In each case, the configuration with six clusters
per node did better than those with three clusters per node. Using this metric we
conclude that the best configuration is the one with the largest number of points
and clusters per region, even though this will lead to a longer execution time. The
increase in execution time is o↵set by the decrease in cost as a result of fewer nodes
being used.
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Figure 4.12: The optimal configuration of EDC approach based on the number of regains
(MapReduce boxes), number of clusters within each region for a dataset consist of 2000 data
points. A larger value of (g) leads to better configuration of EDC approach based on three
factors which are analysis accuracy, execution time and cost of resources.
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Figure 4.13: The optimal configuration of EDC approach based on the number of regains
(MapReduce boxes), number of clusters within each region for a dataset consist of 4000 data
points. A larger value of (g) leads to better configuration of EDC approach based on three
factors which are analysis accuracy, execution time and cost of resources.
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Figure 4.14: The optimal configuration of EDC approach based on the number of regains
(MapReduce boxes), number of clusters within each region for a dataset consist of 8000 data
points. A larger value of (g) leads to better configuration of EDC approach based on three
factors which are analysis accuracy, execution time and cost of resources.
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4.2 Privacy-preserving Expectation Maximisation
for gaussian mixture modeling in the cloud
4.2.1 Introduction
With the evolution of digital content and rapidly expanding data sources, machine
learning algorithms can play a critical role in the discovery of knowledge that im-
proves the quality assurance of services delivery. The Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm, introduced by Dempster et al.[119], is one of the most widely used
machine learning techniques in various fields (including signal processing, healthcare
and industry applications [120] [121] [122]) and is used to estimate the statistical
model parameters that would maximise the occurrence probability of observed data.
The EM algorithm is used to find the (locally) optimal parameters of a model with
hidden or (”latent”) variables, in addition to unknown parameters and known data
observations [123]. However, one of the main EM algorithm disadvantages is its slow
convergence rate [124].
Unlike traditional computing platforms, the unlimited cloud resources can be
utilised e ciently to outsource intensive data mining tasks of massive amount of
data [2], such as the EM algorithm which requires an iterative processing approach.
Nevertheless, the privacy of sensitive data is a major concern because the cloud plat-
form is exposed to several external and internal privacy and security threats. There-
fore, users’ data must be secure to preserve the privacy of data outsources to the
cloud. To address this issue, several privacy-preserving data mining techniques have
been introduced in the literature. These are broadly divided in two main categories:
randomisation-based and cryptographic-based approaches. Randomisation-based ap-
proaches rely on randomisation techniques by adding noise into the original data to
protect the data privacy, such as [104, 105]. Cryptographic-based approaches, such
as secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques [85, 87], use defined mathe-
matical models that allow two or more parties to achieve certain tasks over their
data without disclosing each parties’ private data to other parties. However, these
privacy-preserving data mining approaches have several drawbacks:
- Lacking in both terms of data privacy and the accuracy of data mining analysis
results (as in randomisation-based approaches, due to the high random noise that is
involved in perturbing process).
- Poor performance (as in SMC techniques, due to the huge overhead of commu-
nication and computation processes between shared parties [106]).
- Rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is considered a security vulnera-
bility that can reveal an individuals private data [10].
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Figure 4.15: The model architecture of the privacy-preserving distributed EM algorithm. Sub-
sets of data are processed in a distributed manner to accomplish certain analysis tasks and
then merged to produce final analysis results. Our model has the scalability feature in the
distributed approach, where it takes into consideration three main factors: analysis accuracy,
performance (execution time) and size of resources.
Unlike previous traditional cryptography techniques, Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE), constructed by Craig Gentry in 2009 [22], opens the door to using
cloud computing for e↵ective analytic services solutions. FHE has the ability to carry
out analysis tasks computations in an encrypted domain. In this paper, we intro-
duce a distributed privacy-preserving EM algorithm for Gaussian Mixture Modeling
in cloud computing. The proposed model deploys FHE to perform analysis tasks
without the need to interact with any parties, such as data owners or a TTP. How-
ever, performance overheads of both the iterative analysis tasks of EM algorithms and
FHE computations are the major barriers to providing practical and secure analytic
model in the cloud.
To overcome these barriers, we adapt the developed distributed and scalable
approach developed from our previous work [125]. The approach takes the advan-
tage of massive cloud computing resources to subdivide aggregated data into subsets
that processed in the cloud Virtual Machines (VMs) independently. This enables
the analysis of massive amounts of data with significantly faster performance. The
analysed data collected from di↵erent VMs is merged through normalisation and rec-
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onciliation processes to accomplish high level of accuracy in the final merged results.
Figure 4.15 shows the general architecture of the distributed privacy-preserving EM
algorithm. Our distributed approach has the scalability features that takes three
main factors into consideration: analysis accuracy, analysis performance (execution
time) and resources. These factors o↵er more scalability options and provide users
with more capabilities to apply constraints based on these factors.
4.2.1.1 Contribution
We propose an innovative privacy-preserving Expectation Maximization (EM) for
Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) in distributed cloud computing framework. The
data is protected through encryption by using FHE before being sent to the cloud
analysis. The main feature of our model is that all required computations are handled
by public cloud computing securely without any interaction data owners or a third
party. The specific contributions of the paper can be highlighted as follows:
– Privacy-preserving data analytics based Expectation Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm for Gaussian Mixture Modeling (GMM) in cloud computing framework.
The privacy of data and analysis tasks are protected by a FHE cryptosystem
called the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [67].
– Our distributed and scalable approach is developed by taking advantage of the
massive cloud computing resources to overcome performance limitations of both
the EM algorithm and encrypted computations overhead of FHE.
– We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the capabilities in the proposed
model with accuracy and e ciency evaluated over di↵erent datasets using a
variety of experiments. Experimental outcomes demonstrate that the proposed
model can preserve data privacy in an e cient process without e↵ecting data
analysis accuracy.
4.2.2 Related Work
A substantial amount of EM research exists in the statistical literature. This section
will attempt to summarise this work, as well as describe how it is related to the
present e↵ort. A number of methods have been proposed to accelerate the conver-
gence of the EM algorithm, which can be very slow with certain datasets. In partic-
ular the iterative step can be modified to use the conjugate gradient and modified
Newton methods (NewtonRaphson) [126]. Also, EM can be used with constrained
estimation methods, although the resulting algorithm may sometimes take longer to
converge than standard EM.
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Expectation Conditional Maximization (ECM) replaces each M step with a se-
quence of Conditional Maximization (CM) steps in which each parameter ✓i is max-
imised individually, with the constraint that during this single parameter optimi-
sation, all other parameters remain fixed [127]. In the Generalized Expectation
Maximization (GEM) algorithm, the goal is to increase in the objective function
F for both the E step and M step under the alternative description [128]. GEM
has been extended to work in a distributed environment and shows promising re-
sults [128]. It is also possible to consider EM algorithm as a subclass of the MM
(Majorize/Minimize) [129] and therefore use any machinery developed in that more
general case [130].
The objective function Q used in the EM algorithm is based on the log likeli-
hood. Therefore, it may be referred to as the log-EM algorithm. The use of the log
likelihood can be generalised to that of the ↵–log likelihood ratio. Then, the ↵–log
likelihood ratio of the observed data can be exactly expressed by using the Q-function
of the ↵–log likelihood ratio and the ↵–divergence. Obtaining this Q–function is a
generalised E–step, and can therefore be parallelised in exactly the same manner as
was demonstrated above. Its maximisation is a generalised M–step. This pair is
thus referred to as the ↵–EM algorithm [131], which contains the log–EM algorithm
as a subclass. Thus, the ↵–EM algorithm is an exact generalisation of the log–EM
algorithm and no computation of a gradient or Hessian matrix is needed. The ↵–EM
shows faster convergence than the log–EM algorithm by choosing an appropriate ↵.
The ↵–EM algorithm leads to a faster version of the Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
estimation algorithm ↵–HMM [132].
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Figure 4.16: An overview of privacy-preserving distributed EM algorithm.
EM typically converges to a local optimum, not necessarily the global optimum,
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with no bound on the convergence rate in general. It is possible for it to be arbitrarily
poor and an exponential number of local optima is possible. Hence, a need exists for
alternative methods for guaranteed learning. EM alternatives with better guarantees
for consistency exist and are termed moment–based approaches, or the so–called
spectral techniques. In moment–based approaches to learn, the parameters of a
probabilistic model are of interest since they have provable guarantees such as global
convergence under certain conditions. No such proofs exist for EM, which is often
plagued by the issue of getting ‘stuck’ in local optima. Algorithms with guarantees
for learning can be derived for a number of important models, such as mixture
models, HMMs etc. For these spectral methods, no spurious local optima occur and
the true parameters can be consistently estimated with certain regularity conditions
[133], [134]. Algorithms with these guarantees are harder to parallelise, since there
is a larger amount of intercommunication required between the various steps of the
algorithm.
However, privacy and security issues limit the ability to deploy machine learn-
ing techniques for various applications in the cloud where the data stored in their
plaintext form in public servers. Some studies on privacy-preserving EM algorithms
use security mechanisms that rely on either Secure Multiply Computation (SMC) as
in [135] or di↵erential privacy as in [136]. These techniques su↵er from either high
communication overhead or loss of accuracy due to the addition of high noise to the
data. In comparison to the existing EM algorithm performance enhancement work,
ours is a practical and e cient distributed EM algorithm for cloud-based environ-
ments. Moreover, we consider privacy and security concerns though adapting FHE
to protect owners’ data during all analysis stages in the cloud without the need to
interact with any other third party.
4.2.3 Privacy-preserving distributed em algorithm in cloud
computing
In this section, we introduce a privacy-preserving distributed EM algorithm cloud-
based model. A distributed analytics approach is developed to enhance the e ciency
of encrypted EM algorithm computations by leveraging cloud computing resources.
First, we present the system architecture and the preliminaries of FHE. Then, we
introduce the EM algorithm and a toy example to illustrate the basic functionalities
and security mechanisms. Finally, we illustrate how the EM algorithm is developed
in a distributed manner and applied for the GMM estimation.
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4.2.3.1 System architecture
We introduce a privacy-preserving distributed approach for an EM algorithm in cloud
computing. Our system architecture has two main parties: End User (EU) and Cloud
Service Provider (CSP). The work flow of the system starts by encrypting the data
from its source (e.g. industrial sensors) or in a secure side that is operated by EU.
Then, the encrypted data is sent to public cloud servers for analytics services. The
CSP is responsible for managing cloud resources and is unable to disclose encrypted
data as all computations are carried out on encrypted form of the data. Figure 4.16
shows the main parties and the workflow of the system architecture.
4.2.3.2 Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) fully
homomorphic encryption
The BGV [35] is an asymmetric encryption scheme the security of which relies on
the hardness of Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem[101]. The BGV scheme
is a levelled fully homomorphic scheme that eliminates the expensive re-encryption
operation. Therefore, it can evaluate all circuits homomorphically up to a predefined
depth without bootstrapping.
The BGV algorithm is parametrised by several quantities: the security param-
eter  , the modulus q, the exponent d, the dimension n (which is always 1 in our
implementation), and the ‘noise’ distribution  . We add an additional parameter N ,
which is the integer d(2n + 1)log(q)e. For simplicity, we assume that the plaintext
space for m is {0, 1}, although the more general case can also be handled easily.
The BGV algorithm has five components: initialisation (E.Setup), secret key
generation (E.SecretKeyGen), public key generation (E.PubKeyGen), encryption
(E.Enc) and decryption (E.Dec). We will now describe each of these components.
– E.Setup(1 , 1µ, bsel): in the general case, we use the bit bsel to denote whether
we are using the ring of integers (d = 1) or the ring of polynomials (n = 1). For
the purposes of this description we always assume the latter, so that bsel = 1.
The value µ denotes the number of bits in the modulus q. We write params =
(q, d, n,N, ).
– E.SecretKeyGen(params): choose s0 =  n and set the secret key sk = s  
(1, s0[1], . . . , s0[n]) 2 Rn+1q .
– E.PublicKeyGen(params,sk): generate a matrix A0  RnNq uniformly, and also
a vector e   N . Then, set b  A0s0 + 2e. Then set the matrix A to be
the (n + 1) column matrix consisting of b followed by the n columns of  A0.
Observe that A · s = 2e. Set the public key pk = A.
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– E.Enc(params,pk,m): set the vector m (m, . . . , 0) which is in Rn+1q . Sample
r  RN and then output the ciphertext c  m + AT r. Observe that c is an
element of Rn+1q .
– E.Dec(params,sk,c): output m [[< c, s >]q]2.
4.2.3.3 Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm
The EM is an iterative algorithm that is used to find maximum likelihood and max-
imum a posteriori estimates for models with latent (Hidden) variables. The EM
algorithm consist of two main steps, the: 1) Expectation step which is responsible
for guessing a probability distribution over completions of missing data of a given
model (known as the E-step); and 2) Maximization step, which is responsible for
re-estimating the model parameters using these completions (known as theM-step).
The name ’E-step’ comes from the fact that one does not usually need to form the
probability distribution over completions explicitly, but rather need only compute
’expected’ su cient statistics over these completions. Similarly, the name ’M-step’
comes from the fact that model re-estimation can be thought of as a ’maximization’
of the expected log-likelihood of the data. Figure 4.17 illustrates an overview of the
EM algorithm workflow model.
Start
Initialize values
Expectation step (E-step)
Guessing a probability distribution 
over completions of missing data
Maximization step (M-step)
Re-estimating the parameters 
using the current completions
Figure 4.17: Workflow model of the EM algorithm.
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4.2.3.4 Toy example of EM algorithm
We can consider a simple coin tossing experiment in both a centralised form and also
a distributed form to explain the basic concepts of EM algorithm. We are given a pair
of coins A and B of unknown biases, ✓A and ✓B , respectively. Thus, on any given coin
toss, coin A will be heads with probability ✓A and tails with probability 1  ✓A, with
the same definition applied to coin B. Our goal is to estimate ✓ = (✓A, ✓B) by using
the following algorithm a given number of times (five in this experiment): randomly
choose one of the two coins, and perform a given number of independent coin tosses
with the selected coin. In this example, we will use ten coin tosses. Thus, the entire
experiment has a total of 50 coin tosses. During the experiment, we will keep track
of two vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , x5) and z = (z1, z2, . . . , z5), where xi 2 1, . . . , 10 is
the number of heads observed during the i   th set of tosses, and zi 2 A,B is the
identity of the coin used during the i  th set of tosses. The identity of zi variable is
known to be hidden.
Randomly choose 
one of the two coins 
(A, B) and perform 10 
independent coin 
tosses (per row) with 
the selected coin.
E-step
Probability distribution over 
possible completions is computed 
using the current parameters
Estimating likely number 
of heads and tails
Initial 
guess of the 
parameters
Updated 
parameters 
estimation
M-step
is the number of heads in each row
is the number of tails in each row
is a heads (H) or a tail (T)
Figure 4.18: The iterative process of the EM algorithm. Parameter estimation for complete
and incomplete data. The EM algorithm begins with an initial guess of the parameters. Then,
the E-step computes a probability distribution over possible completions using the initial pa-
rameters. In the M-step, new parameters are determined using the current completions and
after several iterations, the algorithm converges.
One iterative process of EM algorithm for completing is as follows: start from
some initial parameters, ✓ˆt = ✓ˆtA, ✓ˆ
t
B and determine for each of the five sets whether
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coin A or coin B was more likely to have generated the observed tosses using the
current parameter estimates. Then, assume these completions, (that is, guessed coin
labels) to be correct, and apply the regular maximum likelihood estimate to get
✓ˆ(t+1). Finally, repeat these two steps until convergence (see Figure 4.18). As the
estimated model improves, so too will the quality of the resulting completions.
4.2.3.5 Challenges of the distributed EM algorithm
Let M be a random process that emits symbols s in a finite language L. Let |M | =
length(L) be the number of distinct symbols in L. We do not make the standard
assumptions that the s are independent or identically distributed, so it may happen
that M is biased. In the limiting case where |M | = 2, we have the previous toy
example of a coin toss of a possibly biased coin, and we can label the two symbols
as Heads (h) and Tails (T).
The first challenge that arises in developing a distributed EM algorithm is how to
separate the process M across multiple nodes, while still preserving the probability
distributions of the individual symbols s 2 L. This can be solved by designating a
single node as the one that will run the process M and collect the symbol output.
This node observes the output of M and distributes the resulting symbols to each
of the EM computational nodes. At first glance this might seem to require that the
system be serialised, as each compute node appears to need to wait for the next
symbol. However, this objection is immediately overcome because we can have the
M process node operate in a streaming fashion. The first time that a node needs
a symbol the node will have to wait, but for all subsequent requests the node will
not have to wait. While each compute node is performing its computations, the
M process node, which we will refer to as the Control Node (CN), will continue to
generate values and store them in a First-In First-Out queue (FIFO). Whenever a
compute node requires a symbol, the CN will provide the value that is at the head
of the queue without delay. Thus, other than the one time cost penalty associated
with each node receiving its very first symbol, the CN does not force serialisation,
and thus computations can proceed in a distributed manner.
Now consider a more challenging variant of the parameter estimation problem
in which we are given the recorded symbol counts xi but not the identities of the
symbols zi used. These components are known as hidden variables. This is the
classic example of the an incomplete data case. In this case we cannot use the
estimation methods described previously because we do not known which symbol
was output at any given time. For example, suppose we label the symbols a, b, c, d
and we have a count vector of 40, 20, 15, 25. This tells us that 100 symbols have been
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outputted, but we do not know which symbol belongs to which count. If we had some
method of completing the data (in this example, by producing an assignment such
as c : 40, d : 20, a : 15, b : 25) then we could reduce the parameter estimation problem
for the case of incomplete data to the much easier maximum likelihood problem for
complete data. This means that even in the case of incomplete data we can still use
the distributed-based approach to significantly increase performance.
The EM algorithm is a refinement of the idea that, rather than trying to pick the
single most likely completion of missing data (the symbol assignments), each iteration
computes probabilities for all possible assignments of the missing data. It does this
using the current parameters ✓ˆt. The probabilities are used to create a weighted
training set consisting of all possible completions of the data. Finally, a modified
version of the maximum likelihood algorithm that handles weighted training data
produces new parameter estimates ✓ˆt+1 at the next time step. By using weighted
training data, rather than attempting to choose the single best completion of the
data, the EM algorithm takes into account the relative confidence associated with
each of the possible assignments to the incomplete data.
4.2.3.6 Distributed approach of the EM algorithm
We consider a set of measurements y from a set Y , and suppose these to be a subset
of all the measurements x from a set X. The missing data is a set Z = X   Y with
elements z. Thus, x = (y, z). The weights will be denoted as ✓, with themth iteration
of the estimated weight as ✓(m). The conditional probability density of y given ✓ we
write as p(y|✓) = pY (Y = y|✓).  is the closure of the set {x | p(x|✓) > 0}, also known
as the .. of X. If we condition this support on y, we write that as  (y) which can
be formally defined as the closure of the set of x values such that {x | p(x|y, ✓) > 0}.
Finally, we define the expectation EX|y[X], also denoted by EX|Y [X|Y = y], as
EX|y[X] =
Z
 (y)
xp(x|y) dx (4.8)
In order to apply EM, we require the observables y, the probability density p(y|✓),
and the probability density p(x|✓). For the distributed approach, we assume that
the total set of all observables has been distributed over a set of nodes, based on the
number of observables and also the total number of nodes that are available. We
also assume that the probability density values are originating in a CN node that is
operating in streaming mode. Note that we require ✓ 2 ⇥ for some predefined set ⇥.
We do not observe the random variableX directly; instead we observe the data values
y of the random variable Y = F (X) for some function F (). For example, if x ranges
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over the complex numbers then we might define the function F (w) = <(w) which
gives the real part of the argument w, so that y will range over the real numbers.
When we start the EM process, we do not actually know the probability density
over x. Therefore, we perform an iterative algorithm in which we take a guess for
✓, we derive an estimate that the complete data is x and use this to calculate a new
value of ✓ the expected value of p(x|✓). To do this, we consider all possible values
for x and weight the value of p(x0|✓) by the probability of seeing exactly x0. Since
the log function is monotonic, it is traditional to use log p(x|✓), which is called the
log–likelihood. Use of the log function in the EM algorithm is a carryover of the
use of that same function in Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), of which the
EM algorithm is a significant generalisation. It is useful to define the expectation of
log p(x|✓) using a function often known as the Q–function, which is (EXP denotes
’expected’):
Q(✓|✓(m)) = EXP log p(x|✓) = EX|y,✓(m) [log p(X|✓)]
=
Z
 (y)
log p(x|✓)p(x|y, ✓(m)) dx (4.9)
In the distributed implementation, the entire dataset has been partitioned, and
the EM algorithm runs in parallel in each node. Initially the weights will be nor-
malised over the entire dataset, but once the partitioning has occurred, the weights
will be normalised only within the region to which they have been assigned. As a
result, after an iteration, all of the per-region data must be recombined in the CN.
The resulting weights will no longer be normalised. Let us assume the weight prob-
abilities matrix is MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij in the CN. If we denote the total sum
of the weights for each data point by |Wi|, then we need to replace each weight wij
with wij/|Wi|. This step is referred to as renormalisation.
When we merge the data points in the CN, it is also necessary to select a weight
that is 0.50 or greater for each data point. This is necessary in order to choose a
majority candidate weight among all aggregated weights for each data point. This
step is referred to as reconciliation. First, the weight with the maximum value is
located. If there are multiple weights with this value, one is chosen at random. We
refer to this weight as wmax for a data point. If this value if already greater than or
equal to 0.5, then nothing further action is required. Otherwise, the value of wmax is
replaced by 0.5. Next the value G = (0.5  wmax)/(|Wi|  1). All the other weights
wij for the data point are replaced by wij  G. Reconciliation ensures unambiguous
maximum and also preserves normalisation. These steps will be described in greater
detail below.
We can illustrate the EM algorithm as a set of four steps:
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– The initialisation step: EM parameter initialisation is performed only once
in the CN and then sent to all initialised parameters across distributed nodes
(regions) to run the EM algorithm independently for each subset of a dataset.
– Data distribution: the aggregated encrypted data is split into multiple frag-
ments called regions (see Figure 4.19 ). Each region represents a node that
has a subset of data points. For the purpose of distributed processing of EM
algorithm, we need to assign a certain number of data points N and a certain
number of random hidden variables H to be processed independently in each
node. If the total number of data points is P , then we write P = aN + a0
where a0 < N . If the total number of random hidden variables is Q, then
we write Q = bH + b0 where b0 < H. Consider the problem as a matrix
MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij with P rows and Q columns. We have now defined a
method in which this can be subdivided into (ab) submatrices where a repre-
sents the number of data subsets N and b represents the number of H subsets,
each of size N ⇥H. In addition, if a0 > 0 or b0 > 0 then there will be one extra
region that contains those data points that do not fit into the region defined
by the ab submatrices. Thus, the total number of regions will be ab+ z, where
z = 0 if a0 = 0 and b0 = 0. The initial weight matrix will be written as MP⇤Q
and has PQ members MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij . The index i varies over the
data points (rows), while the index j varies over the columns H. Figure 4.20
shows how the data is distributed and processed a among a set of regions. For
the purposes of distributed processing, we subdivide the matrix UP⇤Q into ab
submatrices MN⇤H =
PH
j=1
PN
i=1 wij , each with (N) data points and H ran-
dom hidden variables where 1  i  N and 1  j  H. If there is an extra
region because of extra points that do not fit into the submatrices regions, we
treat this extra region as a special case, although the analysis tasks are the same.
– The E-step and the M-step: these steps are performed in each region inde-
pendently for each subset of the complete dataset. The two steps are performed
iteratively to derive updated EM parameters from the previous iteration. The
E-step is used to create the Q function previously defined, which is a function
of both ✓ 2 ⇥ and ✓(m), where we consider m to be the iteration count. The
M-step is defined as:
✓(m+1) = max(Q(✓|✓(m)) | ✓ 2 ⇥) (4.10)
That is, the next (m + 1)th iteration of the weight vector is defined as the
maximum value of the Q function as ✓ ranges over the entire set ⇥.
127
Normalization & 
Reconciliation
Input data:
Dataset consists of P data points
and Q hidden variables
Final analysis 
results
Subdataset consists of 
N data points and
H hidden variables
Region 1 
(Node 1)
Region 2 
(Node 2)
Region M 
(Node M)
Figure 4.19: An overview of how data is distributed among a set of regions (nodes) where each
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– The convergence step: this step is performed in each region for a data subset
to determine if the current parameters update is close enough to the previous
one to declare that the algorithm has converged.
After executing the EM algorithm in each region, we aggregate and merge all
results in the CN. The merging process that consists of two steps: Renor-
malisation step where the overall weight matrix (MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij) is
normalised, and Reconciliation step where the overall weight matrix (UP⇤Q)
reconcile. We define these two steps in more details below.
– The normalisation and reconciliation steps: we perform these steps to
ensure the correctness of analysis results and to achieve a high level of accu-
racy due to data distribution among a set of regions. In the centralised EM
algorithm version, there is only one region that processes the data and pro-
duces analysis results. Thus, we are guaranteed that the sum of the weights
in that region is 1.0. In the distributed version of EM algorithm, the sum of
the weights in each region is 1.0. The sum of all weights is exactly equal to the
number of regions N , which is certainly greater than 1.0. Therefore, we must
renormalise the aggregated weights of all regions. Let us assume that the mem-
bership matrix (MP⇤Q =
PQ
j=1
PP
i=1 wij) to be the set of probability values
such that wi,j is the probability that point i is a value of the variable j. In the
EM algorithm, any point belonging to some variable (or to belong probabilisti-
cally belonging to more than one variables’ output range) is 1. Thus, the sum
of the probabilities for each data point must sum to 1 or 0. Since each data
point corresponds to a row of M , we have a requirement, which we refer to as
the normalisation requirement that membership probabilities sum (j,M(i, j))
= 1.0. One of the di culties with a distributed approach is that it only adds
entries to a subset of M and when M is completely populated it may be the
case that membership probabilities row sum (j,M(i, j)) ! = 1.0. This leads to
Theorem 1 of the distributed approach of the EM algorithm.
Theorem 1. If weighted probabilities row sum of a data point Ri = rowsum(j,
M(i, j))! = 1.0 , then divide each element of row i by Ri.
This step ensures the consistency of the weighted probabilities for all data
points after aggregation in the CN. While the renormalisation step is neces-
sary, it is not su cient. To see why this is the case, consider a single data
point xi whose weights are being computed relative to two di↵erent regions:
R1 = {w11, . . . , w1q} and R2 = {w21, . . . , w2q}. When both computations are
done, xi will have a first set of membership probabilities {w11, . . . , w1q} for
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R1 and a second set of weighs probabilities {w21, . . . , w2q} for R2 where |R1|
and |R2| = q. In this case, a data point xi must have wij >= 0.5 then no
reconciliation is needed. However, if wm < 0.5 then the reconciliation step is
requited. This leads to Theorem 2 of the distributed approach of EM algorithm.
Theorem 2. Let w1 be the largest probability value, and w2 be the second largest
value of a given data point in the weighted probabilities matrix UP⇤Q. Suppose
that after renormalisation it is the case that both w1 < 0.5 and w2 < 0.5.
Then, we adjust the value of w1 to be 0.5, and adjust the value of w2 to be
w2   (0.5  w1).
This step ensures there is a single maximum among the weights for each data
point. Moreover, it preserves normalisation of the weighted probabilities matrix
and another renormalisation step is not required. After that, the global conver-
gence test is performed in the CN to determine whether the current weighted
probabilities matrix and parameters update is close enough to the previous one
to declare that the algorithm has converged.
4.2.3.7 The distributed EM algorithm for Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM)
How are the EM steps realised for GMM? The key concept is to define the miss-
ing information as the set of probabilities that a given point in the observed data
corresponds to a specific Gaussian. If we assume that the number of Gaussian distri-
butions is k then the density of Y 2 Rd is the sum of the weighted Gaussian densities
 (µi, Ci)
k
i , where the µi are the means and the Ci are the covariances. We write this
sum as:
p(y|✓) =
kX
i=1
wi (µi, Ci)
=
kX
i
exp(  12 (y   µi)TC 1i (y   µi))
(2⇡)d/2|Ci| 12
(4.11)
We assume that all weights wi are non–negative and normalised,
Pk
i=1 wi = 1.
The quantity to be estimated ✓ consists of the set of all wi, µi and Ci. We call this
set of weights, means and variances the parameter set.
In order to write the algorithm completely, we assume that there are n inde-
pendent, identically distributed samples y1, y2, . . . , yn 2 Rd in a GMM with k con-
stituent Gaussian distributions. Since these n values are independent and identically
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distributed, they do not require use of the CN. Also note that each of the n values can
be computed in its own node, o↵ering a specific way of parallelising the algorithm.
We define  (m)ij to be the estimate that the ith sample belongs to the jth Gaussian
in iteration m. These estimates must be normalised: 8i8m Pkj=1  (m)ij = 1. We also
define the subsidiary variables n(m)j =
Pn
i=1  
(m)
ij where j = 1, . . . , k. Then n
(m)
j is
the jth partial sum of the gamma values at iteration m, where the sum is taken over
i. It is useful to think of the gamma values as forming a matrix, where i ranges over
the rows and j ranges over the columns. The n(m)j are then the row sums of this
matrix.
In the initialisation step, we choose the initial values for all of the components
w(0)j , µ
(0)
j , C
(0)
j where j ranges over 1, . . . , k to compute the initial log–likelihood.
L(0) =
1
n
nX
i=1
log(
kX
j=1
w(0)j  (yi|µ(0)j , C(0)j )) (4.12)
Note that the initialisation step is performed only once, so it can be isolated to
a single Control Node (CN) that operates at the beginning of the algorithm.
In the E–step, we compute the values  (m)ij and n
(m)
j as follows:
 (m)ij =
w(m)j  (yi|µ(m)j , C(m)j )Pk
t=1 w
(m)
t  (yi|µ(m)t , C(m)t )
(4.13)
n(m)j =
nX
i=1
 (m)ij (4.14)
where i ranges over 1, . . . , n in the first equation, j ranges over 1, . . . , k in both
equations, and t is a temporary iteration variable that ranges over 1, . . . , k. In the
distributed EM approach, the i will be distributed over di↵erent nodes. In general,
it is simple to compute each individual Gaussian, so there is no significant gain in
also distributing the k steps. Thus, each of the n does performs its own set of k
calculations, for a total of n distributed computations. In the matrix formulation,
each row of the gamma matrix is assigned to its own node.
In the M–step, we compute the new estimates as follows:
w(m+1)j =
n(m)j
n
(4.15)
µ(m+1)j =
1
n(m)j
nX
i=1
 (m)ij yi (4.16)
C(m+1)j =
1
n(m)j
nX
i=1
 (m)ij (yi   µ(m+1)j )(yi   µ(m+1)j )T (4.17)
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L(m+1) =
1
n
nX
i=1
log(
kX
j=1
w(m+1)j  (yi|µ(m+1)j , C(m+1)j )) (4.18)
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Figure 4.21: The distributed EM approach for GMMmodel where the data is distributed among
a set of virtual machines (VMs) to perform analysis tasks in a cloud computing framework.
Recall that the w values are the weights, the µ values are the Gaussian means, the
C values are the Gaussian covariances, and the L functions are the log–likelihoods.
Here j ranges over 1, . . . , k in the equations (8-10) and the superscript T in the
equation (10) denotes the transpose operation. This operation requires that all the
values be communicated to a single node so that the computed values for the next
iteration can be calculated.
In the convergence test, we compute the new log-likelihood. The convergence
metric is then |L(m+1)   L(m)|. These computations are performed in a single node.
If this quantity is less than or equal to a predefined value ✏ then the algorithm is said
to converge, and the most recently computed values of the constituents of ✓(m+1) are
the weights, means and covariances matrices to be used. If the convergence metric
is greater than ✏ then the algorithm has not yet converged and another iteration
is required. If the number of iterations has exceeds a predefined value ⌧ , then the
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algorithm has diverged, and no weights are usable. Figure 4.21 shows how the EM
algorithm works for GMM in a distributed manner and illustrate where the EM
functions are performed in our distributed based environment
As in the previous section, renormalisation and reconciliation must be performed
in the CN. Each of the rows (nodes) of the algorithm will be normalisation, but the
sum of all weights will be equal to n. Thus, in the renormalisation stage all weights
w must be divided by n. Similarly, in order to avoid divergence in the Condorcet
algorithm, all the weights must have an unambiguous maximum which is at least 0.5.
The reconciliation computation is performed exactly as in the previous section: the
current maximum is located and set to 0.5; the G value is computed as the sum of
all other weights divided by n  1, and G is then subtracted from each weight other
than the maximum.
4.2.4 Security analysis
For the purposes of this analysis we will examine the various components and data
paths in the ED implementation of the EM algorithm. This analysis is based on
the assumption that FHE is itself secure, and also that the implementation provided
by HElib is also secure. Specifically, this means that if p is a plaintext value, f
is the fully homomorphic encryption function, and c = f(p) is the corresponding
ciphertext, then it is computationally intractable to recover even a single bit of p
from c, except with negligible probability.
Our threat model assumes that the secure user is, in fact, secure and is able to
read the plaintext values from one or more files and/or data streams, and encrypt
this data using f , without an attacker being able to gain any information about
the plaintext values. The model assumes, however, that any other data path or
compute node is completely insecure, and that an attacker can read the contents of
a data path, or the memory of a compute node, as well. From the standpoint of the
computation servers, we identify the following types of nodes: (a) the control node
(CN) which provides the initial parameters for the first iteration of the EM algorithm
and performs convergence test; (b) the processing nodes (PNs), which perform the
E-step and M-step of the EM algorithm.
The PNs perform all arithmetic computations on encrypted data. These nodes
have no access to the private key, which is only stored in the secure client side, and
therefore never handle plaintext data. Under the assumption that FHE is secure,
and all its component operations are secure. Furthermore, the transmitted data
between these nodes and the other nodes in the system only transmit encrypted data,
through sockets or through files in the shared global file system. Therefore, these
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data communication challenges are also secure based on our assumption. Further,
we known that both the E–step and M–step are rational functions, and therefore,
by the previous analysis the perfect eavesdropper can learn nothing about the data
values or final results.
In summary, the only knowable quantity in the distributed EM model is the
public key, which is stored in a file in the shared global file system. Under the
assumption that FHE is secure it is not possible to recover the private key from the
public key, except with negligible probability. Since only the secure user possesses
the private key, and since we have assumed that the user itself is actually secure, the
entire distributed EM model taken as a whole is also secure. As indicated earlier it
may be possible for this perfect eavesdropper to learn something about the structure
of the algorithmic functions being computed. Without the plaintext values, however,
this knowledge does not disclose anything about the data, and thus does not represent
a vulnerability in the implementation.
4.2.5 Experiment and results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving EM
algorithm through comprehensive experimentation. Our model is developed based
on two data workflow scenarios: in the first scenario data can be aggregated in a
centralised storage and then distributed for analysis purposes based on our model.
In the second scenario, data can be aggregated and processed in a distributed fashion,
as in the case of distributed sensor networks, where data is generated from distributed
sensors and analyses independently analysis before merging them to produce final
analysis results.
The model evaluation is performed in three phases. In the first phase, we evaluate
the accuracy of the data analysis process for di↵erent data distributions. We then
compare the achieved accuracy levels to the results obtained over the same datasets
in plaintext. In the second phase, we consider the evaluation of the model e ciency
through the analysis of the execution time for di↵erent datasets and varying sizes of
VMs in cloud computing. For these purposes, the proposed model is implemented
using the Google Cloud Platform (GCP). In the third phase, we demonstrate the
scalability feature of our distributed approach. For these purposes, we implement
the proposed model in the Google public cloud computing service platform. The
experiments achieve comparable levels of analysis accuracy in the ciphertext version
compared with plaintext version, with the added advantages of privacy preservation
and data security. Moreover, the model achieves significant reduction of encrypted
computations overhead and enhanced e ciency of analysis tasks.
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Figure 4.22: 2D synthetic datasets with di↵erent distributions. Each row represents a set
of four datasets that are similar in the distribution with varying number of data points and
clusters.
4.2.5.1 Datasets
Synthetic datasets are used to evaluate our proposed model. A data generator is
utilised to generate three datasets with di↵erent distribution. We evaluate both
accuracy and e ciency of the proposed EM algorithm model with varying experi-
mentation settings. Figure 4.22 shows four datasets that have di↵erent properties
in size and number of clusters. The datasets are generated based on the model in
[118] that is designed specifically for clustering purposes. The generator produces
two dimensional datasets with cluster labels identification and generates data based
on several parameters, such as standard deviation of the slope and average separa-
tion of line centres along the x and y axises. Each data point is represented by a
vector of two values (x, y) and a label that represent a data point cluster based on
the generator specifications.
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4.2.5.2 Analysis accuracy
We evaluate the analysis accuracy of our proposed model. Comparisons are made
between the plaintext and ciphertext versions of the proposed approaches based on
the EM algorithm. The experimental results show similar accuracy levels using the
above mentioned datasets. Figure 4.23 shows the analysis accuracy results of the
datasets for both plaintext and ciphertext implementations. Both versions achieve
high and similar levels of accuracy. Experimental results show that the di↵erence in
the analysis accuracy among all datasets is 1% to 2% in both versions.
Figure 4.23: The analysis accuracy comparison between plaintext and ciphertext versions of
the proposed distributed EM for GMM model.
Moreover, we demonstrate the analysis accuracy of the proposed model in Tables
4.12 - 4.15. The statistical measures of Sensitivity and Specificity are used to calculate
analysis accuracy. These measures are identified through the four values of True
Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN).
Sensitivity =
TP
(TP + FN)
, Specificity =
TN
(TN + FP )
(4.19)
Table 4.12: Analysis accuracy of varying sizes of datasets [a, b, c and d] based on sensitivity
and specificity statistical measures.
# of clusters Sensitivity Specificity
Dataset size
2000 data points 3 0.9821 0.8349
4000 data points 6 0.9856 0.8520
6000 data points 9 0.9840 0.8602
8000 data points 12 0.9895 0.8342
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Table 4.13: Analysis accuracy of varying sizes of datasets [e, f, g and h] based on sensitivity
and specificity statistical measures.
# of clusters Sensitivity Specificity
Dataset size
2000 data points 3 0.9952 0.9409
4000 data points 6 0.9971 0.9615
6000 data points 9 0.9943 0.9629
8000 data points 12 0.9960 0.9809
Table 4.14: Analysis accuracy of varying sizes of datasets [i, j, k and l] based on sensitivity
and specificity statistical measures.
# of clusters Sensitivity Specificity
Dataset size
2000 data points 3 0.9980 0.9943
4000 data points 6 0.9995 0.9980
6000 data points 9 0.9994 0.9965
8000 data points 12 0.9992 0.9971
Table 4.15: Analysis accuracy of varying sizes of datasets [a, b, c and d] based on sensitivity
and specificity statistical measures.
# of clusters Sensitivity Specificity
Dataset size
2000 data points 3 0.9986 0.9979
4000 data points 6 0.9936 0.9969
6000 data points 9 0.9954 0.9982
8000 data points 12 0.9920 0.9928
The observed results show sensitivity average ranges between 0.9992 and 0.9821
among all datasets with the selected number of clusters 3, 6, 9 and 12. Furthermore
, the specificity average ranges between 0.9982 and 0.8342. This indicates that our
privacy-preserving EM model version has achieved highly accurate results. We also
demonstrate how distributed EM for GMM model. It demonstrates how the increase
in the distributed nodes (number of VMs) e↵ects accuracy with varying sizes of
datasets in Figure 4.24. We found that increased in the number of VMs decreases
the accuracy to between 0.21% to 1.07%. This shows the e ciency of the distributed
approach even when large number of VMs is deployed.
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Figure 4.24: The analysis accuracy of the proposed distributed EM for GMM model. It
demonstrates how the increase in the distributed nodes (number of Virtual Machines (VMs))
e↵ects the accuracy with varying sizes of datasets.
4.2.5.3 Analysis performance
We demonstrate the performance the privacy-preserving distributed EM algorithm in
cloud computing. Figure 4.25 shows the execution time of analysis on di↵erent sizes
of datasets and varying number of VMs. It is clear that the increase in deployed
VMs speeds up the analysis process which, in turn, proves that the distribution
mechanism is an optimal approach to overcome the shortage of performance barrier
of FHE computations for EM algorithm. For example, it takes 779 seconds to process
a dataset consists of 4000 data points with 40 VMs, while this is decreased by 52%
to 457 seconds with 80 VMs.
Figure 4.25: The analysis performance of the proposed distributed EM for GMM model with
varying sizes of datasets and number of VMs.
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(a) 2000 data points (b) 4000 data points
(c) 6000 data points (d) 8000 data points
Figure 4.26: The representation of aggregate matrix (g) based on di↵erent configuration for
datasets consisting of 2000, 4000, 6000 and 8000 data points.
4.2.5.4 Analysis scalability
We show the scalability of the distributed EM model through studying three quan-
tities: analysis accuracy (a), execution time (t) total cost (resources) of clustering
analysis (k). In our distributed approach, a set of data points p and a set of initial
clusters c are subdivided into regions that are processed on m nodes. The distributed
approach can involve multiple di↵erent configurations. For example, for 1000 data
points and 12 initial clusters, and 25 nodes, one can create a single task on each
node with 40 data points and either 6, 4 or 3 clusters. One can also create two tasks
per node, with 20 data points in each. Keeping p and c fixed, it is also possible to
vary m nodes, thus creating even more possible configurations. We will discuss an
experimental approach in which a particular metric is used to assess the quality of a
particular configuration, given fixed p and c.
We define an aggregate metric g = a/(k ⇥ t). For a given set of total data
points (p) and total initial clusters (c), we would like (a) to be as large as possible,
while we would also like (K) and (T ) to be as small as possible. In Table 4.16,
we have created 6 di↵erent configurations that are used to demonstrate the optimal
configuration represented by aggregated metric (g). Figure 4.26 shows the value of
the metric g in y axis with the corresponding configuration index I in x axis with
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varying sizes of datasets. Based on this metric the best configurations (those with
the largest values of g) actually employ fewer nodes and split up the clusters into
as many per region as possible. In each case, the configuration with 6 clusters per
node did better than those with 3 clusters per node. Using this metric we conclude
that the best configuration is the one with the largest number of points and clusters
per region, even though this will lead to a longer execution time. The increase in
execution time is o↵set by the decrease in cost as a result of fewer nodes being used.
Table 4.16: A set of configurations that contain varying sizes of nodes (m) and number of
clusters (c) that are used to process varying sizes of datasets.
Label Nodes (VMs) Clusters
1 25 6
2 25 3
3 50 6
4 50 3
5 100 6
6 100 3
4.2.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced an innovative and e cient distributed privacy-preserving
big data analytic models to be implemented on cloud computing. The distributed
approach is suitable for big and heterogeneous data processing in distributed and
scalable architecture. We applied the distributed approach into two categories of
data clustering algorithms, namely centroid-based and distribution-based clustering
algorithms. The two major advantages of the proposed distributed approach are the
scalability of the distribution settings and the ability to accelerate the performance of
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) computations while preserving high level of
analysis accuracy. The adapted FHE cryptosystem ensures end-to-end protection for
the data through data encryption prior to processing, intermediate computations and
the final clustering results. The experimental results demonstrated the feasibility of
our privacy-preserving distributed analytic model in a practical data mining context
for cloud-based applications.
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Chapter 5
Real-time applications based
on homomorphic encryption
Abstract
The rapid growth in real-time monitoring and ubiquitous computing
applications is increasingly enabling smart functionality and autonomy
in numerous fields, such as smart grid, healthcare and industry. This
has given rise to several security and privacy challenges in the real-time
cloud-based processing of massive data that is sensitive in nature. In
this chapter, we design and implement two privacy-preserving real-time
cloud-based applications based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE). We
adapt two HE cryptosystems and demonstrate their computational and
performance capabilities for applications that require timely and reli-
able delivery of services. The first section (5.1) of this chapter presents
a privacy-preserving cloud-based billing model using a lightweight ho-
momorphic cryptosystem. This model performs real-time analysis tasks
on aggregated smart grid data in a secure manner. The main advantage
of this model is the e ciency of encrypted computations. However, some
analysis tasks require interaction with a trusted party, in this case a pri-
vacy manager entity, to overcome the lack of computational capabilities
of the lightweight HE cryptosystem. The second section (5.2) of this
chapter introduces a real-time health surveillance monitoring and diag-
nosing model based on Holt’s linear trend method. Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) is adapted to perform Holt’s method computations
in an encrypted domain. FHE ensures end-to-end data security starting
with the capture and storage of encrypted vital signs data and ending
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with analysis and retrieval of encrypted analysis results. To reduce the
FHE computational overheads, we introduce an innovative technique
to distribute encrypted computations. Di↵erent security and privacy
issues are demonstrated in both application models, including the il-
lustration of possible secure scenarios to preserve users’ sensitive data.
Experimental evaluation demonstrates the e ciency of the proposed ap-
plication models for both performance and accuracy in building secure
cloud-enabled analytic applications.
5.1 Privacy-preserving real-time billing system
with lightweight homomorphic encryption
5.1.1 Introduction
Pervasive monitoring and data collection using di↵erent type of sensors is increas-
ingly enabling smart functionality and autonomy in numerous industrial sectors.
Operational e ciencies are improved manyfold through more streamlined decision
making with capabilities for near real-time data access for decision support. In this
context, smart grid is a key application domain that is revolutionising traditional
ways of infrastructure management in the industrial sector. The general architecture
of smart grid includes the generation, transmission and distribution domains [137],
that are integrated to deliver consumer services. The generation domain consists
of traditional power stations while the transmission domain delivers services to the
distribution domain.
There is an increasing trend to store, manage and analyse large datasets on public
cloud infrastructure. Such integration is a natural step in the context of managing
the exponential growth of smart meter sensor data. For instance, the smart grid data
volume was expected to rapidly increase from 10, 780 Tbytes in 2010 to over 75, 200
Tbytes in 2015. At this level of continuing growth, the cloud can be a convenient
platform for smart grid service delivery. (i.e. on the cloud platform it is possible to
aggregate and analyse massive amounts of real-time smart meter sensor data while
dynamically balancing demand and supply, to provide more refined customer oriented
services, as billing/consumption monitoring. Figure 5.1 shows the various entities
and involved service components of a cloud integrated smart grid architecture.
In smart grid applications, cloud computing o↵ers scalable and flexible resources
to develop a software-based service delivery infrastructure, providing dynamic and
’always-on’ connectivity. The specific advantages of moving smart grid sensor data
applications to the cloud includes:
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Figure 5.1: An overview of the cloud integrated smart grid architecture with access to unlimited
computational and storage capabilities. Consumers and the grid operator exchange encrypted
data with cloud-based services through secure communication channels. Homomorphic data
encryption techniques are applied to ensure data privacy over the storage/processing phase in
cloud.
– Avoidance of costly infrastructure investment, especially during peak hours, for
data management by exploiting elastic on-demand cloud computing resources.
– Ability to share consumption data and pricing information in real time, al-
lowing consumers to access and retrieve their data for further benefits (e.g.
rationalisation of energy purposes).
– Automation of services (e.g. billing) through streamlined sensor data sharing
with authorised third parties (e.g. service provider) in a secure manner.
However, data security and privacy concerns (e.g. information privacy and in-
tegrity) are inherent concerns of moving such services over to a cloud platform,
especially in the case of storing and maintaining sensitive corporate information or
private consumer data. The limitations of moving smart grid sensor data applications
to the cloud includes:
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– Vulnerability of currently implemented communication channels between smart
meter sensor networks and cloud service to eavesdropping, data manipulation
or service disruption attacks.
– Unwarranted data exposure to third parties (e.g cloud service provider) or vul-
nerability for security attacks from malicious entities.
In the energy sector, consumer behaviours and habits can also be revealed by
the regular (e.g. daily or monthly) transmission of consumption rates of energy use
collected by smart meters [138]. Furthermore, di↵erent entities in the smart grid
system, such as energy suppliers, smart grid operators and cloud service providers
who collect and manage energy consumption information, can obtain more specific
details about consumers’ lifestyles (e.g. attendance and leave times, activities and
even utilities used) through observing the patterns of energy consumption rates.
Taking into consideration these concerns, we propose a secure cloud-based billing
framework that ensures end-to-end secure communication and secure data analysis
methods of smart meter sensor data, required for aggregation/billing operations. We
apply homomorphic encryption techniques on the data transmitted between cloud
facilities and consumers or grid operators at the time services are performed. In
our framework, the billing/consumption records retrieval services are implemented
securely in the cloud by adapting an encryption technique that is capable of carrying
out computations on encrypted data. This unique feature of homomorphic encryp-
tion helps to avoid communication overheads, extensive numbers of encryption and
decryption processes and the involvement of trusted parties for analysis implemen-
tations that are required when traditional encryption techniques are employed.
5.1.1.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this work are:
– Development of a cloud integrated smart grid solution that ensures privacy
of consumer data and implementation of billing/consumption monitoring ser-
vices in the cloud, while ensuring end-to-end communication security among
di↵erent entities. The core of the proposed model is the practical adoption of
a homomorphic encryption scheme that overcomes the limitations of existing
solutions, including the e cient implementation of required services.
– Practical adoption of a suitable lightweight homomorphic encryption scheme
within the cloud integrated smart grid constraints. Our approach manages and
stores consumer data in cloud facilities in a secure manner, through imple-
mentation of convenient and e↵ective homomorphic encryption techniques. In
contrast to other privacy-preserving techniques, this approach provides more
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flexibility with the way in which data is securely processed and overcomes criti-
cal issues, such as management of encryption/decryption keys while processing
in the cloud. The use of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme [47] enables various arith-
metic operations to satisfy smart grid application requirements. This is a con-
siderably lightweight and e cient scheme, in terms of encryption/decryption
cost and e ciency of arithmetic operations, compared to other homomorphic
encryption schemes that can be applied in this context (e.g. the well known
homomorphic encryption scheme Gentry’s scheme) [66] that are applicable in
this context.
5.1.2 Related work
Smart grid technology has been considered extensively from various perspectives.
However, in our framework, we focus primarily on the security and privacy of smart
grids; we investigate feasible solutions for preserving consumer privacy while per-
forming computations on their data for billing purposes. In this respect, Boroojeni et
al.[139] highlighted various security and privacy threats, with specific attention drawn
to academics, industry and even governments. In a broader context, we can classify
privacy preserving smart grid approaches into three main categories: anonymisation,
encryption-based and hybrid techniques. Firstly, the anonymisation approach refers
to smart grid schemes that are implemented and based on a trusted third party
(TTP) or other trusted infrastructure. In this approach, neither consumer records
nor their their identities are disclosed to the service provider, such as schemes in
[139] and [140]. Secondly, the encryption-based approach preserves the privacy of
consumer records during transmission between di↵erent entities. However, the ser-
vice provider is regarded as a trusted party that can disclose consumer records and
their identities, such as schemes in [141]. Lastly, the hybrid approach hides con-
sumer records by two main techniques: load signature moderation as in [142] and
consumer records masking, as in [143]. However, consumer identities exposed to ser-
vice provider. Table 5.1 illustrates the main privacy-preserving techniques for smart
grid systems.
In addition, Khurana et al. [150] addressed some security issues related to en-
cryption and key management, in terms of complexity and scalability. Smart meter
security technologies were investigated by Metke and Ekl [151][152], with a focus
on public key infrastructure (PKI) and trusted computing (TC). Homomorphic en-
cryption in smart grid was introduced in [153] as a secure data aggregation protocol.
However, even as a secure protocol, this approach is lacking in terms of functionality
because it is limited to data aggregation. Therefore, a flexible homomorphic encryp-
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Table 5.1: Privacy-preserving techniques for smart grid systems.
Technique category Solution Billing service Service provider accessibility
Anonymization Trusted third party(TTP) [140] TTP Not allowed
Trusted gateway [144] smart meter Not allowed
Escrow service [145] Energy supplier Per consumer
Encryption-based Traditional encryption [141] Energy supplier Per consumer
Hop-by-hop aggregation [146] Energy supplier Per consumer
Secret sharing [147] Energy supplier Not allowed
Hybrid Load signature moderation [142], [148], [141] Energy supplier Per consumer
Data masking [143], [149] - Not allowed
Table 5.2: Homomorphic cryptosystems
Operation capabilities
Cryptosystem Additive Multiplicative Key type Message expansion Security aspect
Paillier [30] X Asymmetric 2 Semantically secure
El-Gamal [29] X Asymmetric 2 Semantically secure
Okamoto-Uchiyama [71] X Asymmetric 3 Provably secure
Naccache-Stern [72] X Asymmetric   4 Semantically secure [Conditional]
Castelluccia, Mykletun [155] X Symmetric Considered a small Provably secure
RSA [31] X Asymmetric 1 Not semantically secure
Eliptic curve El-Gamal [156] X Asymmetric 4 Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
Domingo-Ferrer [47] X X Symmetric 2 Secure against chosen ciphertext attack
tion scheme is required to improve smart grid computations capabilities. He et al.
[154] proposed a cryptosystem for smart grid that combines PKI and homomorphic
encryption techniques. Although it is considered a secure scheme, the need for a con-
venient key management scheme and lack of computation capabilities are two main
drawbacks of this technique.
Among the various techniques shown in Table 5.1, we have decided to focus on
encryption-based techniques, and specifically on the homomorphic encryption tech-
nique, because it overcomes almost all of the limitations of other techniques, espe-
cially in the case of cloud-based frameworks. Table 5.2 shows selected homomorphic
encryption techniques and their capabilities, in terms of computations and overheads.
Compared to the related works previously described, ours is an e↵ective and
secure cloud-based framework for billing purposes in smart grid infrastructures. We
adapt a practical homomorphic encryption scheme, Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme, [47]
that can perform secure computations over encrypted data to aggregate consumers’
consumption rates and manage billing securely in the cloud.
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Figure 5.2: An overview of the cloud-based smart grid architecture for secure billing imple-
mentation. Consumers and grid operator exchange encrypted data with cloud services through
secure communication channels. Homomorphic encryption is applied to ensure data privacy
while processing in cloud with regard to enabling specific aggregation/billing operations as
required.
5.1.3 Privacy-preserving billing framework for cloud
integrated smart grid
In this section, we provide an overview of the architecture of our privacy-preserving
smart grid model. We also illustrate how di↵erent entities in the smart grid model can
communicate securely to accomplish tasks, starting from aggregating consumption
data from smart meter sensors and ending by carrying out computations for billing
purposes.
5.1.3.1 The conceptual architecture
Our model has three main entities: consumers, grid operators and cloud-based ser-
vices, who communicate to provide di↵erent services to each other. Figure 5.2 il-
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lustrates an overview of these entities and communication avenues among them for
di↵erent purposes while Figure 5.3 provides more detail on encrypted data channels
and the di↵erent analytical phases in cloud. Both consumers and the grid operator
can communicate with cloud-based services securely to perform specific tasks. Each
smart meter is linked to a consumer and has its own public/private key pairs based
on fully homomorphic encryption. Every 15 minutes, the smart meter encrypts the
meter reading homomorphically prior to sending it to cloud-based storage. Moreover,
the cloud servers process the data and perform billing computations completely in
an encrypted domain without the need to interact with any trusted parties (or even
the data owners) thanks to homomorphic encryption. A consumer’s identity is used
as a unique identifier and is similarly secured by homomorphic encryption. Con-
sumers can retrieve their data for certain purposes (e.g. rationalisation of energy
consumption or verification of billing costs) and the grid operator can use consumers
records for their own purposes (e.g. monitoring and billing services). The privacy of
consumers data is guaranteed through end-to-end security.
The consumption rate of each consumer is measured by a smart meter that
sends a periodical reading (i.e. every 15 minutes) as a data package containing a
consumer unique identifier, an encrypted reading and a timestamp. The consumer
unique identifier is granted by the grid operator prior to installing the smart meter,
therefore, it must be included within each data package sent. The cloud services
also need the consumer identification to identify smart meter data when processing
queries. The timestamp indicates the time of a meter reading and is used by the grid
operator for monitoring purposes. The cloud services use the timestamp to identify
the periods of the readings (i.e. peak or o↵-peak ).
5.1.3.2 Communication among smart grid entities
An essential purpose of this research is to design a secure smart grid billing model
while preserving consumer privacy. Therefore, the communication procedures be-
tween smart grid entities must guarantee the privacy of consumer data. Smart
meters have the feature of bidirectional communication, which is mainly used to
periodically send encrypted consumption readings to cloud-based storage automat-
ically. The smart grid operator, which is responsible for billing services, can access
encrypted data in the cloud to perform encrypted computations (e.g. billing pur-
poses) through cloud-based servers.
In our model, we assume that an encryption mechanism with homomorphic en-
cryption/decryption keys has been installed in a consumer smart meter upon joining
the service. In this scenario, o✏ine communication between a consumer and energy
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Figure 5.3: An overview of our smart grid billing architecture. Various services (e.g. records
retrieving and billing mechanism) can be performed in cloud computing securely. Both data
owners and grid operator can use cloud-based services with secure computations and commu-
nication.
supplier occurs to agree on homomorphic encryption/decryption keys. We also as-
sume the consumer smart meter is physically secure. Both the consumer and grid
operator can access and retrieve stored encrypted smart readings on demand, but
each entity will access di↵erent levels of detail due to security purposes. The cloud-
based servers are responsible for storing consumer data and communicate with smart
grid operators to manage billing services and with consumers to retrieve their data.
The communication avenues between entities are as follows:
– A consumer’s smart meter automatically sends an energy consumption mea-
surement (mi), which is measured in kilowatt-hours (kWh), every 15 minutes to
cloud-based storage in encrypted form. Each measurement is encrypted homo-
morphically through adaption, a lightweight homomorphic encryption scheme
that is the Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism
scheme [47]. This is explained in more detail in section 4.
– Consumers and grid operators are able to communicate with cloud-based ser-
vices through secure communication channels (VPNs) to retrieve consumption
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measurement data. This functionality supports consumers to obtain specific
information on their consumption rates. This aids the rationalisation of energy
consumption and even allows both the consumer and grid operator to verify
energy consumption bills.
5.1.4 Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy
homomorphism scheme
In this section, we illustrate the arithmetic operations capabilities based on homo-
morphic encryption. Domingo-Ferrer introduced in [47] an Homomorphic Encryption
Scheme (HES) that has the ability to perform main basic arithmetic operations (addi-
tion, subtraction and multiplication) in a secure and convenient manner. Domingo-
Ferrer’s scheme is classified as a symmetric-key encryption scheme and is proven
secure against chosen ciphertext attacks [73]. The basis of arithmetic operations
based on Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme is described below.
In this scheme, m and d are two public parameters, where the former is a large
integer with many divisors and the latter is a small integer and d > 2. Since each
single encrypted value is represented by a tuple, which is a set of elements, the
parameter d represents the number of elements in each tuple. The secret parameters
are m0 and r . The former is a small divisor of m, m0 > 1 and the latter is r 2
Zm, as long as r 1 modulus m exists. In short, we can consider the secret key in
this scheme as k = (m0, r). All encryption and decryption processes are performed
in a classified level that is considered a secure part of this scheme. Meanwhile, all
arithmetic operations on encrypted data are performed in an unclassified level, which
is defined as a public environment, such as cloud-based storage.
The encryption process is performed through randomly splitting the selected
value a 2 Zm0 into small secret values (a1, a2..., ad), where d determines a tuple size
for each splitted value, as previously mentioned. The splitting process must satisfy
the following:
a =
dX
i=1
ai modm
0 where ai 2 Zm (5.1)
After that,
Ek(a) = (a1r
1 modm, a2r
2 modm, ... , adr
d modm) (5.2)
At the end of an encryption process, a tuple of encrypted values is used to
represent its plaintext value in encrypted form. It can be used to perform arithmetic
operations with other encrypted tuples.
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The decryption process is performed through calculating a scalar product of the
ith element in a tuple by r 1 mod m to retrieve ai mod m as follows:
(a1r
 1 modm, a2r 2 modm, ... , adr d modm) (5.3)
Then, all elements in a resulting tuple are added through recalling Eq(4) to
retrieve an original value of a as follows:
a =
dX
i=1
ai modm
0 (5.1)
All arithmetic operations on encrypted data are carried out over (Zm)d at an
unclassified level.
5.1.4.1 Arithmetic operations based on Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme
In this section, we describe the specifications of arithmetic computations, based on
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme [47], using algorithms that show the arithmetic computa-
tions in detail.
– Addition and subtraction operations : these operations are carried out as component-
wise between terms with the same degree. Algorithm 9 represents the steps to
perform the specific encrypted operations for addition and subtraction.
Algorithm 9 Addition and subtraction operations
1: Inputs: m, (addition or subtraction operation ⌦),
2: a and b (encrypted values), a tuple z
3: Initialisation: (a1, a2) a , (b1, b2) b, (0, 0) z
4: z = (a1 ⌦ b1 modm , a2 ⌦ b2 modm)
5: z = (z1, z2) // zn  (an ⌦ bn)
6: // Tuple z is an encrypted operation result
– Multiplication operation: this operation is performed as polynomials: cross-
multiplication is applied among all terms in Zm. Encrypted multiplication
steps are shown in detail in algorithm 10.
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Algorithm 10 Multiplication operation
1: Inputs: m, (multiplication operation ⌦),
2: a and b (encrypted values), a tuple z
3: Initialisation: (a1, a2) a , (b1, b2) b, (0, 0, 0, 0) z
4: z = [0, a1 ⇥ b1 modm, (a1 ⇥ b2 + a2 ⇥ b1) modm,
5: a2 ⇥ b2 modm] // carried as polynomials
6: z = [0, z1, z2, z3, z4]
7: // Tuple z is an encrypted operation result
The encrypted division operations are carried out in a rational format, such
that E(a)/E(b) because the polynomials are considered as a ring, not a field.
5.1.4.2 Numerical example
In this section, we illustrate how the Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme operations works with
a simple and unrealistic numerical example. We have chosen public and private pa-
rameters. Public parameters : m is the public modulus and it is chosen to be m = 28.
For simplicity, we chose d = 2, which represents a number of elements in a single
tuple. Private parameters: we chose r = 3 and m0 = 7 to be the secret key. We need
to ensure that r 1 mod m exists, which is r 1 = 19 in this case.
We use a simple formula to perform encrypted computations based on Domingo-
Ferrer’s scheme. The formula has two addition operations and a single multiplication
operation; (x1 + x2) ⇥ x3 where x1 = 4, x2 = 2 and x3 = 1. We encrypt plaintext
value by recalling Eqs. (1) and (2) respectively.
First, transform each plaintext values to a tuple of random value based on Eq.(1)
as follows:
x1 =4  ! (18, 14)
x2 =2  ! (7, 9)
x3 =1  ! (13, 16)
Second, encrypt the transformed tuples by using Eq.(2) as follows:
E(x1) =((18⇥ 3) mod 28 , (14⇥ 9) mod 28) = (26, 14)
E(x2) =((7⇥ 3) mod 28 , (9⇥ 9) mod 28) = (21, 25)
E(x3) =((13⇥ 3) mod 28 , (16⇥ 9) mod 28) = (11, 4)
Now, the encrypted computations are performed based on the following formula
(x1 + x2)⇥ x3. First, we perform addition operation (x1 + x2), as follows:
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((26 + 21) mod 28 , (14 + 25) mod 28) = ( 19 , 11 )
Second, we multiply the result of addition operation by E(x3), as follows:
( 19 , 11 )⇥ E(x3) =( 19 , 11 )⇥ ( 11 , 4 )
=(0 , (19⇥ 11) mod 28, (19⇥ 4 + 11⇥ 11)
mod 28, (11⇥ 11) mod 28)
=( 0 , 13 , 1 , 9 )
The final result can be decrypted based on Eq.(3), as follows:
( 0 , 13 , 1 , 9 ) =(0⇥ r 1 modm, 13⇥ r 2 modm,
1⇥ r 3 modm, 9⇥ r 4 modm)
=(0⇥ 19 mod 28, 13⇥ 192 mod 28, 1⇥ 193
mod 28, 9⇥ 194 mod 28)
=( 0 , 17 , 27 , 25 )
Finally, we obtain the plaintext result by adding all elements in the tuple over
Zm0 to get 69 mod 7 = 6, which is the correct result if we replicate the same
operations on plaintext values.
5.1.5 Secure cloud-based data analysis and management
In this section, we illustrate billing procedures in a cloud-based billing management
system. Smart meter information is sent frequently to cloud storage in encrypted
form and computations are performed on this information to generate billing in-
formation, which is sent back to consumers for payment purposes. A smart meter
measurement can be expressed as follows:
mi = fi(t) (5.4)
where fi is an energy consumption rate in kWh, and t is consumption period,
which includes start and end times. We assume that smart meter measurements are
recorded and sent to cloud-storage every 15 minutes, generating 96 measurements
per day.
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dayn =
96X
i=1
mi
where dayn is a total consumption rate of the nth day of a month. Table 3 shows
how single measurements of one day are stored in the cloud.
Monthly consumption is expressed as follows:
Mj =
mX
n=1
dayn
where Mj is a total consumption of the jth month of a year. All this information is
stored with attached access control mechanisms to determine access levels for both
consumers and energy suppliers. For convenience, we assume that access control
mechanisms grant energy suppliers access to monthly records Mj . Granting access
to the least amount of information protects consumer privacy and decreases the risk
of consumption behaviours being accessed. In contrast, consumers can access their
own daily consumption rates or even single measurements. As previously mentioned,
we adapt an additive homomorphic encryption scheme for daily and monthly mea-
surements aggregation securely in the cloud. Table 5.3 shows how consumption rates
are represented and stored on a daily and monthly basis in the cloud.
A billing management system in the cloud provides billing services for consumers,
which involves calculations of consumption rates and corresponding costs in peak
and o↵-peak periods. Moreover, statistical information, such as daily average usage,
is provided by the billing management system to consumers, which helps them to
rationalise their energy consumption.
Table 5.3: Consumption rates on a daily and monthly basis in encrypted form in the cloud.
Day / Month M1 M2 ... M11 M12
day1 d1 =
P96
i=1mi d1 =
P96
i=1mi d1 =
P96
i=1mi d1 =
P96
i=1mi d1 =
P96
i=1mj
day2 d2 =
P96
i=1mi d2 =
P96
i=1mi d2 =
P96
i=1mi d2 =
P96
i=1mi d2 =
P96
i=1mi
... ⇡ ⇡ ⇡ ⇡ ⇡
... ⇡ ⇡ ⇡ ⇡ ⇡
dayn dn =
P96
i=1mi dn =
P96
i=1mi dn =
P96
i=1mi dn =
P96
i=1mi dn =
P96
i=1mi
Monthly consumption
P
dn
P
dn
P
dn
P
dn
P
dn
Billing management system services have three main functionalities:
5.1.5.1 On-demand consumption measurements retrieval
Individual consumers can retrieve their own consumption measurements upon re-
quest. The billing management system receives consumer requests with an indicator,
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such as consumer-ID, which refers to consumer records in cloud-based storage. Figure
5.4 illustrates an information retrieval process among the di↵erent entities.
Consumer Billing management system Cloud Storage
1 - Send information 
retrieval request and 
include a speci!ic 
interval of the 
requested records.
2 - The requested records 
are retrieved
retrieve (Consumer-ID, Pi)
(Consumption Records)
encrypted
retrieve (Consumer-ID, Pi)
(Consumption Records)
encrypted
Figure 5.4: An overview of an information retrieval process.
5.1.5.2 Regular consumption cost computations
As a part of secure computations in the cloud, we assume that a consumer and the
energy supplier agree on a contract, including pre-defined pricing details such as
supply charge and services and pricing of peak and o↵-peak periods. Accordingly,
pricing details are encrypted under agreed encryption/decryption parameters. This
encrypted information is uploaded to the consumer profile in the cloud to be used
for billing computational purposes. For the sake of clarity, electrical energy is used
to express consumption cost computations in the following equations.
1. The energy Ei in Kilowatt-hours (kWh) is equal to the power pi in kilowatt
(kW) times number of usage hours per day ti :
Ei = pi ⇥ ti (5.5)
2. Subsequently an energy consumption charge equation is applied as follows:
Pricei = Ei ⇥ Ci (5.6)
where Pricei is the energy consumption charge and Ci is a charge per 1 kWh.
For example, let us assume that the power pi is 0.25 kWh with ti = 5 hours
usage per day and energy cost Ci = 17 cents/kWh. Thus, energy consumption
Ei = 0.25⇥ 5 = 1.25 kWh and price Pricei = 1.25⇥ 17 = 21.25 cents per day.
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Since we have di↵erent prices for peak and o↵-peak periods, we rely on the time
period ti of a consumption measurement mi (see Equation 1) to classify and
aggregate all measurements in peak and o↵-peak periods per day. So, we can
calculate the energy consumed in a day, Edi, as follows:
Edi =
(
E(Peak) = pi ⇥ t(Peak) for peak period
E(Off peak) = pi ⇥ t(Off peak) for O↵-peak period
As demonstrated in previous cases, peak and o↵-peak energy consumptions are
aggregated securely in the cloud to represent the total consumption for a day, Edi. It
is important to note that multiplication operations for di↵erent pricing periods c(peak)
and c(off peak) are performed securely in the cloud as well, using homomorphic
encryption. A total charge of Edi can be computed as follows:
Pricetotal =
8>>>><>>>>:
Price(Peak) = E(Peak) ⇥ C(Peak)
for peak period
Price(Off peak) = E(Off peak) ⇥ C(off Peak)
for O↵-peak period
Both energy consumption and pricing computation processes can be performed
on a daily or monthly basis. In the case of a daily calculations, an encrypted data
storage and indexing mechanism should be made to store and keep track of total
consumption and their corresponding charges for monthly billing procedures.
5.1.5.3 Analytical service of consumption rates over the time
The billing management system can perform secure computations to provide statisti-
cal facts about consumption rates of individual consumers. Average usage per day of
a specific period and an overall picture of consumption rates di↵erences in a specific
time (e.g. on a monthly basis) are compared with the same period of previous years.
These statistics are the most common information shown in billing statements. Con-
sumers have on-demand permission to request statistical analysis of a specific period.
A daily average usage can be computed securely as follows:
A daily average usage of a period (P ):
(P ) =
Pn
i=1mi
t
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where the numerator represents all measurements of a period P . The denomi-
nator t represents a total number of days of a period P . For example, if we want
to determine the daily average usage over a period of one month, then t is 28, 30 or
31 depending on the month in a year. As a result, a value of n can be acquired as
follows:
n = t⇥ 96
where 96 is a total number of measurements per day, which is one measurement
every 15 minutes. A consumption rate comparison can be computed by performing
a secure subtraction operation as follows:
The di↵erence in consumption rate (Di) of a period (P ):
Di = Pcurrent   Ppast
Di =
⇢Pn
i=1mi
t
 
current
 
⇢Pn
i=1mi
t
 
past
where Di represents the di↵erence of energy consumption and has two cases -
either a positive result, which indicates a higher current consumption rate compared
with the past, or a negative result, which indicates a lower current consumption rate
compared with the past.
5.1.6 Security analysis
In this section, we analyse the security aspects of our proposed protocol. We focus
on communication security among authorised parties in the architecture and data
privacy in a cloud-based environment.
In the proposed protocol, we assume that Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [36] protocol
is adapted to secure communication channels between di↵erent entities (consumers,
grid operators and cloud-based services) who exchange information. Moreover, the
data privacy is ensured by using homomorphic encryption in both cloud-based stor-
age and during processing while performing services. An encryption mechanism is
installed in smart meters to encrypt data generated every 15 minutes, before it is
sent to cloud computing storage. Moreover, the grid operator has the ability to re-
trieve consumer data though communication with cloud-based services via a secure
communication.
On the other hand, the preservation of private data relies on Domingo-Ferrer’s
scheme, which is work based on homomorphism properties to protect data privacy.
We show the parameter settings for both encryption and decryption processes. The
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encryption process involves four parameters, two of which are public and two of
which are private. The public parameters are d and m: the former represents the
number of splitted parts of a plaintext and the latter is a large integer (⇡ 100200 or
larger). The private parameters are r 2 Zm and m0 that is a small divisor > 1 such
as s = logm0 m. The condition d > 2 or larger must be satisfied to ensure the security
of encrypted data. Table 5 shows the influence of encryption/decryption parameters
choices on the probability of key guessing.
Table 5.4: Examples of encryption/decryption parameter choices (l(x) = dlog10xe).
n s l(m0) l(m0) probability of key guesing
5 6 20 120 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 20
10 11 20 220 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 20
50 51 5 255 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 5
50 53 5 265 ⇡ 1.64⇥ 10 15
The variable n is the number of random revealed pairs of plaintext-ciphertext
by a malicious agent. The value of s should be arbitrarily chosen to be small to
ensure the security of encryption/decryption parameters (even n pairs of plaintext-
ciphertext are leaked). Moreover, the behavior of encryption keys should be taken
into consideration because in Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme, the probability of any two
keys decrypting a random ciphertext to the same plaintext is O((logm)/m). Hence,
the parameter m should be increased to make this probability arbitrarily small. The
security of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme relies on the fact that the subset keys consistent
n revealed pairs is kept large, and the probability of any two keys yielding di↵erent
plaintexts from the same ciphertext is high.
5.1.7 Implementation and performance evaluation
In this section, we describe implementations of the proposed scheme and its opera-
tions. Our code runs on an Intel Core i5 Processor 2.40 GHz and 4 GB RAM and
Matlab simulator is used as a convenient framework. Our implementation has the
following three main processes: (1) An encryption process, which involves generating
random values and transformation to tuples followed by an actual encryption process;
(2) Performing encrypted operations that mainly include addition, subtraction and
multiplication; and (3) A decryption process, which is the final stage after finishing
the computation process.
We complete a performance analysis by identifying the execution time rates for
di↵erent scenarios. In the first scenario, we examined the execution time for an
adapted cryptography algorithm (i.e. Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme) which includes en-
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cryption and decryption processes and operational calculations under various sce-
narios. We assume that only consumption records are encrypted and the consumers’
identification will be used as plaintext indexes. Table 5.5 illustrates approximate
execution times for encryption and decryption processes for a single variable (either
integer or float-point number) and the di↵erent operations between two variables.
All results are shown in units of milliseconds.
Table 5.5: Execution time of encryption / decryption processes and various operations of
Domingo-Ferrer scheme. (unit: Milliseconds)
Encryption ⇡ 9.85⇥ 10 3
Decryption ⇡ 5.02⇥ 10 3
Addition/ ⇡ 9.85⇥ 10 3
Subtraction
Multiplication ⇡ 7.27⇥ 10 3
In the second scenario, we use real collected data to determine how the perfor-
mance of execution time is a↵ected by factors such as size of data and configuration
of cloud-computing architecture. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 shows an example of analysis
collected smart grid data by Sbarker et al. [157] for 400 anonymous homes. We il-
lustrate the execution time of data aggregation and consumption billing for di↵erent
system settings, which includes a number of Virtual Machines (VMs) that are used
in cloud-based architecture (e.g. single VM or multiple VMs) and the number of
houses assigned for each VM. In this scenario, we assume the data is encrypted and
uploaded to cloud-based storage. Moreover, we assume that the electricity usage is
recorded every 15 minutes (i.e. 96 records per day). The aggregation process involves
only an addition operation, while consumption billing process requires multiplication
operation to produce bills for consumers. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 clearly show that the
execution time for aggregation and consumption billing processes decreases and is
directly proportional to an increased in the number of VMs.
Table 5.6: The average execution time of data aggregation for di↵erent setting of both number
of VMs and houses in one day. (unit: Milliseconds)
No.Houses No.Houses No.Houses No.Houses
No.VMs 100 200 300 400
1 104.56 199.12 293.68 388.20
2 52.28 98.61 146.85 196.32
4 26.07 49.90 73.46 97.08
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Table 5.7: The average execution time of consumption billing for di↵erent setting of both
number of VMs and houses in one day. (unit: Milliseconds)
No.Houses No.Houses No.Houses No.Houses
No.VMs 100 200 300 400
1 107.31 201.15 297.03 396.12
2 53.52 100.29 148.18 198.24
4 26.34 50.56 74.09 99.08
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate how the number of VMs a↵ects the performance of
execution time with an increased in the total number of houses. It is an obvious that
the increase in the number of VMs rapidly decreases the aggregation and consumption
billing execution time.
Figure 5.5: The performance of aggregation execution time with di↵erent setting for both
number of houses and VMs.
Figure 5.6: The performance of consumption billing execution time with di↵erent setting for
both number of houses and VMs.
In the third scenario, we demonstrate a realistic example where we apply our
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architecture to cover one of Melbourne’s suburbs. Through observing statistical
information from the Australian Bureau of Statistics [158], we found that the average
number of separate houses in each suburb in Melbourne’s north to be is about 3000
houses (e.g. the suburbs of Pascoe Vale and Fawkner suburbs). We undertook the
experiment for 3000 houses in di↵erent periods: one day, one month, three months,
six months and one year, with multiple VMs to observe the influence of the setting
on the performance of execution time. Table 5.8 shows that the increase of VMs
significantly decreases the performance of execution time for processing thousands
to millions of smart grid readings.
Table 5.8: Execution time of data aggregation for 3000 houses with di↵erent settings of both
number of VMs and periods of collected data. (unit: Milliseconds)
No.VMs Month Six months Year
1 794.3⇥ 102 4705.82⇥ 102 10099.28⇥ 103
2 3971.5⇥ 10 23529.1⇥ 10 50496.4⇥ 102
4 1985.7⇥ 10 11764.5⇥ 10 25248.2⇥ 102
For real world systems, it is well-known that there is a trade-o↵ between security
and e ciency. In our protocol, we adapt a practical homomorphic scheme with
other secure mechanisms to ensure the privacy of consumers data and performance
elasticity of provided services.
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5.2 Real-time secure health surveillance for
smarter health communities
5.2.1 Introduction
A secure pervasive healthcare application utilising wearable sensors, cloud comput-
ing and internet of things (IoT) can expedite the evolvement of future smart com-
munities. The adaptation of secure and e↵ective techniques for early discovery of
life-threatening disease in real-time can minimise the dependency on caregivers and
reduce healthcare cost. The innovation of smart decision-making techniques can
make all the di↵erence through enabling early treatment to get a favourable out-
come for the community residents and saves lives. To achieve such goals, continuous
monitoring of community residents’ vital signs is required, which can be captured
through wearable wireless body sensors. The healthcare providers then can provide
e cient remote healthcare communication for monitoring and diagnosis services to
the residents of smart community.
With the healthcare technology revolution, designing real-time surveillance and
automated predication systems of patients vital signs (e.g. heart rate, blood pres-
sure, body temperature) abnormality is attractive for many applications [159]. Prior
prediction capability of abnormal changes (e.g. increasing or decreasing trends) in
multiple vital signs in a real-time personalised health monitoring application works
as a preventive system which can take early actions and most importantly, save peo-
ple’s lives. This also reduce healthcare expenditures. The predictive analyses over
patients’ historical data using scalable cloud technology can provide more accurate
diagnosis for preventing future abnormalities.
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Figure 5.7: Increasing and decreasing trend observed in di↵erent vital signs - heart rate (HR),
systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic BP (DBP) and mean BP (MBP).
An increment or decrement in single or multiple vital signs indicates clinical
abnormalities and can be responsible for the progression of various diseases. An ex-
ample of abnormal changes in multiple vital signs is shown in Figure 5.7. A rise in
heart rate (HR) is known as tachycardia and a fall is known as bradycardia. In case
of BP rise is called hypertension and fall is named hypotension. For respiratory rate
(RR) rise and fall is known as tachypena and bradypena respectively. Elevation in
body temperature is responsible for fever and decrement causes hypothermia. For
blood glucose (BG) rise and fall is called hyperglycemia and hypoglycemia respec-
tively [160]. Simultaneous occurrence of hypotension, tachycardia, hypothermia can
cause sepsis. Fever is normally accompanied by tachycardia. Therefore, in order
to identify early sign of various clinical deterioration and assess treatment e↵ects,
capturing such abnormal changes are an essential part of patient-care.
In this work, our goal is to develop a secure mathematical prediction model to
detect anomalous changes in multiple vital signs because in such monitoring systems
patients are much conscious about privacy of their physiological data and are re-
luctant to share their personal information until a firm assurance is provided in the
entire methodology. Therefore, developing a prediction model for capturing abnor-
mal changes with the assurance of privacy is the biggest hurdle for such applications.
An overview of our proposed model is presented in Figure 5.8.
Several health surveillance systems has been proposed in literature [161, 159, 162].
However, the privacy and security issue has not been addressed in such systems
though it is a serious concern in case of the patients? sensitive data. Storing, man-
aging and processing massive amounts of patient data is another issue that needs
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Figure 5.8: An overview of privacy-preserving change detection model in cloud-based real-time
personalised monitoring system.
to be highlighted. In this respect, cloud computing can be considered as a conve-
nient platform for digital healthcare ecosystems as it can be easily used to store and
manage massive amount of data. Cloud computing becomes an e cient platform for
di↵erent entities (patients, doctors and HCOs) to have more e↵ective interactions
which in turn is reflected in healthcare environment. HIMSS Analytics’ survey of
cloud computing adoption in HCOs found that 83% of HCOs were using some form
of cloud applications in 2014 [163]. Also, it found that 59% of those surveyed are
plan to adapt cloud-based solutions to their data analysis needs.
However, the cloud computing environment has several obstacles that need to be
addressed due to concerns about protecting confidential data [164]. The cloud-based
applications have di↵erent sensitivity levels to security and privacy issues, Personal
Health Information (PHI) can be considered as one of the highest level of sensitivity
[165]. It is protected by laws and regulations of the U.S.A. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) complies with strict regulations to en-
sure the security and privacy of the PHI and from being misused. Hence, to take
advantage of the cloud computing innovation in the area of healthcare, the security
and privacy restrictions of PHI have to be considered crucial. Broadly speaking, the
health information has to be secured in three main stages: capturing, storing and
processing (analysis). While the first two stages can be secured by using traditional
security mechanisms (e.g. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)), protecting the
data privacy in the stage 3 (analysis) is a challenging issue.
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Motivations
We are motivated by our previous works where we developed cloud-based system to
detect abnormal changes in multiple vital signs of remote monitoring patients [166,
167]. However, we ignored the privacy concerns in those works. Numerous privacy-
preserving approaches have been proposed in literature to preserve the privacy of
PHI. They are either cryptographic-based approaches [168, 169], or noncryptographic-
based approach [170, 171]. These approaches solve secure issues such as authentica-
tion, authorisation, access control and management of encryption/decryption keys of
PHI and ensuring the privacy of PHI while it is outsourced in a Trusted Third Parties
(TTP) (e.g. cloud storage). However, existing privacy-preserving approaches have
unavoidable computations and communications overheads that make them imprac-
tical to be adapted in cloud-based real-time health monitoring systems and perform
health data analysis tasks on encrypted data e ciently [78]. All these limitations
motivated us to develop a secure system to detect future trends in multiple vital
signs using a cloud-based model.
Contributions
The motivations and results of our existing works have encouraged us to develop this
privacy-preserving surveillance and predictive model for smart community to patient-
specific future change detection in health data using cloud computing technology,
exponential smoothing techniques and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). The
contributions of the work are the following.
– We develop a privacy-preserving and cloud-based change detection and ab-
normality prediction framework based on FHE. FHE is an emerging encryp-
tion technique which we first time utilised in such predictive system. We
precisely use Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [35], a FHE
cryptography-based technique that can be used to secure cloud-based data
analysis. Comparing to traditional cryptography, the FHE supports encrypted
computations and end-to-end data security starting from capturing, storing
encrypted data and ending by performing analysis tasks and retrieve the en-
crypted results. FHE can play a critical role to preserve the privacy of users’
data while it is stored in a public cloud and opens the doors to take advantage
of cloud computing innovation in di↵erent fields.
– We develop a secured forecasting technique using Holt’s liner trend method
[172] for predicting abnormal changes in patient’s vital sign by detecting a
trend (increasing or decreasing) which can predict the growth of several chronic
diseases. In our framework, we adapt the BGV scheme to preserve the PHI data
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while they are stored in cloud storage and perform analysis tasks for aggregated
real-time vital signs data. The framework works completely in independent
manner and all analysis tasks computation are carried out on encrypted data.
The analysis results can be retrieved by a data owners though the CSP.
– We implemented a parallel algorithm of Holt’s method to improve the e -
ciency of FHE computations. Our innovative technique significantly reduces
the overhead of encrypted computations.
5.2.2 Related work
The cloud computing platform supports continuous availability for PHI which makes
it preferable to other platforms [173]. Nevertheless, PHIs are exposed to vulnerability
of malicious attacks and possible TTPs abuse. Therefore, security mechanisms, such
as authentication, authorisation, policy integration, access control and cryptography,
have to play a critical role to preserve the privacy of PHIs [174]. Storing massive
volumes of sensitive medical data in TTP cloud-based storage is susceptible to leakage
or loss. worth mentioning that cryptographic techniques are considered to be one of
the most e cient and convenient mechanism to secure cloud-based data. ? Moreover,
they significantly enhance security and privacy of the data, especially in the public
cloud environment.
Our focus is on cryptographic approaches because they o↵er highly accurate
analysis results and support well-known and proven privacy preservation mechanisms.
Cryptographic-based techniques are divided into two categories: Secure Multi-party
Computation (SMC) or Homomorphic Encryption (HE). The SMC technique was
introduced by Yao in 1982 [60]. It allows shared parties to collaborate to compute
a specific function on their encrypted data while ensuring the data privacy of each
party. The SMC has two main approaches: secret sharing, such as [90], and oblivious
transfer, such as [87] and most of SMC applications are based on semi-honest models.
These models assume that adversaries follow the protocol but that they also try to
learn information during communication more than the results of the protocol. The
SMC applications based on malicious adversary models are not suitable for real-time
data analysis applications in their current form.
HE can carry out encrypted-based computations. It has two main categories:
Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE), as in [31], and Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE), as in [22]. Although PHE schemes are e cient, they are impractical
to be adapted in real-world applications due to their lack of the arithmetic oper-
ations capabilities that can be carried in encrypted domain which are essential for
data analysis applications . Moreover, it costs a massive communication overhead
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because data owners and the service provider are required to exchange data several
times to perform computations that can not performed in encrypted domain or even
verification purposes. On the contrary, FHE requires the encrypted data to be sent
only once to the server provider, Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in our case, and all
computations performed securely in encrypted domain without the need to interact
with data owners during analysis tasks. However, due to the large computational
overhead, most of them are still far from being ready to use in practical applica-
tions due to the heavy computational overhead. While recent developments in FHE
schemes [175, 176] have sped up the performance until the development of the ho-
momorphic encryption library (HElib) using the BGV scheme [35], and have made
it possible to build secure applications based on FHE. We take advantage of FHE to
build an independent privacy-preserving healthcare monitoring and prediction model
that can perform encrypted-based analysis tasks and eliminates most of the security
and privacy vulnerabilities of other cryptography techniques.
5.2.3 Privacy-preserving change detection and abnormality
prediction model
In this section, we describe the architecture of our model and illustrate how di↵erent
entities interact in a privacy-preserving manner. We first show an overview of the
system architecture and then describe the security mechanism that is used to protect
the privacy of the raw patient data and during di↵erent processing stages. Then, we
explain how we deploy the change detection and abnormality prediction model.
5.2.3.1 System architecture
The proposed system provides a privacy-preserving cloud-based real-time change
detection and abnormality prediction framework for multiple vital signs of a patient.
The system architecture has three main entities.
– End User (Patient) (EU): Multiple vital signs data of many end users can
be aggregated and sent directly to the cloud-based storage.
– Cloud Storage (CS): It is used to store end user data in encrypted form.
– Cloud-based Monitoring and Prediction Engine (CMPE): It is the core
entity of our framework where the collected encrypted data is processed based
on a mathematical model for detecting abnormal changes in EU’s vital signs.
These entities jointly collaborate to monitor and predict vital signs of each EU.
After EU send the encrypted data to CS, CMPE works in an independent manner
to complete analysis tasks. The EU can retrieve encrypted result though the CS and
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it can be decrypted in a secure manner at EU side. Figure 5.9 illustrates the main
entities of our model and the data workflow between them.
End User(EU)
BodymonitoringsensorsHeart rateBloodPressureTemperature
EncryptedData low
...
Cloud-basedMonitoring andPrediction Engine(CMPE) EncryptedData low
AuthorizedHealthcareProvider (AHP)
Encrypted data issent directly toCloud storage (CS) CMPE works on encrypteddata and mathematicalcomputations areperformed based onhomomorphic encryption
Encrypted data is exchangedbetween CMPE and AHP fornoti ication CMPE and AHP fornoti ication and emergencypurposes
Cloud storage (CS) isused to storeencrypted users' data Cloud storage (CS) isused to storeencrypted users' data
Figure 5.9: System architecture showing di↵erent components of proposed privacy-preserving
change detection and and abnormality prediction model in the cloud.
5.2.3.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
We use FHE as security mechanism in our framework for two main goals. 1) Achieve
end-to-end security which ensure the privacy of patient data while it is stored in a
public cloud storage. 2) Encrypted-based processing which means the monitoring and
prediction mathematical computations are completely preformed while the patient
data is encrypted which, in turn, preserves the data during di↵erent processing stages.
The BGV [35] is a well-known FHE scheme and it is classified as an asymmetric
encryption, the security of which is linked to the di culty of ring-learning with errors
(RLWE) problem[101]. The BGV scheme is a leveled fully homomorphic scheme
that eliminates the expensive re-encryption operation. Therefore, it can evaluate
all circuits homomorphically up to a predefined depth without bootstrapping. The
BGV operates over a polynomial ring A = Z[X]/F (X) where F (X) is a cyclotomic
polynomial. The ciphertext space is polynomials over Aq = A/qA where q is an
integer modulus, the plaintext space is a ring Ap = A/pA for some integers p ⌧ q
and gcd(p, q) = 1. The basic BGV operations can be distributed as follows:
– (pk, sk) BGV.KeyGen (1 , , q). The key generation algorithm has three
inputs: a prime number p that defines the plaintext space, a security parameter
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 , and the depth level of the evaluated arithmetic circuit l. The outputs are a
secret key Sk and a corresponding public key Pk.
– BGV.Encyrption Enc (Pk,m). The encryption algorithm has two inputs:
the public key Pk and the plaintext message m 2 Ap. The output is a ciphter-
text c 2 Aq that is homomorphically encrypted.
– BGV.Decryption Dec (Sk, c). The decryption algorithm has two inputs:
the secret key Sk and the ciphertext message c 2 Aq. The output is a plaintext
m 2 Ap.
The fact that the BGV scheme has homomorphic encryption means that:
m1 op m2 = Dec(Enc(m1) op Enc(m2)) 8m1,m2 2 Ap
where op is an unlimited number of either addition, subtraction or multiplication
operations. The BGV scheme is built in order to provide computationally feasi-
ble implementations in addition to certain convenient routines on top of the basic
arithmetic operations.
5.2.3.3 The change detection model
The real-time monitoring of a vital sign (vi) generates time series data that is rep-
resented as a sequence of observation, such as HR and BP time series data. Figure
5.10 shows an example of HR time series.
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Figure 5.10: Time series graph of heart rate with 1800 observations for a user.
We developed a privacy-preserving forecasting model based on Holt’s liner trend
method [172] that is an extension of simple exponential smoothing technique. Holt’s
method is utilised for time series analysis to forecast future values of vital signs from
the available dataset. This method involves one forecast function and two smoothing
functions (one for the level and one for the trend):
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Table 5.9: Prediction of glucose rates based on Holt’s liner trend method
Glucose rate monitoring period Observed glucose rate Glucose rate smoothing value Trend smoothing value Glucose rate forecast value
(t) (yt) (`t) (bt) (Ft)
1 100 100 0 100
2 104 102 ... ...
3 108 ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
39 224 222 1.0 223
40 226 224 1.5 225.5
Level equation: `t = ↵yt + (1  ↵)(`t 1 + bt 1) (5.7)
Trend equation: bt =  (`t   `t 1) + (1   )bt 1 (5.8)
Forecast equation: Ft+h = `t + hbt (5.9)
where `t denotes an estimate of series level (i.e. any available vital sign data)
at time t, bt denotes an estimate of the trend (slope) of the series at time t, ↵ is
the smoothing parameter for the level, 0  ↵  1 and   is the smoothing parameter
for the trend, 0     1. As with simple exponential smoothing, the level equation
here shows that `t is a weighted average of observation yt and the within-sample
one-step-ahead forecast for time t, here given by `t 1 + bt 1. The trend equation
shows that bt is a weighted average of the estimated trend at time t based on `t `t 1
and bt 1, the previous estimate of the trend.
We illustrate an example of how Holt’s liner trend method works for one vital
sign( Glucose rate series data ) in Table 5.9. For the sake of simplicity, we set the
smoothing parameters ↵ = 0.5 and   = 0.5 to predict future values of the possibility
of increasing and decreasing trends. We can show how di↵erent functions of Holt’s
liner trend method works in encrypted domain by looking at the forecast for period
t = 40 as follows:
E(`40) = E(↵)⌦ E(y40)  (E(1) E(↵))
⌦ (E(`39)  E(b39))
= (E(0.5)⌦ E(226))  (E(1) E(0.5))
⌦ (E(222)  E(1))
= E(113)  (E(0.5)⌦ E(222))
= E(113)  E(111) = E(224)
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And,
E(b40) = E( )⌦ (E(`40) E(`39))  (E(1) E( )
⌦ E(b39)
= E(0.5)⌦ (E(224) E(222))  (E(1)
 E(0.5))⌦ E(1)
= (E(0.5)⌦ E(2))  (E(0.5)⌦ E(1))
= E(1)  E(0.5) = E(1.5)
Finally,
E(F41) = E(`40)  E(h)⌦ E((b40)
= E(`40)  E(h)⌦ E(b40)
= E(224)  E(1)⌦ E(1.5)
= E(224)  E(1.5) = E(225.5)
We use similar approach to predict the trend (increasing and decreasing) in other
vital signs (e.g. blood pressure, body temperature, respiratory rate, blood glucose)
securely by using FHE cryptosystem.
5.2.3.4 Improve e ciency by parallel exponential smoothing
In the standard Holt’s method, we can notice that it is a sequential algorithm. Thus,
it would be di cult to make a parallel version of it since it would seem that calculating
the current forecast value cannot proceed until the previous value has been calculated.
However, if we view the Basic exponential smoothing formula for Holt’s method:
si = ↵xi + (1  ↵) si 1
We notice that it is linear in each of its components. The Holt algorithm is said
to provide exponential smoothing because si ⇡ ↵n. That is, the relationship between
the current value and the value that is n indices before it is exponential in ↵, with
the exponent being n, the di↵erence in the indices. This observation leads to the idea
that if we split up the data set into a set of overlapping subsets, we can compute the
forecast values of each subset in parallel, and then apply some form of ”stitching”
to blend together the values of the overlap region. Thus, if the total number of data
points is P and we split the data into ! subsets, the computation time Tpar will be:
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Tpar =
Tser
!
+ Tstitch
Our goal is to make the stitching time be much less than the sequential compu-
tation time, namely Tstitch ⌧ Tser. In fact, the observation that was made about the
linearity of the equation in each component suggests that a simple linear interpola-
tion within the overlap region may be su cient to realise this parallel form of Holt’s
algorithm. We will now introduce some mathematical formalism to this approach
and then prove that it produces nearly the same results as the completely serial ap-
proach. In this context the phrase ”nearly the same” means that the ”stitch” is a
linear algorithm with a proportionality constant that can be made as small as we
wish. This we can trade o↵ accuracy versus computation time by varying the value
of !.
Let xvaly denote the integer part of the value val. Given a set W we denote the
number of elements of that set to be card(W ). Since the number of subsets is ! we
can write:
P = ! xTser
!
y +  
where   is the remainder of the quotient Tser! . We define L = xTser! y and require L
to be an even number (for a reason that will become clear shortly). We denote the
set of all data values to be X and the set of all forecast values to be S. As a result
of the subdivision process we have immediately that S = S1
S · · ·SS! and observe
that all the subsets except the last have card(Sn) = L, while for the final subset we
must also incorporate the left–over terms, so that card(S!) = L +  .
Write L2 = (L/2) and require that L2 be an integer (which is why we re-
quired that L be even). For a subset Xy = {xm . . . xn} we define the overlap re-
gion with the subsequent subset to be {xm+1+L2 . . . xn+L2}. Thus, for example for
data that is indexed from 1 to 30 we will choose L = 10 and thus have five sub-
sets {1 . . . 10}, {6 . . . 15}{11 . . . 20}{16 . . . 25} and {21 . . . 30}. The number of non–
overlapping subsets is ! = 30/10 = 3 and the number of overlapping subsets is
!   1 = 2. The number of points in the overlap region is L2 = 10/2 = 5 so that, for
example {6 . . . 15} overlaps with {1 . . . 10} at five points (predecessor overlap) and
also overlaps with {11 . . . 20} at five points (successor overlap). By definition X has
! subsets, while X 0 will have 2!   1 subsets, where we define X 0 to be the union of
the non–overlapping subsets and the overlapping subsets.
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Figure 5.11: Structure of parallel computations for a set consisting of 30 observations among
5 virtual machines in cloud computing
We implement Holt’s algorithm on each of the subsets of X 0, in parallel, to
create the forecasted values set S0. It is now necessary to describe the algorithm that
computes S0, and also look at upper bound for the error between S0 and S. Given two
adjacent subsets X 0m and X 0m+1, by construction one of these overlaps the other. We
define the overlap region to be S0m = X 0m
T
X 0m+1. Outside the overlap region we use
the standard Holt’s algorithm, because there is only a single set of data, while within
the overlap region we have two sets of forecast values that must be stitched together.
Using our earlier example {1 . . . 10}, {6 . . . 15} the overlap region is Wi = {6 . . . 10}.
Within this overlap region we have two values for s0i where 6  i  10. One of these
two sets was computed in the node handling {1 . . . 10} while the other was computed
in the node handling {6 . . . 15}. We refer to the former values as stop and the latter
values as sbot. For i 2Wi we perform the linear interpolation as follows:
s0i = 0.5 s
top
i + 0.5 s
bot
i 1
and then use the following conversion to derive the s value from the s0 value:
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si = ↵xi + (1  ↵) s0i 1
Note that if either i or i   1 is not in the overlap interval, we simply use the
previously computed value of s. Thus in our example when we compute s6 we will
use s5 rather than s05 (which does not exist). In this case s5 was computed using
the standard Holt method over the non–overlapping subset {1 . . . 5}. What is the
error in using this form of the parallelized Holt algorithm? From the equation given
above for si we see that the error for the first member of the overlap interval Wi
is proportional to 1   ↵, the error for the second member of the overlap interval is
proportional to (1   ↵)2, and so on. To obtain the total error we sum the series
⌃kj(1   ↵)j f+1), where kj is the proportionality constant for the j–th term, and
where j ranges over Wi, and f is the first index in Wi. Write Ki = max(kj). We can
then bound this sum from above byKi/(1 ↵) since 1 ↵  1.0. For all i we can write
Ki/(1 ↵)  q/(1 ↵), with q an absolute constant. Summing over the entire data
set, the maximum error is bounded by q(! 1)/(1 ↵). We can empirically compute
the value of q and ↵ is fixed by the algorithm. The only adjustable parameter we
have is ! which is the number of non–overlapping subsets. Thus we see that if we
have only 1 subset, the error is zero. This is to be expected since in this case there
are no overlap regions and the computation is completely serial. We can choose !
based on the number of compute nodes we have, and thus can derive an absolute
error bound in that case. Figure 5.11 shows an example of parallel computations
structure for a set consisting of 30 observations among 5 virtual machines.
5.2.4 Experiments and results
To evaluate our privacy-preserving change detection and prediction model using the
cloud we have utilised Google Cloud Platform (GCP). As described previously, we
implemented two encrypted versions of Holt’s liner trend method. The first one is a
sequential version and the second one is a parallel (MapReduce) version. Figure 5.12
shows the forecasting result of six vital signs (heart rate, body temperature, mean,
systolic, and diastolic blood pressure, respiratory rate and blood glucose) using our
encrypted version for a single user. We use 40 periods observed data for each vital
sign (in blue colour) with corresponding 50 forecasting data generated (red colour)
by Holt’s method.
Moreover, Table 5.10 illustrates the performance of our monitoring and predica-
tion model with varying number of collected observations of a single user based on
both sequential and parallel versions. It is obvious that the performance overhead
increases directly proportional to the increase in the size of observations that need to
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Table 5.10: The performance of monitoring and predication model with varying number of
collected observations based on both sequential and parallel versions (unit: seconds).
Number of Average execution Average execution
observation time per observation time per observation
(Sequential version) (Parallel version)
40 4.97 maximum 4 subsets:
1.24
80 6.65 maximum 8 subsets:
0.83
160 7.89 maximum 16 subsets:
0.49
320 8.48 maximum 32 subsets:
0.26
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Figure 5.12: Change detection of di↵erent vital signs values based on our privacy-preserving
monitoring and predication model.
be processed due to the overhead of encrypted computations. Therefore, our parallel
approach shows high performance when we sub-divide the observation processing into
subsets. Another possible solution to enhance the analysis performance is processing
users data in a pool of Virtual Machines (VMs) based on MapReduce model [177]
where each VM process a single user’s data. It can rapidly decrease the encrypted
computation overhead in case of processing large number of users. Figure 5.13 shows
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Figure 5.13: The execution time performance of sequential and parallel versions. The number
of VMs in the parallel version is varying based on the number of patients (Number of patients
equal to the number of VMs).
how we can reduce the processing time of varying number of patients as minimum as
we process a single user data if we take the advantage of unlimited cloud resources
through distribute the users’ data in di↵erent VMs.
5.2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we designed and implemented two innovative privacy-preserving real-
time application models in the cloud based on homomorphic ecnryption. The first
application is a secure billing model for smart grid data in cloud computing. We
adapted a lightweight homomorphic encryption scheme, which can perform various
arithmetic operations to satisfy smart grid billing requirements. The second ap-
plication is a privacy-preserving change detection and abnormality prediction model
based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). We developed a secured forecasting
technique using Holt’s liner trend method for predicting abnormal changes in patient
vital signs by detecting a trend which can predict the growth of several chronic dis-
eases. The framework works completely in independent manner and all analysis
tasks computation are carried out on encrypted data. Finally, we developed a inno-
vative parallel approach of Holt’s method to significantly improve the e ciency of
FHE computations. The experiments evaluation demonstrated the capability of pro-
posed application models in achieving highly satisfactory results in terms of analysis
accuracy and e ciency without any compromise in data privacy.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, we present an overview of the research challenges and questions
examined in this thesis. The achieved research contributions are summarised, along
with the core findings and discussion. Moreover, we highlight the potential pathways
that future research can following on from this thesis work.
6.1 Concluding remarks and discussion
The aim of this research was to develop e cient and secure data analytics for cloud-
enabled frameworks based on homomorphic cryptography. From the outset, we illus-
trated that the major advantage of homomorphic-based cryptography, compared to
traditional cryptosystems, is that data can be processed in encrypted form without
the need to disclose or share data with other parties. This enables users to out-
source their data processing to the cloud and maintain complete control over the
data. Deploying Homomorphic Encryption (HE) to cloud-enabled models can pro-
vide real-time processing for the aggregated data in various domains (e.g. healthcare,
utility and industry) to extract knowledge and support decision-making mechanisms
in a secure manner. Moreover, it eliminates several security and privacy issues for
building reliable and trusted cloud computing applications. First, it avoids the role
of Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) as a Trusted Third Part (TTP), which can lead
to data leakage or misuse. Second, it builds complete secure automated data ana-
lytic models and eliminates communication within data owners or external trusted
parties, which may lead to data interception or theft by external hackers.
In order to make the most of cloud storage and computing capabilities, analytic-
based applications must protect their data both while in the cloud storage and during
data processing. HE provides the ideal solution for such cases where authorised par-
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ties (i.g. data owners) can encrypt the data homomorphically and delegate analytic
tasks processing to cloud servers. In this scenario, data confidentiality is always
protected since the CSP does not have access to plaintext data or even the en-
cryption/decryption credentials. The authorised parties can retrieve data processing
results in encrypted form and can decrypt it on the secure side.
The research presented in this thesis has, therefore, focused on the development
of privacy-preserving analytic models for cloud-enabled applications based on HE. It
has explored di↵erent HE schemes and how they can be developed and adapted to
process large-scale and heterogeneous data. Moreover, this thesis showed how various
data analysis algorithms can be resigned in a distributed manner, in order to process
massive data and overcome the computation overhead resulting from HE operations.
Cloud resources are often utilised for building secure analytic frameworks that involve
heavy computational tasks . The experiments of the proposed models were carried
out in the cloud environment Google Cloud Platform (GCP). The developed privacy-
preserving models preserve high e ciency of both analysis performance and accuracy.
We proposed a set of solutions to address the thesis’ three research questions to
provide e cient and secure cloud-enabled analytic models.
6.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Anomaly Detection in Cloud with
a lightweight Homomorphic Approach
The first research question (RQ - 1) was addressed in Chapter 2. The main objective
of this chapter was the development of a privacy-preserving analytic model based on
the lightweight homomorphic scheme in the cloud. This model avoided the need for
any trusted parties (CSP) to mange and perform analysis tasks for data stored in the
cloud. Although the adapted HE scheme was e cient, it lacked some mathematical
computation capabilities. To overcome such issue, a private cloud entity was deployed
and managed by a user (i.e. data owner) to accomplish the analysis tasks that can
not performed in an encrypted from. The model was evaluated for computation
performance and accuracy e ciency. Overall, this model o↵ers a practical secure data
analytic solution for cloud-enabled applications. The contributions of this research
are summarised as follows:
– We proposed a cloud-based data analytic model for performing anomaly de-
tection for large-scale data in a privacy-preserving manner. Encrypted data
is processed in public cloud servers complemented by a single server owned
privately by data owners (i.e. enterprises ) requiring the analytics service.
– We adapted the lightweight Homomorphic Encryption (HE) cryptosystem called
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme [47] to encrypt all sensed data prior to analysis in the
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cloud. However, due to limitations in the HE cryptosystem, some of the re-
quired computations in the overall anomaly detection scheme needed to be
performed on decrypted data. These operations were performed on the trusted
private server called (privacy manager) while all other operations were per-
formed in the public cloud infrastructure on the encrypted data itself. The
communication between these two entities is encrypted to ensure end-to-end
privacy. There are very few communication costs as the private server is located
in the public data centre itself. The HE cryptosystem was found to be to be
particularly successful in maintaining trade-o↵ between performance e ciency
and computational capabilities when compared to other potential schemes.
– We achieved a high level of accuracy in the analysis tasks while preserving
data privacy during the anomaly detection process. Comparisons for detec-
tion accuracy between plaintext and ciphertext show comparable results, with
an average sensitivity of 95% and an average specificity of 99% and a high
processing e ciency.
6.1.2 Privacy-preserving anomaly detection in the cloud for
quality assured decision-making in smart cities
Regarding the second research question (RQ -2), a fully automated privacy-preserving
analytic framework was built to enabled comprehensive data processing in the cloud
with unlimited computation capabilities, based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) (Chapter 3). The framework eliminates the need for a privacy manager entity,
as was the case in the model presented in Chapter 2. However, FHE cryptosystems
have massive computation overheads that make it impractical to apply to real-world
applications. MapReduce model was deployed to reduce the homomorphic compu-
tation overhead through parallelising analysis tasks with massive cloud computing
resources. The parallelisation approach significantly reduces the homomorphic com-
putation overhead while preserving high levels of analysis tasks accuracy. The specific
contributions of this chapter can be highlighted as follows:
– We developed an innovative privacy-preserving analytic model in cloud com-
puting based anomaly detection in large-scale sensor data for smart cities. The
framework is both scalable and adaptive for dynamic data streams that are gen-
erated in a distributed manner. The sensed data was aggregated over a time
window, encrypted using a fully homomorphic cryptosystem called Brakerski-
Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [89, 67] and sent to the cloud for implementa-
tion of required analytic tasks.
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– A key feature of this model is the use of public cloud computing facilities to
handle all required computations securely without any interaction between TTP
or even the the data owners during the analysis process.
– The BGV scheme supports secure computations over integers only. Our model
overcomes this limitation by introducing a practical solution to represent floating-
point numbers and their computations. This was achieved by adapting the
IEEE standard for floating-point arithmetic (IEEE 754).
– Another important feature of our model is the parallel processing approach
where encrypted computations are distributed among a large number of Virtual
Machines (VMs) based on MapReduce model to overcome involved computa-
tional overheads.
6.1.3 Privacy-preserving distributed analytics based on fully
homomorphic ecnryption in cloud computing
The third research question (RQ -3) was addressed in Chapter 4 where scalable
distributed approaches were developed for e cient data clustering (centroid-based
and distributed-based algorithms) in a secure manner. This approach enables secure
real-time processing for large-scale big data. It overcomes the obstacle of huge ho-
momorphic computation overhead by not only parallelising encrypted computations
over a MapReduce model, but also distributes data into subsets that are processed
independently and then merges the distributed analysis results for each subset as if
they are processed in a centralised approach. The distributed approach is suitable for
various clustering techniques and it can preserve high levels of analysis accuracy and
significantly speeds up analysis performance. The e↵ectiveness of the proposed model
was demonstrated in the GCP through comparative evaluations. The contributions
of this research are summarised as follows:
– We developed a secure and distributed analytic model for both centroid-based
(e.g. Fuzzy c-means clustering) and distributed-based (e.g. Expectation Maxi-
mization (EM)) clustering algorithms with large-scale and heterogeneous data.
A distributed clustering approach that segmented the data onto multiple sub-
sets was used to overcome FHE computational overheads, as compared to a
centralised-based clustering approach. The resulting framework ensures end-
to-end security during the communication between the cloud computing entity
and data owners.
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– A key feature of this model of our distributed analytic model is the scalability
feature, which takes three main factors into consideration: analysis accuracy,
analysis performance (execution time) and used resources (in this case, cloud
resources). These factors o↵er more scalability options and provide users with
more capabilities to apply constraints based on these factors. For example,
users may want to restrict the used resources or place time constraints on
certain analysis tasks.
– The introduced model was demonstrated through detailed comparisons to a
centralised approach, involving multiple datasets and description of encrypted
mathematical computations on data clustering with their implementation within
a public cloud infrastructure. In particular, we highlighted that the distributed
approach has the advantage of speeding up the clustering process, in compari-
son to a centralised approach, while achieving similar levels of accuracy.
6.1.4 Real-time cloud-based application based on
homomorphic encryption
Regarding the fourth research question (RQ -4), we developed practical privacy-
preserving cloud-enabled applications to show the visibility of applying our pro-
posed models in the first and second research questions. In the first application, we
highlighted several security and privacy issues for building smart grid billing cloud-
enabled systems that can aggregate, manage and process consumers’ data by using
the lightweight homomorphic approach. It provides a practical solution that enables
consumers to interact with the cloud to manage their data and allows for smart
grid operators to process consumers’ data without disclosing their smart grid data.
In the second application, we built a secure real-time healthcare surveillance model
for Smarter Health Communities. It supports monitoring and change detection and
abnormality prediction framework based on FHE. This model enables secure data
processing for patient biosignals data in cloud computing. We built a MapReduce
model for the change detection model to increase the e ciency of FHE computations
while preserving highly accurate results. The main contributions of this chapter are:
– Development of a cloud integrated smart grid solution that ensures privacy
of consumer data and implementation of billing/consumption monitoring ser-
vices in the cloud, while ensuring end-to-end communication security among
di↵erent entities. The core of the proposed model is the practical adoption of
a lightweight homomorphic encryption scheme [47] that overcomes the limita-
tions of existing solutions, including the e cient implementation of required
services.
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– Development of a privacy-preserving and cloud-based change detection and
abnormality prediction framework based on FHE. We developed a secure fore-
casting technique using Holt’s liner trend method [172] for predicting abnormal
changes in patient vital signs by detecting a trend (increasing or decreasing)
which can predict the growth of several chronic diseases. In our framework, we
adapted the BGV scheme to preserve the PHI data while in cloud storage and
perform analysis tasks for aggregated real-time vital signs data. The framework
works in a completely independent manner and all analysis computations tasks
computation are carried out on encrypted data.
Overall, the research is significant because it provides a practical privacy-preserving
analytic models for cloud-enabled applications. These models ensure high levels of
security and privacy are preserved when outsourcing users’ sensitive data to the cloud
and avoid the use of trusted parties by automating the analysis tasks via homomor-
phic cryptosystems. Moreover, the secure analytic models achieve similar analysis
results compared with unsecured (plaintext) ones. Massive cloud computing com-
putational and storage resources are used to improve processing time performance
of homomorphic computations. The developed parallelisation (MapReduce model)
and distribution approaches can be applied to various data mining algorithms to
overcome such issues. The distributed approach has a significant impact on building
a secure real-time processing models based on FHE, since it rapidly speeds up the
processing time performance, especially for large-scale data applications.
6.2 Limitations and future work
This thesis has focused on the development of innovative analytic cloud-based models
that can manage and process outsourced data on the cloud, while preserving the
confidentiality of users data. HE cryptosystems are applied to secure data processing
in the cloud as the key solution to overcome the limitations of existing privacy-
preserving models through direct processing of encrypted data on the cloud without
the need to interact with any trusted parties. We also showed the potential of
HE by building practical analytic cloud-based models for smart grid and healthcare
applications based on di↵erent homomorphic cryptosystems. While the proposed
models have been successfully developed with high levels of both performance and
accuracy, there is the potential to improve on the limitations of our models. This
opens up pathways for future research, including:
– In this thesis, we developed privacy-preserving data analytic cloud-based mod-
els that ensure the privacy of outsourced data in the cloud by using homomor-
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phic cryptosystems. Although these cryptosystems are one of the most conve-
nient solutions to protected data stored and processed data in the cloud, they
need capabilities improvement in terms of performing various and more com-
plex arithmetic computations to meet data analysis requirements. Therefore,
we will further work to overcome these limitations by improving the arithmetic
computations capabilities by build comprehensive models that can perform var-
ious analysis tasks independently in the cloud.
– Fully Homomoprhic Encryption (FHE) has proven its substantial influence in
developing several secure cloud-enabled applications proposed in this thesis.
However, the computational performance of such cryptosystem require further
improvement to make them more e cient and scalable, especially in the case
of processing large-scale data with computational intensive data mining algo-
rithm. This is a crucial limitation that must be overcome to develop practical
cloud-based application solutions. Therefore, we will work on further improv-
ing the performance of FHE to make it more practical for complex data mining
algorithms that require massive computations.
– With the exponential growth in massive data generation, we realise the poten-
tial of adapting HE as one of the most suitable security mechanisms to develop
secure data mining models for outsourced data in cloud computing. This allows
us to take advantage of the massive cloud resources to process large-scale and
heterogeneous data and extract meaningful information to support decision-
making in a secure manner. In the future, along with our proposed models, we
intend to explore the applicability of building more advanced privacy-preserving
data mining models that are both e cient and capable of complex mathemat-
ical computations. We believe this combination between cryptographic and
data mining paradigm will be one of the major directions in cloud-enabled
applications level context.
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